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Jleference, Defial)ce, and the_ U§~f.ulA.rts

I came from an administrative law background. I thought the PTO was an
administrative agency. But we don't teview it as if it is. There is no other
administrative agency in the United States that I know of in which the standard
of review over the agency's decisions .gives the appellate court as much power
.over the agency as we have over·the¥l'O.
-Judge S. Jay Plagerl

The court seems inclined to let this matter slide, but I believe the decision .
today upholding jurisdiction puts the issue squarely before us, and the
ramifications of that decision should not go quietly unnoticed. We should not
pretend we are reviewing judicial decisions if they are really nothing more than
policy actions.
-Judge H. Robert Mayefl

One of my main messages to you is that standards of review influence
dispositions in the Federa1 Circuit far more than many advocates realize.

-Judge Paul R. MicheJ3

• This Article was written when I was the Julius Silver Fellow in Law, Science, and
Technology, at Columbia University School of Law and is in partial fulfillment· of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of the Science of Law in the Faculty of Law,
Columbia University. I would like to thank Harold Edgar, Director of the Julius Silver
Program in Law, Science, and Technology at Columbia Law School, for his helpful
comments on an earlier draft of this Article and overall support during my residence at
Columbia Law School. I am also indebted to Richard Pierce, Jr., John Manning, and
Rebecca Eisenberg for their valuable suggestions on an earlier version of this Article as well
as to Walter Gellhorn and Henry Lebowitz for their infinite patience during our
conversations. Lastly, I am grateful to the Julius Silver Program for its generous financial
support.
1 s. Jay Plager, An Interview with arcuit Judges. Jay Plager, 5 J. PROPRIETARYRTs.
2, 5 (1993) (Circuit Judge, Court of Appeals for the Federal ·Circuit).
2 In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Mayer, J., dissenting)
(discussing the standard of review applied to the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences).
3 Paul R. Michel, Advocacy in the Federal Orcuit, C961 ALI-ABA 5, 8 (1994)
(Circuit Judge, Court of Appeals for the Federa1 Circuit). These comments were deliver~
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INTRODUCTION

Ever since the UrJted States Supreme Cou.rt decided crrevron U.S.A. Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 4 a plethora of scholarship has been
published in the area of administrative law, most of which focuses on judicial
review of administrative action.s However, this scholarship has never fully
addressoo the relationship betWeen ilie CoUrt of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit6 and the Patent and Trademark Office (PT0).7 Tnis paucity of attention
as part of a speech sponsored by the AU-ABA and the Intellectual Property law
Association of Chicago.
4 467 u.s. 837 (1984).
5 See, e.g., Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Administrative Law in a Global Era: Progress,
Deregulatory Change, and the Rise of the Administrative Presidency, .73-CoRNELL L. REv.
1101 (1988); Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind Otizens and
the Courts?, 7 YP.lEJ. ON REG. 1 (1990); Stephen Breyer, Judidal Review of Questions of
Law and Policy, 35 ADMIN. L. REv. 363 (1956); Ciark Byse, hdidal Review of
Administrative interpretation of Statutes: An Analysis of Chevron 's Step Two, 2 ADMIN. L.J.
255 (1988); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the
AdmiPJstrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452 (1989); Thomas W. Merrill, TexP.wlism and
the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351 (1994) [hereinafter Merrill,
Textualism]; Thomas W. Merrill, Judidal Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J.
969 (1992) [hereinafter Merrill, Judidal Deference]; Abner J. Iviilcva, How Should the
Courts Treat Administrative Agendes?, 36 AM. U. L. REv. 1 (1986); Richard J. Pierce,
Jr., The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to Cacophony and
Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 749 (1995) [hereinafter Pierce,
New Hypertextualism]; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and Its Aftermath: Judidal Review of
Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1093 (1987) [hereinafter Pierce, Chevron and Its
.;!flennath]; Antonin Scalia, Judidal Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law,
1989 DUKE L.J. 511; Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An
Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 Dmm L.J. 984; Kenneth W. Starr,
Judidal Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 363 (1986); Peter L. Strauss,
One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implicatio!IS of the Supreme Cowt 's Limited
Resources for Judidal Review ofAgency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1093 (1987); Cass R.
Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 CoLUM. L. REv. 2071 (1990}
[hereinafter Sunstein, Law and Administration]; Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in an
Administrative State, 103 HARv. L. REv. 407 (1989) [hereinafter Sunstein, Interpreting
Statutes].
6 In 1982, Congress passed the Federal Courts Improvement Act, which created the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub.
L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982). The Federal Circuit has exclusive appellate jurisdiction
over appeals, relating to patent law, from the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences and
federal district courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (1988).
7 This Article focuses on PTO actions as they pertain to patent law. Therefore, PTO
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may be due in part to the highly specialized character of the patent system and
esoteric nature of its ·rules· and · . regtftations. 8 ·Agencies such as the
Enviromilental Protection Agency, NatioDalT.abor Relations Board, Federal
Trade Commission, and Food and Drug Administration command a more
substantial following among legal academics, 9 possibly because the .respective
enterprises of these agencies pertain to a larger segment of society or involve
politically sensitive subject matter. Although the actions and internal operations
of.theseagencies, as well as others,· ¥e unquestionably"des~ing of scholarly
~ysis, there. are a number of compelling reasons to address how interpretive
power1° should be allocated between the Federal Circuit and the PrO, perhaps
the oldest agency in the American administrative state; 11
actions relating to trademlifk law (e.g., decisions of the Trademark Trial and Appeals
Board) will be discussed only to the extent that they are relevant to my thesis.
8 See, e.g., Herbert C. Wamsley, The Rulemaking Power of the Commissioner of
Patents and Trademarks (Part 1), 64 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 490, 491 (1982) ("Partly because
the PrO was established before the field of general administrative Jaw became established,
and partly because most patent and trademark lawyers are specialists, the PTO often has not
felt the cross-currents arising from administrative law developments."); Wm. Redin
Woodward, A Reconrideration of the Patent System as a Problem of Administrative Law, 55
HARv. L. REv. 950, 950 (1942).
9 For example, I reviewed four-casebooks on Administrative Law, and each one had a
separate heading in its index for the Environmental Protection Agency, National Labor
Relations Board, Food and Drug Administration, and Federal Trade Commission. STEPHEN
G. BREYER & RICHARD B. STEWART, ADMINISTRATNE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY (3d
ed. 1992); CASS ET AL., ADMINISTRATNELAW (2d ed. 1994); WALTER GELLHORN ET AL.,
ADMINISTRATNE LAW (8th ed. 1987); JERRY L. MAsHAW ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAw:
THE AMERICAN PuBLIC SYSTEM (3d ed. 1992). I also read numerous Jaw review articles on
administrative Jaw, and reviewed several more articles focusing particularly on judicial
review. Neither the casebooks, nor the scholarly literature, with few minor exceptions,
address the administrative law aspects of patent Jaw, specifically the relationship between
the Patent and Trademark Office and Federal Circuit, despite the fact that the Federal
Circuit is the busiest circuit court with respect to administrative Jaw caseload. Schuck &
Elliott, supra note 5, at 1018 ("[T]he busiest circuit by far in the most recent period
[1984/85] was the Federal Circuit, whose caseload was 36.4%, three times that of the D.C.
Circuit, and two and a half times that of its closest competitor, the Ninth Circuit.").
10 I use the terms "interpretive power" and "interpretive authority" interchangeably.
These terms are meant to convey not only the authority to interpret regulatory statutes, but
the overall interpretive balance of power between the Federal Circuit and PTO as it pertains
to both legal and factual issues.
11 The first patent statute was enacted in 1790. Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat.
109 (1790). The 1790 Act established a group of executive officers (the Secretary of State,
Secretary of War, and Attorney General) who were authorized to issue patents if the officers
determined that the inventor was the "first and true inventor" and that the invention was

·· ·
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First, technological innovation and its relationship with the law is asserting
itself within our legal culture, and, as a result, the practical importance of
intellectual property law, particularly patent law, is rapidly being recognized
and embraced by society, legislatures, lawyers, and law schoolsP
"sufficiently useful and important." Thomas Jefferson, the first Secretary of State, was
primarily responsible for administering this patent statute. However, it was the 1836 Patent
Act that created tile Phlenf Offic'lnmd vested it with the authority to administer the patent
s-ys>.em. Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117 (1836). Thus, nearly 100 yearn before the
New Deal and the birth of the modern administrative state, the Patent Office was examining
and issuing patents. For a general history of the Patent Office, see P.J. Frederico ed.,
Outline of the History ofthe United States Patent Office, 18 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 1 (1936).
12 See, e.g., D. CmsUM & M. JACOBS, UNDERSTANDING lNTELLECfUAL PROPERTY
LAw§ lA, at 1-2 n.l (1992):
·
J

At no time in history has there been greater public expectation that the science and
technology community will devise solutions to dietary, health, environmental, and other
proble.-ns. It is to this corruTIUiiit"j that the public a.1d public officials look for L1e
prevention or cure of heart disease, cancer, and AIDS, for better biodegradable
materials, for more efficient energy use, etc .
. . . This clamor for new technology comes at a time when there is public
resistance to higher taxes, which are necessru-y to support high levels of governmental
spending on research and development. Universities and private firms must rely
increasingly on private financing for both basic and applied research, which may be
unavailable without the prospect of financial return to which patents can contribute.
Furthermore, Bruce Lehman, Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Commissioner of
the Patent and Trademark Office, has recently asserted that
fp]roperty law has been the very essence of business law for the whole history of
capitalism, but I do not think a lot of people have realized how much property law has
shifted from tangible property to intangible. Now we're in an era in which ... the rules
that define what intellectual property is will be the basis of the economy.

Reinventing the Patent Qffice, NAT'LL.J., Dec. 26, 1994, atClO.
Increasingly, law schools are offering patent law and intellectual property courses.
Institutions like George Mason University School of Law and John Marshall Law School
have specific patent law curricular tracks. George Washington University School of Law,
John Marshall Law School, and Franklin Pierce Law Center are recognized for their
emphasis on intellectual property, specifically patent law. Furthermore, a number of law
schools offer advanced law degrees in fields generally considered to fall under the umbrella
of intellectual property. For example, New York University School of Law, George
Washington University School of Law, University of Houston School of Law, and John
Marshall Law School offer LL.M. degrees in patent law or trade regulation with an
emphasis on patent law. Columbia University School of Law established, in 1985, the Julius
,_t
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Second, much of the economic literature relating to patent law, while
espousing somewhat disparate justifications for the existence of a patent
system, 13 clearly recognizes the patent system's 'rolE~ in encouraging
Silver Program in Law, Science, & Technology.
There are approximately 16 journals, law reviews, or legal publications which pertain
specifically· or reiate in some fashion to law and technology or intellectual property. They
· are: American Intellectffiil Property Law Association Quarterly JoUr.oal; Computer Law
Journal; The COmputer Lawyer; Fordham Entertainment/Media & Intellectual Property
Law Journal; Journal of Intellectual Property; Harvard Journal ofi...aw & Technology; High
Technology Law Journal; IDEA:· The Journal of Law & Technology; Journal of Law &
Technology; The Journal of Proprietary Rights; Journal of the Patent and Trademark Office
Society; RutgerS Computer&·Technology Law·Joumal; ·Santa Clara Computer & High
Technology. Law Journal; SOftware· Law Journal; Temple Environmental & Technology
Journal; and the University ofBaltimore Intellectual PrbpertyJoumal.
13 The most traditional economic theory relating to patent law is the "reward theory,"
which holds that there will be little or no innovative activity in the absence of patent
protection because ideas are easily appropriated once they are made available to the public.
See, e.g., SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE
JUDICIARY CoMMrrrnE; 85TH CONG., 2D SESS., AN EcoNOMIC REviEw OF THE PATEN!'
SYSTEM, STUDY No. 15 (1958) (prepared by Fritz Machlup); Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic
Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in RATE AND DIREcriON OF
INvENTIVE AcnvrrY: EcoNOMIC AND SOCIAL FACI'ORS 609-25 {1962); WILLIAM D.
NORDHAUS, INvENTION, GROWTH, AND WELFARE 70-90 (1969); F.M. ScHERER,
INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND EcoNOMIC PERroRMANCE 379-99 {1970); Richard R.
Nelson, The Economics qfInvention: A Survey ofthe literature, 32 J. Bus. 101 (1959).
Another rationale for otir patent system is the "disclosure theory." This theory holds
that if patents were unavailable, inventors would maintain their inventions in secret in fear
of competitive exploitation. See, e.g., Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Globe Oil and Ref. Co.,
322 U.S. 471, 484 (1944); Martin J. Adelman, Property Rights Theory and Patent-Antitrnst:
The Role q{Compulsory licensing, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 977, 982 (1977). The reward theory
has been criticized for its failure to explain actual patent decisions. For example, there is a
great deal of valuable and costly innovation that does not receive patent protection. In light
of this criticism, alternate economic theories were developed.
Professor Edmund Kitch formulated his "prospect theory," whereby he focused on the
role of patents in post-invention innovation. Kitch emphasized the efficient allocation of
resources thrOugh central coordination of exclusive property rights. See Edmund W. Kitch,
The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & EcoN. 265 (1977).
Professor Mark F. Grady and Jay I. Alexander offered yet another economic theory.
According to Grady and Alexander, the reward and prospect theories do not explain actual
patent decisions and suggest that patent protection is most likely when inventions are of little
value but "signal a large potential for improvement." Patent protection is awarded and its
validity upheld for inventions that fall into this category because the low value and high
improvement potential minimizes rent dissipation in the pre-inventive and post-inventive
stages. That is, due to the minimal value of the invention, there will be a lower probability
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technological innovation, especially in certain industries. 14
Third, the basis of American patent law is firmly embedded in the United
States Constitution. The Constitution expressly authorizes Congress to
"promote the Progress of ... useful Arts;"15 and Congress has done just that
in the form of Title 35 of the United States Code. 16 Viewed in this light, the
proper balance of interpretive authority and sta.-1dards of review relating to our
patent system have constitiltional implications, which, as I will discuss, play a
significant role in the~Fed~~al'C~ircuit's-con~tion of deference. 17
D:l....stly, a..11d most LrnpoJ:ta,qtly, a..11 a..Tlalysis of the appropriate allocation of
of redundant research ·and· development efforts because pioneer inventors will _be
discouraged from· developing low value technology at the pre-inventive stage; and,) at the
post-inventive stage, third-party inventors will be discouraged from engaging in duplicative
research because of the prohibitive nature of the patent scope. See Mark F. Grady & Jay I.
Alexander, PatentLawandRent Dissipation, 78VA. L. REv. 305, ns'"-21 (1992); see also
JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRAc/81-110 (3d ed. 1950)
(Schumpeter;s anaiysis suggests that technoiogical innovation may be promoted by patent
monopolies}. For a general economic overview of our patent system that is currently being
written, see Roberto Mazzoleni & Richard R. Nelson, Economic I11eories About the
Benefits and Costs of Patents (unpublished manuscript on file with author). For a study of
the role of patents in the industrial revolution, see HAROLD I. DUTTON, THE PATENT
SYSTEl\t. AND INVENTIVE ACriVfiT DURING THE ll'IDUSTRIAL P~VOLlJflON 1750-1852 (i984).
14 See, e.g., Edwin Mansfield, Unauthorized Use of Intellectual Property: Effects on
Investment, Technology Transfer, and Innovation, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF lNTELLECfUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 107-45 (Mitchell B. Wallerstein et al.
eds., 1993); Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research
and Development, 3 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON EcoN. AcrJVITY 783-820 (1987); Edwin
Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 1986 MGMT. So. 173-81; Robert
P. Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of Patentability, 7 HIGH 'IECH. L.J. 1, 10-12
nn.30-31 (1992).
15 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, states: "[The Congress shall have the power t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
The framers, employing colonial syntax as one would expect, were respectively
referring to the works of authors and inventors when they used the terms "Science" and
"useful Arts." In the 18th century, the term "Science" meant learning in general or
knowledge in a vast array of disciplines. See Kenneth J. Burchfield, Revisiting the
"Original" Patent Qause: Pseudohistory in Constitutional Construction, 2 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 155 (1989); Edward S. Irons & Mary Helen Sears, The Constitutional Standard of
Invention-The Touchstone of Patent Refonn, 1973 UTAH L. REV. 653; Giles S. Rich,
Prindples of Patentability, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 393, 394-97 (1960); Karl B. Lutz,
Patents and Sdence: A Oari.fication of the Patent Qause of the U.S. Constitution, 18 GEo.
WASH. L. REV. 50 (1949).
16 35 u.s.c. §§ 1-376 (1988).
17 See discussion infra part ll.A.2.

-·i
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interpretive authority between the Federal Circuit and PTO, in the context of
patent law, has never fully been performed. 18 The need to reme<;Iy this
scholarly void assumes a sense of \lrgency in light of the fact that the Pto, a8
of )ate, has displayed an independent temperament, at times to the point of
defiance, 19 and has argued for greater deference with respect to its patentability
decisions and interpretations ofvarious provisions of the patent code (i.e., Title
35).20 When· confronted with a question of law pertaining to patentability on
appeal from the.fTO's Board of]~atent Appeals and .Interferences (BPAI),21 the
18 See generally R. Carl Moy,. Judicial Deference to the PTO ~ Interpretations of the
Patent Law, 14 1. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 406, 409 (1992) (arguing against
deference because "the PTO is outside the class of Fed~ral agencies to whose statutory
interpretations the judiciary owes deference"); Clarence M. Dillow lli, Judicial Review l!f
Patent d.fi;ce Action: A More Rational Review System, 53 I. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 205 (1971).
19 For example, th~ PTO issued a directive to examiners on March 29, 1994,
instructing them •t6 cllsreg~ the Federal Circuit's decision in /n re Baird, 16 F.3d 380
(Fed. Cir. 1994), whe11 assessing prima fu.cie obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103. PTO ffill
Not Follow C4FC Decision on Obviousness ofOlemical Compounds, 41 Pat. Trademark &
Copyright J. (BNA) 500(Apr. 7, 1994). In addition, the PTO refused to follow the Federal
Circuit's interpretation of the sixth paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 set forth in In re Bond,
910 F.2d 831 (Fed. Cir. ~990). PTO Issues Directive to Examiners on Means-Plus-Function
Equivalency, 41Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 411-12 (Mar. 14, 1991). The PTO
followed this directive with a public notice articulating its position. PTO Notice on
Application l!f 35 U.S.C 112 16, 43 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) (Dec. 19,
1991). See discussion infra part ill.B.
20 For cases in which the PTO has argued for greater deference with respect to
patentability determinations, In re Napier, 55 F.3d 610, 614 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Brana
51 F.3d 1560, 1568-69 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re McCarthy, 763 F.2d 411, 412 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (PTO arguing for greater deference with respect to patentability determinations); see
also Hoechst Aktiengesellschaft v. Quigg, 917 F.2d 522 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (mterpretation of
the phrase "regulatory review period" in 35 U.S.C. § 156); Glaxo Operations U.K. Ltd. v.
Quigg, 894 F.2d 392 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (mterpretation of the term "product" in 35 U.S.C.
§ 156); Ethicon v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (mterpretation of the phrase
"special dispatch" in 35 U.S.C. § 305). See discussion infra part ill.B. Furthermore,
Commissioner Bruce Lehman, in an interview with the author, stressed that the PTO should
be given greater deference: "Deference is clearly an issue and there is no doubt where I
stand on it. I have a very strong personal opinion that we [the PTO] should have a much
more deferential standard of review for our cases." Interview with Bruce Lehman,
Commissioner of the PTO, in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 2, 1994).
21 The BPAI is an adjudicative board within the PTO which hears (1) appeals from the
patent examiner's decision refusing to issue a patent on a particular claimed invention; (2)
questions of priority in interference proceedings between two or more inventive entities for
the. same invention; and (3) entitlement proceedings, which are proceedings to determine
whether the inventor or the federal government is the owner of a patent on an invention
developed during work on a space program under the National Aeronautics and Space
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Federal Circuit has resisted applying the Chevron doctrine. 22 Instead', the court
has adopted a highly questionable, if not erroneous, de nov~- standard of
review. With respect to the JPTO Commissioner's statutory interpretations of
the patent code, not directly related tO patentability, the Federal Circuit,
although invoking the Chevron doctrine, employs divergent theories of
statutory construction resulting, ·invariably, in a finding that the statutory
language in question is unambiguous. In essence, the Federal Circuit, in the
context of.patent law, hasceschewectJheChevr.on doctrine, while, at the same
time, applied the doctrine to nonpatent related cases, including an appeal from
the Trademark Trial and Appeals Board.23 Regarding questions of fact, the
Federal Circuit employs a "clearly erroneous" standard of review. This
standard is also troublesome, and like the de novo standard applied to questions
of law, appears to be inconsistent with .Present case law, the Administrative
Procedures Act (APA),24 and underlying policy considerations ..
The question to be asked, is what standard of review ·best serves the
constitutional purpose of promoting the "Progress of [the] useful Arts." My
objective i.n this Article is to demonstrate that the JPTO's patentability
determinations are questions of policy and, therefore, the Federal Circuit's
standards of review, as applied to these determinations, are unsound. 25 With
Administration. J. THOM..AS MCC.A.Rnnr, MCC.A.RTH.-i's DESK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 32 (1991). Of the three listed above, I am concerned only with
appeals from an examiner's rejection because these actions directly relate to patentability.
For a general history of the BPAI, see Michael W. Bloomer, Tne Board of Paient Appeals
and interferences, AM. lNrELL. PROP. L. Ass'N BULL., Dec. 1992, at 188; Paul J.
Federico, The Board of Appeals 1861-1961, 43 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 691 (1961); Paul J.
Federico, Evolution of Patent Office Appeals, 22 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 838 (1940).
22 See discussion infra partJI.A. This Article is not concerned with the appropriateness
of the OJevron decision in and of itself. Given the doctrine, my focus is on the reluctance of
the Federal Circuit to embrace the OJevron doctrine in the context of patent law.
23 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Bell & Howell Document Management Prods. Co., 994
F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1993). The Trademark Trial and Appeals Board (ITAB), like the
BPAI, is an adjudicative body within the PIO. The ITAB hears (1) appeals from the
trademark examiner's decision rejecting an application for a trademark; and (2) decides
inter partes proceedings (i.e., oppositions and cancellations) relating to challenges to
registered trademarks. See MCCARTHY, supra note 21, at 343.
24 5
§§ 551-559, 701-706 (1988).
25 See discussion infra part TI.A.-B. Instead of appealing to the Federal Circuit, a
patent applicant may appeal the BPAI's decision to the District Court for the District of
Columbia. However, this Article focuses only on appeals to the Federal Circuit because
patent applicants, in a vast majority of cases, ta..lce their appeal to the Federal Circuit. This is
not to suggest that appeals to the district court are not worthy of discussion. In fact, just the
opposite is true, especially in light of the fact that a civil action is a de novo proceeding in
that it is not limited to review "on the record,; as is an appeal to the Federal Circuit. See 35
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respect to the Commissioner's statutory interpretations, I intend to demonstrate
that the court's "traditional factors of statutory construction," 26 which are used
in such~·a. way as to avoid deferring to the PTO, result in irrational decisions, or
at the very least, an alternative theory of interpretation no more convincing
than that put forth by the PTO. 27 My principle assertion, grounded in both
doctrine and policy, is that the Federal Circuit's judicial review of the BPAI's
patentability determinations and the Commissioner's statutory interpretations is
paternalistic and results, in a less than optimal balance of interpretive power.
What i ultimately advocate, therefore, is a "paradigm shift" with respect to the
way deference is viewed by the Federal Circuit.
This Article is divided into three main parts. In Part ll, I review the
standards of review employed by the Federal Circuit when reviewing the
decisions of the BPAI. Specifically, I explore the court's treatment of questions
of law and questions of fact. Part ill addresses the Federal Circuit's use of
"traditional tools of statutory construction" as applied to the Commissioner's
sta..tutory interpret..ation..s. Lastly, I discuss the policy concerns as they relate to
the proper balance of interpretive authority. 28

ll. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND THE PrO: A UNIQUE RELATIONSIDP
Traditionally, the standard of review adopted by a court was dictated by
the type of question it was reviewing, that is, a question of law or question of
fact. However, at times, it was very difficult to distinguish law from fact, and
the dichotirnization of such has long plagued and confused courts. 29 Indeed,
U.S.C. §§ 144-145 {1988); see also 3 DoNALDS. CmsUM, PATENTS§ 11.06[3], 11-190 to
11-191 (1994).
26 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843 n.9 (1984).
27 See discussion infra part m.
28 While I am critical of the Federal Circuit's judicial review analysis, it is important to
keep in mind that, as Jerome Frank once stated, "one who calls attention to defects should
not be presumed to be delighting in defects. The physician who publicizes the prevalence of
a dangerous and preventable disease does not desire its perpetuation but its cure." JEROME
FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND XXVll (6th ed. 1970). Indeed, I recognize the
perplexing nature of this area of administrative law. There are no easy answers, for Justices,
judges, and commentators have struggled with scope of review issues for years. I am no
exception.
29 See, e.g., Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288 (1982) (referring to the
"vexing nature of the distinction between questions of fact and questions of law."); see also
Ronald M. Levin, Identifying Questions of Law in Administrative Law, 74 GEO. L.J. 1, 1112 (1985). Among the first commentators to address this issue were Professors Kenneth
Culp Davis and Louis L. Jaffe .. See KENNETH C. DAVlS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE
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law and fact often overlap, forming a third category called mixed questions of
law and fact or law application to fact. 30 In light of this law-fact bluredness,
some .have opined that because questions of law had been generally regarded to
be within the domain of the judiciary, if a court desires to decide an issue or
disagrees with the agency's decision, it would define that issue as one of law.
On the other .hand, if the court wished for the agency to make the decision, the
court would charact~rize. the , issue .~ one of fact. 31 . Despite this potential
confusion-, once a federal appellate eourt ascertained the type of question on
appeal, the applicable standard of review usually reflected the fact that an
agency's decision was being reviewed. That is, the standard of review was
generally more deferential than if a decision of an Article m tribunal were on
appeal. As will be discussed below, the Chevron decision did away with this
ch. 30 (1st ed. 1958); Loms L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION ch.

16 (1965).
30 See, e.g., JAFFE, supra note 29, at 546-47 (toward the center of the law-fact
continuum a "finding of fact [shades] imperceptibly into conciusion of iaw. >;); see also
Campbell v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd., 27 F.3d 1560, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("In cases ...
which fall within the zone of logical overlap, '[t]here [can be] no fixed distinction [between
questions of law and fact] .... The knife of policy alone effects an artificial cleavage at the
point where the court chooses to draw i:he line .... "').
31 See, e.g., JAFFE, supra note 28, at 572:
[W]here the judges are themselves convinced that certain reading, or application, of the
statute is the correct or the only faithful reading or application, they should intervene
and so declare. Where the result of their study leaves them without a definite
preference, they can and often should abstain if the agency's preference is
"reasonable."

/d.; Ernest Gellhom & Glen 0. Robinison, Perspectives on Administrative Law, 75 COLUM.
L. REv. 771,780 (1975); Levin, supra note 29, at 8 n.41; see also William H. Rogers, Jr.,
Judidal Review of Risk .;l.ssessments: The Role of Decision 17leory in Unscrambling the
Benzene Dedsion, 11 ENVrL. L. 301, 302 (1981). The Federal Circuit has also stated:
When law and fact merge, "courts in such situations do not decide to defer because
they have concluded a priori that something is a question of fact, but rather, decide
something is a question of fact because they have concluded it is wise policy to defer ..
. . The mixed question at issue here ... is not sufficiently close to one end of the [lawfact] spectrum or another to permit an easy answer based on logic alone.
Characterization therefore must follow from an a priori decision as to whether deferring
to the [Merit Systems Protection] Board's application ... is sound judicial policy. We
would be Jess than candid to suggest othervtise.

i
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law-fact distinction.
However, with respect to the Federal Circuit's administrative caseload,
specifically decisions of the BPAI, the issue of what is a question of law and
question of fact is still of great relevance and leads to the application of
standards of review less deferential than those applied by other federal circuit
courts.32 Specifically, questions of law and questions of fact are reviewed by
the Federal Circuit under ~c~ .9~ DQV() <m,A-' _clearly erroneous standards,
respectively. In modern administrative law, these standards of review are
rarely, if ever, applied, and it is the Federal Circuit's adoption and use of these
standards, as well as the court's review of the Commissioner's statutory
interpretations, which form the primary thesis of this Article.
_

A. Appeals from the BPAI: Questions ofLaw and De Novo Review
1. The Chevron Dedsion
Prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in Chevron, NLRB v. Hearst
Publications Inc. 33 and Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB34 were generally
considered as representative of the Court's view on deferring to an agency's
statutory interpretation. Hearst is often cited for the proposition of limited
judicial intervention in an agency's statutory interpretation;35 whereas Packard
32 See discu~ion infra part II.A.-B.
33 322
111 (1944).
34 330
485 (1947).
35 The issue in Hearst was whether "newsboys" were "employee[s]" as that term was
used in the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). If they were employees, the newsboys
could organize; if not, however, the newsboys would be "independent contractors." The
Court initially decided de novo the proper legal standard, that is, whether the common law
standard applied in determining whether newsboys were employees. The Court decided that
the common law did not apply because Congress meant for there to be a uniform standard
in this regard. After holding that the common law did not apply, the Court decided that the
term "employee" must be determined. in light of "the history, terms and purpose of the"
NLRA. Until this point, the Court had not mentioned the agency in setting these legal
parameters. However, the Court deferred to the agency in determining whether certain
persons are employees under the NLRA. Hearst, 322 U.S. at 123-30. The Hearst Court
also stated:

u.s.
u.s.

It is not necessary in this case to make a completely definitive limitation around the
term "employee." That task has been assigned primarily to the agency created by
Congress to administer the Act.... Everyday experience in the administration of the
statute gives it familiarity with the circumstances and backgrounds of employment
relationships .... The experience thus acquired must be brought frequently to bear on
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is seen as being at odds with Hearst and supporting a court's independent
review. 36 Thus, for nearly forty years there existed these diverging and, at
the question who is an employee under the Act. Resolving that question, like
determining whether unfair labor practices have been committed, "belongs to the usual
administrative routine" of the Board.

In making that body's determinations as to the facts in these mattern conclusive, if
supported by evidence, Congress entrusted to it primarily tlle decision -w"hether the
evidP.,nce esmblished the IJ1l!!erinl fuct__s. Hence in reviewi_ng !he Board's ultirru!!e
conclusions, it is not the court's function to substitute its own inferences of fact for the
Board's, when the latter have support in the record .... Undoubtedly questions of
statutory interpretation, especially when arising in the first instance in judicial
proceedings, are for the courts to resolve, giving appropriate weight to the judgment of
those whose special duty is to administer the questioned statute . . . . But where the
question is one of specific application of a broad statutory term in a proceeding in which
the agency administering the statute must determine it initially, the reviewing court's
function is limited .... [f]he Board's determination that specified persons a.--e
"employees" under this Act is to be accepted if it has "warrant in the record" and a
reasonable basis in law.

Hearst, 322 U.S. at 130-31 (citations omitted).
The Court seemed to bifurcate (1) pure questions of law like statutory interpretation
and (2) application of law to filet. With respect to the former, the court is to give
"appropriate weight" to the agency if the agency administers the statute. As for (2), the
agency's decision is to be affirmed if there is "warrant in the record and a reasonable basis
in law." See also Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 4D2 (1941) (deferring to the decision of the
National Bituminous Coal Commission that the Seaboard Airline Railway was not a
"producer" under the Bituminous Coal Code and was therefore not exempted from its
provisions). But see Nathaniel L. Nathanson, Administrative Discretion in the Interpretation
of Statutes, 3 VAND. L. REv. 470, 473-75 (1950) (asserting that the broader issue in Gray
was "whether the regulatory provisions of the statute authorizing maximum and minimum
prices could be applied to deliveries of coal which involved no change of ownership.").
36 The issue in Packard, as in Hearst, was the scope of the term "employee" under the
NLRA. However, instead of "newsboys," the question was whether "foremen" were
employees. A more conspicuous contrast with Hearst is that the Packard Court defined the
issue as a "nalced question of law," and although the Court affirmed the Board's decision, it
did not give any weight to the reasoning of the Board. Furthermore, the Packard Court did
not cite Hearst even though the two cases involved seemingly similar issues. Arguably,
Packard involved a "tremendously important" issue having national industrial ramifications.
Thus, perhaps the Court thought it was best to decide independently whether foremen were
employees; whereas ramifications related to whether newsboys were employees were
relatively insubstantial. Nevertheless, it seems umvise to base the scope of deference on the
subjective detenniru!!ion of importance of the issue being decided. It should also be noted
that the Packard Court found the statutory language unambiguous. Therefore, it is uncertain
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times confusing, approaches to deference, 37 which attempted to resolve "one of
the most persistently intriguing puzzles" in administrative law: What is the
proper balance of interpretive power between an agency and a court?38
Chevron addressed this question and sought to relieve the tension associated
with the legacy of Hearst and Packard.
In Orevron, the issue before the Court was the Environmental Protection
Agency~~"~(EPA) definigon of the phrase "statiollllcy sour~" in the .:P:~W.
source review" program established in the 1977 amendments to the Clean' Air'·
Act. 39 The EPA required "nonattainment" states, that is, states that have failed
to reduce air pollution to levels below specific ambient air quality standards, to
establish permit programs "for the construction and operation of new or
whether the Court would have deferred to the agency if the statute was ambiguous.
37 See, e.g., Starr, supra note 5, at 292-93 ("Prior to O!evron, it was difficult to
discern any single standard for judicial review of agency interpretations."); Sunstein, Law
and Administration, supra note 5, at 2082 ("Before 1984 [the year O!evron was decided],
the law . . . reflected a puzzling and relatively ad hoc set of doctrines about when courts
should defer to administrative interpretations of law. j; KENNETH C. DAVIS & RICHARD J.
PIERCE, JR., 1 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3.1, 107-08 (1994) (Prior to O!evron,
"[t]he [Supreme] Court ... substitutes judgment in some cases and uses the reasonableness
test in other cases, without providing any guide as to what actuates its choices .... It has
consistently kept the scope of review unpredictable, and for that reason the volume of
litigation has been large."); see also Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d
35 (2d Cir. 1976), qffd, 432 U.S. 249 (1977), wherein Judge Friendly stated:
We think it is time to recognize . . . that there are two lines of Supreme Court
decisions on this subject [of deference] which are analytically in conflict, with the resuh
that a court of appeals must choose the one it deems more appropriate for the case at
hand. Leading cases support the view that great deference must be given to the
decisions of an administrative agency applying a statute to the facts and that such
decisions can be reversed only if without rational basis . . . . However, there is an
impressive body of law sanctioning free substitution of judicial for administrative
judgm~t when the question involves the mesning of a statutory term.

ld. at 49.
38 See Farina, supra note 5, at 452; see also William S. Jordan ill, Deference
Revisited.· PoUtics as a Detenninant of Deference Doctrine and the End of the Apparent
Chevron Consensus, 68 NFB. L. REv. 454, 458 (1989) (The ultimate question is "[h]ow to
assure agency compliance with the law and protection of individual rights 'without
detracting from the efficiency of the administrative agencies in their legitimate operations in
their legitimate field."' (quoting Dean Pound, Administrative Law and the Courts, 24 B.U.
L. REv. 201, 202 (1944))).
39 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,

840 (1984).
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modified stationary sources" of air pollution. 40
During the Carter Administration, the EPA interpreted "stationary source"
to mean each pollution emitting device within a plant. Thus, if a plant modified
an existin!!: "stationarv., source" or added a new one, it was required
to aonlv
...... .,
for a permit. When the Reagan Administration was electf<..d to office, however,
the JEPA repealed these existing rules and adopted the so-called "bubble"
doctrin~..:Under, the "bubble" approach, .a "stationary source" was defined as
the entire plant, not each pollution emitting device. 41 It became possible for a
plant to add or modify a pollution emitting facility without having to apply for
a permit, as long as there was no net increase in the amount of pollution
emitted from the entire plant. In essence, the plant as a whole was viewed as
being enveloped in a notional bubble.
The D.C. Circuit rejected the "bubble" approach and substituted its own
interpretation, despite the court's recognition that there was an absence of
congressional intent regarding the tenn "stationary source. " 42 However, the
Supreme Court, i.ll'!. a l.!!l.a.nk.o1ous oph!ion, 43 reversed the D, C Circuit L! light
of the ambiguity of the statute at issue and lack of congressional guidance, the
Court thought it unwise that the D.C. Circuit willingly supplanted its
interpretation for that of the agency. 44 As such, the Supreme Court developed a
two-step analytical approach (i.e., the Chevron doctrine) for addressing an
agency's inte1vretation of law:

-

First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the
matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unrunbiguousiy expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines
Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does
not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in
the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is
whether the agency's !mSWer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute. 45

40 ld. at 840 n.l.
41 ld. at 840.

42 Id. at 841.
43 Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor and Marshall did not participate in the Olevron
N2tud

T'c"r'';Coc ]~.ffn.<:e

Cct'TlC'il, Inc., ·170

lJ.~.]

L

11~~.') .

.q C:;arcn, C,{:,j U.S. at 2,.:!2.

•15 Jd. at lj42-A3. With respect to step one, a court is to use «traclition?J tools of
statutory construction" to ascertain whether Congress spoke to the "precise question at
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It is important to note that the Chevron doctrine does not apply to every

governmental agency, but only to agencies charged with administrative
authority. 46
This two-step inquiry47 sent shock waves through the legal community and
has provoked a tremendous· amount of commentary, both criticai48 and
favorable. 49 According to Justice Scalia, "Chevron has proven to be a highly
important decisian·,perhaps·omorer<important in.,the field of administrative law
since Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC'; 5 Kenneth Starr, then
Judge Starr, ha8 referred to Chevron as a "revolutionary" decision;5I
Professors Davis and Pierce have called Chevron "one of the most important
decisions in the history of administrative law. "52
The primary reason for this reaction is that Chevron, read to its fullest,
would dictate that agencies assume the primary responsibility of interpreting
federal statutes when the statutory term at issue is ambiguous or the statute is
silent as to its meaning. The agency would assume the role of that which has
been traditionally reserved for an Article ill court; whereas the court's
interpretive prowess would only come into play when the relevant statutory
term is unambiguous. Because of this shift of interpretive power, Chevron has
been viewed by some as a "counter-Marbury. "53 However, Chevron has
proven to be le.Ss than "revolutionary" in practice and the impending doom or
deliverance, depending on your judicial philosophy, forecasted by many has
not been realized.5 4 Nevertheless, Chevron's impact has been significant, for it
has been cited by the federal appellate and district courts no less than 1600 and
900 times, respectively;55 and the effect of the Chevron doctrine on the issue of
deference has been noteworthy. 56

°

issue." Id. at 842 n.9.
46 Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649 (1990) ("A precondition to
deference under Orevron is a congressional delegation of administrative authority.").
47 The Orevron doctrine has been referred to as the Chevron two-step. See DAVIS &
PIERCE, supra note 37, at 109; Pierce, New Hypertextualism, supra note 5, at 749.
48 Aman, supra note 5, at 1101; Farina, supra note 5, at 452; Mikva, supra note 5, at
1; Sunstein,-Interpreting-Statutes; supra note 5, at 407. ·
49 Pierce;
Hypertextualism, supra note 5, at 749-50; Scalia, supra note 5, at 511;
Starr, supra note 5, at 512.
50 Scalia, supra note 5, at 512.
51 Starr, supra note 5, at 284.
52 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 37, at 110.
53 Sunstein, Law and Administration, supra note 5, at 2075.
54 Merrill, Judidal Deference, supra note 5, at 980-93.
55 These figures were gathered from conducting a Westlaw search. My query was
"467 +2 u.s. +2 837."
56 According to Professors Schuck and Elliott, the affirmance rate of agency decisions

New
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2. The Federal Circuit and the Chevron Doctrine
The impact of Cfu;v,on has been lost on tt'le Federal Circuit as it relates to
the BPAJ!'s patentability determinations;57 whereas just the opposite can be said
about the Federal Circuit's nonpatent administrative caseload. An examination
of the Federal Circuit's post-Chevron ad..rn.i.PJstrative 01..seload in Table 1
illustrates this point. ss
rose from 60.6% in 1975 (prior to Chevron) to 76.6% in 1984-85, the year aff.er CJ>.evron
was decided. Schuck & Elliott, supra note 5, at 1007-09.
57 A patentability determination is an informal adjudication because a hearing is not
statutorily required. A formal adjudication is "required by statute to be determined on the
record after opportunity for an agency hearing." See 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1988). It should be
noted, however, that a patent applicant may request a hearing upon paying a fee. See 35
U.S. C. § 41(a)(6) (i988). The BPAI is required to grant a hearing if such is requested. See
37 C.F.R. § 1.194 (1994). Regardless of the informal nature of a patentability
determination, the PTO, like other agencies involved in informal adjudication, is required to
produce a record of the informal proceeding. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Parle, Inc. v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973). As such, if an applicant
appeals an adverse decision of the BPAI, "the Commissioner shall transmit to the [Federal
Circuit] a certified list of the documents comprising the record in the Patent and Trademark
Office." Furthermore, "the Commissioner shall submit to the [Federal Circuit] in writing
the grounds for the decision of the [PTO], addressing all the issues involved in the appeal."
See 35 U.S.C. § 143 (1988). With respect to an issued patent, the examiner must ensure
that the patent prosecution record is complete and that the reasons for allowing the patent
are "evident from the [prosecution] record." See PATENT AND TRADEMAJUC OFFICE,
MANuAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1302.14 (5th ed. 1983 & Supp. 1989)
[hereinafter M:PEP]. If the examiner determines that the file history is not clear as to the
reasons for allowance, she may, under 37 C.F.R. § 1.109, provide additional reasons for
allowing the patent to issue. The MPEP states:
[W]here the examiner's actions clearly point out the reasons for rejection and the
applicant's response explicitly represents reasons why claims are patentable over the
reference, the reasons for allowance are in all probability evident from the record and
no statement should be necessary. Conversely, where the record is not explicit as to
reasons, but allowance is in order, then ... the examiner [under 37 C.F.R. § 1.109]
should make reasons of record and such reasons should be specific.

M:PEP supra, § 1302.14.
58 Column A reflects those agencies over which the Federal Circuit has appellate
jurisdiction: (1) Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB); (2) International Trade
Commission (ITC); (3) Patent and Trademark Office (BPAIIITAB); (4) Board of Contract
Appeals (BCA); (5) Court of Federal Claims; (6) Court of Veterans Appeals (CVA); and (J)
International Trade Administration (Commerce). The "Commissioner of PrO" reflects the

----·~
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statutory interpretations of the Commissioner, not directly related to patentability, which
were initially appealed to a federal district court. I will discuss these cases in detail in part
ID.B. Column B posed some difficulties. There are some problems in deciding which cases
include a deference issue. For example, as Professor Thomas W. Merrill, to whom I am
indebted for the idea of constructing Table 1 above, points out: "[I]t is commonly perceived
that there are many cases in which the Court substitutes its judgment for that of the agency
and fails even to mention the possibility of deference." See Merrill, Judicial Deference,
supra note 5, at 981 n.51 (although Merrill was referring to the Supreme Court, the same
principle applies to the Federal Circuit). Professor Merrill also states that "[o]n the other
hand, it would be very difficult to determine all the cases involving a question of federal
statutory interpretation." Jd. Therefore, I conducted a Westlaw search and selected only
cases which cited OJevron. This search was conducted on Apri13, 1995~ My search query,
as in the CAFC database, was "DA(aft 10-1-84) and AB(name of agency) and 467 +2 U.S.
+2 837." I realize that I may have missed some deference cases, but my main concern is
with those cases that cited OJevron and applied (or did not apply) the two-step doctrine. In
column C, I included cases which affirmed the agency in its entirety or affirmed the agency
in part (the part being the issue relating to deference), In column D, the criteria I used to
determine if the Federal Circuit applied the OJevron doctrine was whether the court quoted
the two-step doctrine and proceeded to analyze the case within that framework, or
structured its analysis around the doctrine. I did not include decisions that merely cited
OJevron or asserted the proposition that "if an agency administers a statute its decision is
entitled to deference if it is not inconsistent with the plain meaning of the statute." In other
words, there was no analysis within the OJevron framework. This approach does not run
the danger of exaggerating the effect of OJevron and its influence on the Federal Circuit's
administrative caseload. Indeed, there were cases that expressed what could be considered
as reflecting the spirit of OJevron. Lastly, column E reflects cases that found statutory
ambiguity and were decided at step two of OJevron (i.e., a reasonableness determination).
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TABLE 1
FEDERAL CIRCUIT POST-CHEVRON
ADMINISTRATIVE CASELOAD
A
Agenc~,

Name
MSPB
ITC
BPAI
TTAB

BCA
Court of

B

c

Chevron

Agency
Affirinoo

Cited
21
8
0
2
3
18

2
1
13

5

4

11

9
0

PTO

Doctrine
Applied
3

12

6
0

,~;:~
CVA
Commerce
Comm'rof

D
Chevron

I

Decision
. . Based on
Step 2
3

4

2

0
1
1
7

0

I
3

E

1
1

6

I

I
2
3
3

0
3
0

I do not mean to suggest that Chevron has had a "revolutionary" impact on
the Federal Circuit's administrative caseload; nor am I asserting that the court
has consistently applied Chevron to non-patent related cases. Rather, my point
is that a panel majority has not only cited Chevron, but has applied it to every
adjudicative body except the BPAI, 59 including the: (1) International Trade
Commission;6° (2) Merit Systems Protection Board; 61 (3) Court of Federal
59 Although the Federal Circuit has applied the OJevron doctrine to the 1TAB and the

statutory interpretations of the Commissioner, the court has never applied the doctrine to a
patentability determination of the BPAI. Moreover, Otevron has been cited only in a
dissenting opinion. See In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1577 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Mayer, J.,
dissenting).
60 See, e.g., Texas Crushed Stone Co. v. United States, 35 F.3d 1535, 1540 (Fed. Cir.
1994) (applying O!evron doctrine); Tell"" Tn,;:truments Inc. v. United States Int'! Trade
Comm'n, 988 F.2d 1165, 1180 (Fed. Cir. 1993), dismissed, 1994 WL 745517 (Fed. Cir.
1994) (same); Chaparral Steel Co. v. UnitedStates, 901 F.2d 1097, 1101 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(same); Lannom Mfg. Co. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 799 F.2d 1572, 1579-80
(Fed. Cir. 1986) (same); Springfield Indus. Corp. v. United States, 842 F.2d 1284, 128586 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (same); see also Avesta AB v. United States, 914 F.2d 233, 236-38
(Fed. Cir. 1990), cerl. denied, 499 U.S. 920 (1991); Borlem SA Empreedimentos
Industriais v. United States, 913 F.2d 933 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Corning Glass Works v. United
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Claims;62 (4) Board of Contract Appeals;63 (5) Court of Veterans Appeals; 64
and (6) Secretary of Commerce (i.e., International Trade Administration). 65
What is most telling, however, is that the Federal Circuit, in Eastman Kodak v.
Bell Document Management Products Company, 66 applied the Ch...P\!Ton
doctrine to an appeal from the Trademark Trial and Appeals Board, a close
relative of the BPAI.
' · "' 'In EaStman Kodak; ·Bell & Howell (B & H) filed'"an intent.,to-use trademark .
application under 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b) in an attempt to register the numbers
States Int'l Trade Comm 'n, 799 F.2d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1986); American Lamb Co. v. United
States, 785 F.2d 994, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
61 See, e.g., Vesser v. Office of Personnel Management, 29 F.3d 600, 604 (Fed. Cir.
1994) (applying O!evron doctrine); Wassenaar v. Office of Personnel Management, 21
F.3d 1090, 1095 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (same); see also Osbiver ex rei. Osbiver v. Office of
Personnel Management, 896 F.2d 540, 541 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Money v. Office of Personnel
Management, 811 F.2d 1474 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Morgan v. Office of Personnel
Management, 773 F.2d 282 (Fed. Cir. 1985). In determining the validity of an
administrative regulation, the court stated in Morgan that
[a]s long as the regulation reasonably implements the purpose of the legislation and
is not inconsistent with any constitutional or specific statutory provision, we have no
basis on which to overturn it .... We cannot substitute our judgment for that of the
agency with respect to the determination of which requirement will best serve the
statutory purpose.

ld. at 287.
62 See, e.g., Chacon v. United States, 48 F.3d 508 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("When we
consider the merits of a party's challenge to an agency's interpretation of a statute it has
been charged with administering, we take our analytic framework from the Supreme
Court's decision in Olevron .... "); DeCosta v. United States, 987 F.2d 1556, 1558-59
(Fed. Cir. 1993) (applying Chevron doctrine); Essex Electro Engineers, Inc. v. United
States, 960 F.2d 1576, 1580 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 408 (1992) (same); Collins
v. United States, 946 F.2d 864, 868-69 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (same); Pine Products Corp. v.
United States, 945 F.2d 1555, 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (same); New York Guardian
Mortgagee Corp: v. United States, 916 F.2d 1558, 1559..:c6Q (Fed;· Cir; 1990) (same).
63 See, e.g., United States v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 927 F.2d 575, 578 (Fed.
Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 919 (1991) (applying Chevron doctrine).
64 See, e.g., Skinner v. Brown, 27 F.3d 1571, 1572-73 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (applying
O!evron doctrine); Gardner v. Brown, 5 F.3d 1456, 1458 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (same), ajf'd,
115 S. Ct. 552 (1994).
65 See, e.g., Koyo Seiko Co. v. United States, 36 F.3d 1565, 1570-71 (Fed. Cir.
1994) ("Our review •.. is guided, however, by the Supreme Court's decision in Chevron .
. . . "); Suramerica de Aleaciones I.aminades, C.A. v. United States, 966 F.2d 660, 665
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (applying Chevron doctrine).
66 994 F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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"6200," "6800," and "8100. " 67 The examiner approved the applications for
publication in the principal register. Upon their publication, Eastman Kodak
filed an opposition to these marks stating that they were "merely descriptive,"
a.'ld should not be registered. 63 Under the La.'lha.T. Act,69 which goverr..s the
federal registration of trademarks, § 1051(b) precludes registration of a mark if
it "oo!l..sists of a mark which ... when used on or in connection with the goods
of the applicant is ':merely descr~ptive ..• of them." The examiner, in ruling
for B & H, asserted that the numerical marks were not "merely descriptive. "70
Kodak appealed u'1e exarniner's decision to u'1e Trademark Trial ru!d Appeals
Board (ITAB). After the ITAB affirmed the examiner, Kodak appealed to the
Federal Circuit.7 1 According to the Federal Circuit, "[t]he statute on its face
neither requires nor precludes the Board's interpretation. "72 fu other words, the
statutory provision (i.e., "merely descriptive") was ambiguous. Instead of
reviewing the applicable law de novo, the Federal Circuit applied the "Chevron
doctrine," deferred to the TTAB, and held that the Board's decision was
"reasonable" under step two of Ou:vron.7 3
Thus, the Federal Circuit has ushered Ch.evron into t.he realm of trademark
law _74 But instead of following this approach and applying the Chevron
doctrine when reviewing questions of patentability arising from the informal
adjudications of the BPAJ, 75 the Federal Circuit has adopted a de novo
67 ld.
63 !d. An "opposition" is a proceeding before the ITAB whereby a person who
believes she will be injured by the federal registration of a trademark can oppose the
registration. 15 U.S.C. § 1063 (1988).
69 15 u.s.c. §§ 1051-1178 (1988).
70 Eastman Kofklk, 994 F.2d at 1570.
71 !d. at 1570-71.
72 !d. at 1572.
73 !d. at 1571-73. Keep in mind that this was a trademark case. The degree of
expertise needed to determine whether a mark is "tradernarkable" does not approach that
which is necessary in examining complex inventions for patentability purposes. I will
discuss the "expertise" of the patent examiners and the BPAI in part N .C, infra.
74 This is particularly relevant because the Commissioner of the PrO derives his
congressionally delegated authority to grant and issue patents and trademarks from the same
statutory source. See 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (1988). I discuss the statutory delegation provisions
of the BPAI and ITAB in part ll.A.3.b., infra.
75 It is important to note that although 01evron was a rulemaking case, it is well
established that the Chevron doctrine applies to adjudications. See, e.g., NLRB v. United
Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 1987, 484 U.S. 112, 123 (1987); Fall River
Dyeing and Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 42-43 (1987); Kohler Co. v. Moen
Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 633-34 (7th Cir. 1993) (applying Chevron to a Trademark Trial and
Appeals Board adjudication); Eastman Korlak Co. v. Bell & Howell Document
Management Prorls. Co., 994 F.2d 1569, 1571-72 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (applying Chevron to
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standard of review; 76 despite the fact that the use of de novo review by federal
appellate courts is extremely rare and "is reserved for extraordinary cases. "77
The de novo standard was first enunciated in 1990 by the Federal Circuit

Trademark Trial. and Appe$ Board adjudication); Midtec Paper Corp. v. United States,
•'
l.~f.~~.: ··~··'),.
·:~·· ,. ,.;:; ......... ~:":?.~:;.
- ···-· - ':.._
. ...,_~ ';'" -~'"'··
- --~ .
.
857 F.2d 14&7, 14~97 (D;C~ Cir. 1988); National Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. F;E.R.C., ·
811 F.2d 1563, 1569-70 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 869 (1987); BERNARD
ScHwARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW§ 10.35, 703-05 (1994).
76 See, e.g., In re Epstein, 32 F.3d 1559, 1567-68 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (applying de novo
review to the "on-sale" bar and "public use" bar}; In re Lowry, 32 F.3d 1579, 1582 (Fed.
Cir. 1994) ("This court reviews the Board's determination of obviousness de novo."); In re
Harvey, 12 F.3d 1061, 1063 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("Obviousness is a question of law which we
review de novo. j; Avia Group Int'l, Inc. v. L.A. Gear California, Inc. 853 F.2d 1557,
1561-62 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (patent validity is a question of law); Paperless Accounting, Inc.
v. Bay Area Rapid Transit System, 804 F.2d 659, 664 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480
U.S. 933 (1987) (whether the specification is enabling is a question oflaw to be reviewed de
novo).
77 ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYI'ON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 459 (1993);
See also 2 KENNETH C. DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE
174 (1994); Citizens To Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971)
(De novo review is to be applied in only two circumstances: (1) "when the action is
adjudicatory in nature and the agency factfinding procedures are inadequate" and (2) "when
issues that were not before the agency are raised in a proceeding to enforce nonadjudicatory
agency action."); Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 141 (1973) ("It is quite plain from our
decision in Qtizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Vope, that de novo review is appropriate
only where there are inadequate factfinding procedures in an adjudicatory proceeding, or
where judicial proceedings are brought to enforce certain administrative actions.") (citation
omitted). It should also be noted that de novo review may be guaranteed by statute, but such
a provision does not exist in Title 35.
To my knowledge, the administrative courts of Germany are the only tribunals in an
industrialized country to employ de novo review of legal determinations of an agency. See
MAHENDRA P. SINGH, GERMAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN CoMMoN LAw PERsPECTIVE 65
(1985) (The administrative law courts "[c]an go into all questions of legality whether
apparent on the· face of the record or hidden in or behind it and can also replace the
administrative determination by their own;"). Singh cites § 113(2) cl.3 of the Law on
Administrative Courts, which states that an administrative law court "may also order the
gr<>...nt of a benefit in addition to invalidation of an administrative action. For example, if
denial of licence by an administrative authority is found to be wrong by the court, it may
not only invalidate the order of denial, but also order that licence be granted." In the United
States, there was an attempt, in 1975, to codizy de novo review of agency questions of law.
Senator Dale Bumpers of Arkansas, in an attempt to encourage courts to play a more active
role in reviewing agency decisions, introduced a bill, which was ultimately defeated, to
amend § 706 of the APA requiring courts to review all questions of law "de novo" and
"independently."
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in In re Kulling, 73 and since its adoption, the court has failed. to explain.,
analyze, or define exactly what it means by de novo review. One could assume
that de novo implies independent review, and there is federal Circuit support
for t~is asswTJption. 79 However, if this is correct a.."ld it cer*ulli"'lly appears to be,
73 897 F.2d 1147 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
79 In a 1979.opinion ofthe..Court ofCust()ms•:.!lJld Patent.Appeals, a predecessor to the
Federal Circuit, the court stated:
[O]bviousness is a legal conclusion based on factual evidence, . ·. . and not a
factual determination. Therefore, the proper issue before us is whether the board
[BPAI] erred, as a matter of law, in holding that the claims were properly n:jected
under 35 U.S.C. § 103. In deciding this issue, the court will make "an independent
determination as to the legal conclusions and inferences which should be drawn from ..
. [the findings of fact]."

In re Carleton, 599 F.2d 1021, 1024 n.14 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (citations omitted).
See also G-ardner v. Tee Sys., Inc., 725 F.2d 1338, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 1984), ce/1.
denied, 469 U.S. 830 (1984) ("A conclusion on obviousness is one of law and subject to full
and independent review in this court."), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 830 (1984); In re Vaeck,
947 F.2d 488, 493 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("Obviousness is a legal question which this court
independently reviews .... "). However, Judge IVfichel, in a recent speech, put somewhat
of a different spin on this interpretation of de novo:
For issues catego~ by precedent as issue of law, our revie-vv is termed "de
novo." An example is in-validity for obviousness. However, since we do nothing truly
"anew," this standard is better expressed as "simple error" or "free review," i.e.,
neither mandatory nor fixed deference. Now that does not mean no deference can or
will be afforded in a particular case, but only that we are free to deny or limit deference
according to the specifics of the case. Only where the issue is one of pure law, ll!l
statutory construction usually is, is our review truly independent. Then there is little or
no deference to the court or Board being reviewed.
Michel, supra note 3, at 9.
What exactly does Judge Michel mean when he says that the court is "free to deny or
limit deference according to the specifics of the case?" What are these specifics? Perhaps de
novo review can mean whatever the Federal Circuit wants it to mean. More likely,
however, de novo review as applied by the Federal Circuit is in accord with Professor

Farina's definition:
The term 'de novo' is not meant to suggest that the court will necessarily try the
case afresh. Indeed, in many instances, the case will proceed on a record compiled
before the agency. Rather, the decision is de novo in the same sense that we speak of
an appellate court reviewing, de novo, a trial court's conclusions of law: the court will
reach its own independent conclusion on the record before it.
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the Federal Circuit's analytical framework for reviewing questions of law is in
direct contravention of the Chevron doctrine. 80
The Federal Circuit's view on the deference doctrine generally and the
court's apparent disregard for Chevron specifically can be illustrated by
examining how the court approaches a nonobviousness determination. 81
According to the Federal Circuit, although a nonobviousness determination
entails a number of antecedent factua4consideratio~::w.hich are re.v:i~waLunder
the "clearly erroneous" standard, 82 the ultimate question of nonobviousness is
one of law to be reviewed de novo. 83 I choose nonobviousness because it is the
Farina, supra noteS, at 453 n.7.
See 35 U.S.C. § 144 (1988) ("The [Federal Circuit] shall review the decision [of the
BPAI] on the record before the Patent and Trademark Office.").
80 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
81 The statutory basis for a nonobviousness determination is embodied in 35 U.S.C. §
103:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or
descnbed as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole
would have been obvious at the time the invention was made by a person having
ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.
35

u.s.c. § 103 (1988).

Even if an invention is novel and has utility it may nevertheless be unpatentable if it
discloses and claims a trivial advancement in the art; in other words, if it is obvious. The
nonobviousness requirement assures that the inventor contributes something to society
before she is granted a 17 year exclusive right to exclude others from making, selling, or
usirig her invention. It wasn't until 1850 that nonobviousness became a requirement for
patentabilitY. In the Supreme Court case of Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.)
248 (1850), the Court rejected a patent because itlacked the "degree of skill and ingenuity
which constitute essential elements of every invention." /d. . at 266. This notion of
"invention" or "inventiveness" became an additional requirement for patentability, but it
was a vague concept, easily manipulated by a court. This led to a lack of unifonnity in its
application. Therefore, in 1952, Congress created-§ 103, above, in an-attempt to . lend
structure and coherency to what became known as the nonobviousness requirement. In
1966, the Supreme Court recognized that§ 103 was a "codification" of Hotchkiss. Graham
v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
82 See irifra part ll.B. for a discussion on the Federal Circuit's review of questions of
fact.
83 See supra note 76 for cases holding that a nonobviousness determination is a
question of law. The legislative requirement for nonobviousness was reiterated by the
Federal Circuit in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966) The factual
determinations include the (1) scope and content of the prior art; (2) differences between the
prior art and the claims at issue; (3) level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and (4) the
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most litigated issue relating to patent validity34 and, arguably, the most
important patentability requirement. In fact, some commentators have called it
the "ultimate condition of patentability" 35 and the "final gatekeeper of the
patent system. " 36 11. 1985, one year cu.4:er Chevron was decided, the PTO, in an
appeal from a BPAJ! decision rejecting a claimed invention as obvious, argued
that the Federal Circuit should grant the BPAJ! greater deference. The Federal
-Circuit was less than receptive:
. ·
The Commissioner, through the Solicitor, raises the threshold question of the
sc...ope of appellate review. The Commissioner urges the novel position that this
court's role, in fulfillment of the mandate of 35 U.S. C. §§ 141-144, is limited
to an inquiry as to this appeal, the Commissioner states "[t]here is a mtiorud
basis for the Board decision. Consequently, there would not be reversible error
therein."
... We have articulated, on occasion, the standard by which we review a
Board determination that a claimed invention would have been obvious under
35 U.S.C. § 103. Obviou...c:ness is a conclusion of law. It is our responsibility,
as for all appellate courts, to apply the law correctiy; without deference to
Board determinations, which may be in error even if there is a rational basis
therefor. 37

so-called "objective" indicia like commercial success and long felt need.) After these factual
determinations are made, the question becomes would the claimed invention have been
obvious to a person having ordinary s..lcill in the art at the time the invention was made. This
latter inquiry is, according to the Federal Circuit, a question of law. See CHISUM & JACOBS,
supra note 12, at 2-58 (The Graham opinion "for the most part, merely restates the
language of Section 103. ");see also Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg., 310 F.2d 1561, 1566
(Fed. Cir.), cel1. denied, 481 U.S. 1052 (1987). The Federal Circuit's characterization of
nonobviousness as ultimately a que.,'tion of law is in and of itself somewhat troublesome. In
fact, a nonobviousness determination is actually a mixed question of law and fact; or, as
some have argued, a question of fact. See Jens H. Hillen, Note, The Coul1 of Appeals for
the Federal Qrcuit: irzdependent Review of Patent Dedsions and the Constitutional Facts
Doctrine, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 187 (1993); Bradley G. Lance, Note, A Proposal to View
Patent Oaim No110bviousness from the Policy Perspective of Federal Rule of Ovil
Procedure 52(a), U. MICH. J.L. REP. 1157, 1200 (1987). However, it is not my intention to
challenge the Federal Circuit's characterization of nonobviousness as ultimately a question
of law based on underlying fu.ctse P~ther 1 assuming such is true, I am more concerned with
the applicable standard of review.
84 See CHISUM, supra note 25, at 11-102.
85 See NONOBVIOUSNESS-TH:E ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY (John F.
Witherspoon ed., 1980).
36 See RoBERTP. MERGES, PATENT LAW AND POLICY 379 (1992).
!!7 In re McCarthy, 763 F.2d 411, 412 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (emphasis added). Most
recently, the PTO has argued for greater deference in in re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir.
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Given the fact that the statutory term "obvious," as I will discuss below, is
an ambiguous and undefined term, 88 the court's appellate review framework is
exactly what Otevron so strongly denounced. As a recent empirical study
demonstrates, this lack of deference is reflected in the BPAI' s affirmance rate
with respect to decisions based on § 103 (i.e., nonobviousness). 89 This study
found that 35 U.S.C. § 103 issues on appeal from the BPAI were affirmed
-79% ·of"'the time; 90 Initially, one may presume,"'as does..fuis,swdy, that a 19·.%,,
affirmance rate is high. What this means, however, is that roughly one in every
five § 103 appeals from the BPAI is either reversed or vacated. When
compared to the Federal Circuit's 95% and 91% affirmance rates of MSPB and
ITC decisions, respectively,9 1 the 79% affirmance rate does not appear so
deferential. This is especially true given the highly technical nature of the
patentability determination.
Although correlation is not causation, it is at least plausible, if not
probable, that the Federal Circuit's de novo review of the BPAI's
nonobviousness determinations is a strong factor in the court's 79% affirmance
rate. Because nonobviousness is an extremely important, if not the most
important, requirement in a patentability determination, this low affirmance rate
is troublesome in that it suggests that the court is supplanting its interpretation
of the nonobviousness requirement in place of the BPAI's. Furthermore, the
court's use of de novo review calls into question the very existence of the PTO
as an administrative agency, and compels us to focus on the Federal Circuit's
reasoning behind its "checkerboard" deference policy. 92 Why is the Federal
Circuit so resolute in its application of de novo review to questions of law on
appeal from the BPAI, especially § 103 nonobviousness determinations?
Another way of asking the same question is why is the Federal Circuit reluctant
to apply the Chevron doctrine to questions of law on appeal from the BPAI, yet ·
is willing to apply the doctrine to non-patent related cases? I believe there are
primarily three answers to these questions, which are also challenges to my
thesis.
1995), and In re Napier, 55 F. 3d 610 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
8 8 See infra notes 154-57.
89 Donald R. Dunner et al., A Statistical Look at the Federal arcuit's Patent
Decisions: 1982-1994, 5 FED. CmcurrB.J. 151 (1995).
90 ld. at 163.
9l ANN. REP. OF THE DIRECfOR OF THE ADM. OFF. {1983-94). It should be noted that
while the Annual Report is not broken down issue by issue (i.e., § 102 or § 103), the
affirmance rate was roughly 80%, almost the same as that put forth by Dunner et al., supra
note 89. ·
92 I use the term "checkerboard" to mean an inconsistent application of a particular
rule or principle to similar situations justified on policy considerations. See RoNALD
DwORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 178-84,217-18 (1986).
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3. A Look Behind De Novo Review: Some Answer.s and Challenges
a. 111e "Uniformity" and "Specializalion" Challenge
·- ·

This challenge asserts that the characterization of patent validity as a
questionlaw, to be reviewed under the de novo standard;· promotes
uniformity in the application of our patent laws,93 and Congress created the
Federal Circuit for this very purpose.9 4 Therefore, if the PrO were granted
greater deference, the Federal Circuit's review of the patentabilit-y
requirements, as initially interpreted by the PrO, would differ depending upon
whether the appeal was from the BPAI or a federal district court. This would
lead to one set of validity standards for the BPAI and another for federal
district courts. For example, this argument asserts that under my proposal, the
BPAI, in affirming an examiner's rejection, may interpret an ambiguous
statutory tenn and that interpret..ation will be given Chevron deference by th.e
Federal Circuit. Assuming the interpretation is reasonabie, the BPAI will be
affirmed. On the other hand, with respect to an issued patent, that same
interpretation, reviewed de novo, may be overruled by the Federal Circuit,
even though reasonable, because the court does not agree with the examiner's
interpretation.
The answer to this dilemma is for the Federal Circuit to provide, as it now
does, the same degree of deference to the PTO, whether the appeal is from the
BPAI (rejected claimed inventions) or a federal district court (issued patents).
However, the degree of deference presently accorded to the PTO and district
courts, although the same, does not necessarily result in an optimal balance of
interpretive power. That is, although the same degree of deference shouid be
accorded by the Federal Circuit, the degree accorded should foster an optimal
balance of interpretive authority. As long as the same degree of deference is
applied to PTO patentability decisions, stability and uniformity will not be
threatened.
Another aspect of this challenge suggests that the Federal Circuit is a
specialized court with the necessary expertise to handle patent cases. Yet a
majority of the judges on the Federal Circuit possesed little if any prior patent
experience before coming to the bench. Furthermore, the legislative history

of

93 See Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg., 810 F.2d 1561, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ("One
effect of considering the § 103 question one of law in this court is to fucilitate a consistent
application of that statute in the courts and in the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). "),
cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1052 (1987).
94 See H.R. REP. No. 312, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 20-23 (1981); S. REP. No. 275, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. 4-6 (1981).
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makes it clear that it was not the intention of Congress to make the Federal
Circuit a "specialized court. "95
In addition, the creation of the Federal Circuit was prompted by a postissuance phenomenon. The lack of uniformity in the application of the patent
laws was due· to the disparities extant in the regional circuit courts, not the
PrO. A patent issued by the PrO may have been declared invalid in one
·circuit court; ·but,;;:jts .validity11pheld in another.96 Thus, one of the•,:primary
policies behind the creation of the Federal Circuit was to prevent forum
shopping by patentees and alleged infringers,97 and had very little, if anything,
to do with the competency of the PTO or its application of the patent laws. 98
The PrO is just as able, if not better suited, than the Federal Circuit to
interpret the patentability requirements. In fact, as I will discuss below, by not
defining the patentability requirements, Congress ·delegated to the PTO the
authority to interpret the statutory provisions relating to patentability;99 and
there are cogent policy considerations which support this conclusion. 100
A brief review of the history of § 103 nonobviousness further illustrates
95 See H.R. REP. No. 312 at 19 ("By combining the jurisdiction of the two existing
courts along with certain limited grants of new jurisdiction, the bill creates a new
intermediate appellate court markedly less specialized than either of its predecessors and
provides the judges of the new court with a breadth of jurisdiction that rivals in its variety
that of the regional courts of appeals. The proposed new court is not a "specialized court."
Its jurisdiction is not limited to one type of case, or even to two or three types of cases.
Rather, it has a varied docket spanning a broad range of legal issues and types of cases.");
S. REP. No. 275 at 6 ("[The Federal Circuit's] rich docket assUres that the work of the ...
court will be broad and diverse and not narrowly specialized. The judges will have no lack
of exposure to a broad variety of legal problems. Moreover, the subject matter of the new
court will be sufficiently mixed to prevent any special interest from dominating it.")
96 H.R. REP. No. 312 at 20-22 ("[S]ome circuit courts are regarded as 'pro-patent'
and other 'anti-patent,' and much time and money is expended in 'shopping' for a favorable
venue." Furthermore, "the validity of a patent is too dependent upon geography (i.e., the
accident of judicial venue) to make effective business planning possible.").
97 Jd. at 22 ("A single court of appeals for patent cases will promote certainty where it
is lacking to a significant degree and will reduce, if not eliminate, the forum'-shopping that
now occurs."); see also S. REP. No. 275 at 5 ("The creation of the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit will produce desirable uniformity in this area of the law. Such uniformity
will reduce the forum-shopping that is common to patent litigation.").
98 For purposes of deference to the BPAI, we are not concerned with the action of
patentees (i.e., patent holders) or regional circuit courts; rather our focus is on pre-issuance
patent applicants, who are unable to forum shop because the PTO is the only governmental
entity authorized to examine and issue patents. With respect to the pre-issuance time frame,
uniformity is built in to the patent examination process.
99 See infra part II.A.4.
100 See infra part IV. for discussion of policy considerations.
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the reasons behind the creation of the Federal Circuit Prior to the enactment of
35 U.S.C. § 103 in 1952, it was generally thought that to be patentable a
claimed invention had to possess an "inventive step," which became known as
u'le "invention" requirement. 101 However, there were no legislative guidelines
or criteria for determining when the "invention" requirement was satisfied;
and, as a result, the term "invention" was interpreted differently by the various
regional· circuit courts. By creating:"a legi...slative· requirement with certain
guidelines to be followed, the authors of § 103 thought they were bringing a
sense of statutory stability to the 1.4invention" determination. 102 Tne enactment
of a legislative requirement Lil 1952, however, did not prevent the region~!
circuit courts from creating their own standards for what is now called the
nonobviousness requirement. A major benefit in creating the Federal Circuit
was that Congress took away from the regional circuit courts the ability to
interpret the patentability requirements, which led to divergent and varying
standards of patentability and, in turn, prompted a spree of forum shopping. 103
Thus, the Federal Circuit, iilce the creation of§ 103 before it, was designed to
infuse stability and w-JfonrJty into our patent laws. Yet, stabiliPJ a,.'ld
uniformity do not necessarily mean that the court should interpret the
patentability requirements, particularly when the requirements are Wldefined
and ll!nbiguous.I04 As stated below, if the same degree of deference is applied
to P'TO decisions, stability and uniformity will not be threatened, especially
since the regional circuit courts are statutorily precluded from hearing patent
appeals. In this regard, the Federal Circuit's role in promotLilg u11JforroJty in
10l The invention requirement was the precursor to the nonobviousness requirement.

See supra note 81.
102 See Giles S. Rich, The Vague Concept of "Invention" as Replaced by Section 103
of the 1952 Patent Act, in NONOBVlOUSNESS-THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF
PATENTABILITY, supra note 85, at 1:4D1:
"One of the greatest technical weaknesses of the patent system is the lack of a
definitive yardstick as to what is invention. To provide such a yardstick and to assure
that the various courts of law and the Patent Office shall use the same standards,
several changes are suggested. It is proposed that Congress shall declare a national
standard whereby [mark these words] patelltability of an invention shall be determined
by the objective test as to its advancement of the arts and sciences."
(alteration in the original) (quoting H.R. Doc. No. 239, 78th Cong., at 6, 10).
Furthermore, the House Report on§ 103, states that: "This section should have a stabilizing
effect and minimize great departures which have appeared in some cases." H.R. REP. No.
1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1952).
103 See supra notes %-97.
104 See infra notes 154-57.
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the application of the patent laws is fulfilled simply by its exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over appeals relating to patent law and its authority, as an Article
m court, to patrol the boundaries of the PrO's congressional delegation. IOS
Implicit h1 this uniformity challenge, however, is yet another challenge.
That is, the ex parte nature of the patent examination proceeding is problematic
in terms of increasing the breadth of deference for issued patents because it is
possible, for the ·PTO ·to' issue;a,'patent without COJ1Sid~ all- of the relevant
prior art. My concern here is not with the PrO's ability to examine patent
applications or interpret statutes that it is authorized to administer; 106 rather,
my concern relates to the PrO's search mechanism and failure, for whatever
reason, to consider a: material prior art reference during the examination
process.I07 With respect to issued patents, therefore, Chevron deference should
105 See infra notes 127-30.
106 Where a district-court upholds a patent's validity, the Federal Circuit affirms the
district court 89% of the time. See ROBERT L. HARMoN, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL
Cmcurr 793 (3d ed. 1994); see also Dunner et al., supra note 89, at 154 ("The most
notable trend, similar to that observed by Harmon, is that, in district court cases, the
Federal Circuit was significantly more likely to affirm judgments in favor of patent owners
than accused infringers. For example, the court affirmed validity of the patent under §103 .
. . about 88% ofthe time .... "); Ronald B. Coolley, What the Federal arcuit Has Done
and How Often: Statistical Study of the CAFC Patent Decisions-1982 to 1988, 71 J. PAT.
& TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 385, 391 (1989) (From 1982 to 1988, where the district court
upheld the validity of a patent, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court 25 out of 28
times or 89%. However, if the district court held the patent claims invalid, the Federal
Circuit affirmed the district court only 18 out of 37 times or 47%.). In light of this high
affirmance rate, one could argue that my claim for greater deference is emphasizing form
over substance. At the same time, however, with such a high affirmance rate, the Federal
Circuit is sending a message that the PTO is entitled to deference. Moreover, de novo
review fosters judicial waste and duplication and calls into question the function of the PTO
as a governmental agency. See infra part N.
107 In ·order to obtain a patent, an applicant must file a patent application, as well as
what she considers to be material prior art, with the PTO claiming what her invention is.
The application is assigned to a patent examiner based on the technology disclosed- in the
application. The examiner, after searching the prior art to determine if the claimed
invention meets the requisite patentability requirements, either issues a patent or rejects the
patent application. If the application is rejeCted, the examiner issues an office action ~tting
forth the reasons why the application was rejected. The applicant may amend her claims in
light of the office action, and resubmit her application. Again, the examiner may issue a
patent or reject the application (at this stage the rejection is usually final). See 35 U.S. C. §§
131-133 (1988); 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.101-1.127 (1994). At this point, the applicant may (1)
simply abandon her quest for a patent; (2) file a continuation application; or (3) file an
appeal with the BPAI asserting that the examiner improperly rejected her application. See
35 U.S.C. §§ 120, 134 (1988); 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.191-1.198 (1994). With respect to the
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be accorded to the examiner's patentability determination only when a prior art
reference had previously been considered by the examiner during the
examination process. On the other hand, deference is not warranted if the
examiner failed to consider the prior art reference, 108 and the court should
independently review the patentability requirements with respect to the

nonexarained reference.
Ideally, to the extent that prior art-has not;cbeen considered,,by the PrO,
patent litigants should be compelled, or at least, strongly encouraged to utilize
latter, if the BPAI a."fi..-ms the examiner's rejection, the applicant may abandon her
application or appeal to either the Federal Circuit or the District Court for the District of
Columbia. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 141-145 (1988); 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.301-1.304 (1994). This
Article is primarily concerned with the Federal Circuit's judicial review of BPAI
patentability determinations.
lOB The Federal Circuit, to a very limited extent, has adopted this approach. However,
the deference to which the court refers is procedural, not substantive. That is, a person
asserting invalidity has the burden of proving such because an issued patent is presumed to
be valid under 35 U.S.C. § 282. Thus, the Federal Circuit reviews de novo whether an
invention is "obvious," but places the burden of proving obviousness on the person
asserting it. See ft.merican Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350,
1360 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984):
[Section] 282 creates a presumption that a patent is valid and imposes the burden
of proving invalidity on the attacker.... Deference is due the Patent and Trademark
Office decision to issue the patent with respect to evidence bearing on validity which it
considered but no such deference is due with respect to evidence it did not consider.

See also Solder Removal Co. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 582 F.2d 628, 633 &
n.lO (C. C.P.A. 1978) ("Application of§ 282 in its entirety has suffered from analogy of the
presumption itself to the deference due administrative agencies."). In Kloster Speedsteel AB
v. Crucible Inc., 793 F.2d 1565, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1034
(1987), the district court properly held that defendant
failed to proffer prior art more pertinent than that considered by the PTO and therefore
had the "added burden of overcoming the deference that is due to a qualified
government agency presumed to have properly done its job." That deference merely
recognizes the statutory mandate that all patents shall be presumed valid.
(citatio!l omitted) (quoting American Hoist & Derrick Co., 725 F.2d at 1359). Fromson v.
Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 755 F.2d 1549, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("The presumption of
validity under § 282 is a procedural device, placing the burden of proving invalidity on the
party asserting it. It is not substantive law."); Alco Standard Corp. v. TVA, 808 F.2d 1490,
1497 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. dismissed, 483 U.S. 1052 (1987) (The introduction of prior art
that was not considered by the PTO "makes it easier for the party challenging the validity of
the patent to carry his burden of proof.").
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the reexamination process. 109 The reexamination process has the benefit of
reincorporating the P'IU's expertise into the patentability determination.
Furthermore, after the patent is reexamined the district court would not have to
apply different standards of review because each prior art reference would have
been con8idered by the PTO. Yet another potential solution would be for the
PTO to adopt a European style opposition proceeding.1 10 Indeed, there seems
to be-,growing support for an opposition proceeding. aiROng. memb~ +>.f,the .
private bar. 111

b. The "Constitutional" Challenge
This challenge, less conspicuous than that of "unifOrmity," lies in the
history of the issue of patent validity, particularly the nonobviousness
requirement. Patent validity was not always viewed as a question of law. In
fact, the Supreme Court, in the first quarter of the twentieth century, reviewed
nonobviousness 11 2 as a question of fact;ll3 and in a later opinion, identified

109 A reexamination is a procedure "pursuant to which a patent owner or anyone else
can seek review by the [PfO] of the validity of a patent on the basis of additional prior art
not previously considered by the PTO." See McCARTHY, supra note 21, at 280. See also 35
U.S.C. §§ 301-307 (1988). A reexamination proceeding has the advantage of permitting the
patent's validity to be "tested in the Patent Office where the most expert opinions exist and
at a niuch.red\lced
See H.R. REP. No. 1307, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1980),
reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6460, 6463. Although the reexamination process as it now
stands permits limited third party involvement, there is legislation pending in Congress that
would broaden the role of a third party ·participation in reexamination proceedings. See
Senate Bill1070, which was introduced on July 25, 1995, and the counterpart to S. 1070 in
the House of Representatives, H.R. 1732. S. 1070, 104th Cong., 1st Sess (1995); H.R.
1732, H;>4th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). For a discussion of the Senate and House bills,
respectively, see 50 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 331 (1995); 50 Pat. Trademark
& Copyright J. (BNA) 115, 126 (1995) ..
llO The deference doctrine and its relation to opposition and reexamination procedures
brings to the fore the subject of my second article. In this article, I intend to advocate the
creation of an ArtiCle I "BOOrd of ValiditY and Infringement' (BVAI) or, in the alternative, a
pre-grant opposition proceeding or compulsory reexamination whenever a patent is
litigated. .
lll See Lawrence G. Kastriner, U.S. Oppositiop.s: A Procedure Whose Tzme Has
Cmne, J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y (forthcoming 1995) (Mr. Kastriner conducted a
survey of 65 patent counsel cutting across the technological spectrum. Of those 65, 42
responded. Of those 42, 80% said they favored a European style pre-grant opposition
proceeding, whereas 90% indicated that they would support a post-grant opposition
proceeding.).
11 2 Prior to 1952, nonobviousness was referred to as "invention," or the "invention
requirement." See supra note 81.
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patent validity as a question of ultimate fuct. 114 fu 196ti, however, the Supreme
Court decided Graham v. John Deere Co., 115 which held that "the ultimate
question of patent validity is one of law. " 116 Implicit in the Court's opinion,
written by Justice Clark, is that :nonobviom:nes.s is a question of law.
The lack of strong precedent and rationale for Justice Clark's assertion
ro..ake.s it difficu.J.t, at first glance, to ascertain why the Court held that validity is
. a questioii.,.of law. Yet,,~in light of the fact that patentability requirements like
nonobviousness are necessary to further the constitutional goal of "promoting
the Progress of u~e useful Ai··w" and to ensure that the public domain is
adequately safeguarded, a plausible reading of Graham is that the Court may
have wanted to place constitutional limits on Congress's authority in the area of
patent law and accentuate its power of judicial review over Congress arull the
JPTQ.ll7

This interpretation is helpful in discerning why the Federal Circuit is so
reluctant to embrace Chevron in the context of patent law. Not only does
OtevTon have the potential to seveiely enfeeble t.lte Federal Circuit's judicial
review of patent validity detefiTiin.atio:ns, but it goes furt_her, calling Lnto
113 See Thomson Spot Welder Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 265 U.S. 445, 446-47 (1924).
114 See United States v. Esnault-Pelterie, 299 U.S. 201, 205 (1936).
115 383

u.s.

1 (1966).

116

!d. at 17.
117 See Giles S. Rich, Laying the Ghost of the "Invention" Requirement, in
NONOOVlOUSNP.,SS-,THEULTIMATECONDITIONOFPATENTABILITY, supra note 85, at 1:501:
Xam going to discuss § 103 of Title 35 United States Code, the 1952 Patent Act,
the unobviousness provision, because it is the heart of the patent system and the
justification of patent grants. Why do i say that? For two reasons: First: it is Section 103
which brings about statutory compliafiCe with the Constitutional/imitation on the power
of Congress to create a patent system . . . . Second, it is the provision which assures
that the patent grant of exclusive right is not in cmiflict with the anti-m01wpoly policy
brought to this country from England ....

ld.; see also Charles D. Reed, Same Reflections on Graham v. John Deere Co., in
NoNOOVIOUSNP.SS-THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY, supra note 84, at 2:305:
[O]ne must recall that the Court has consistently indicated that there is a constitutional
issue involved in the grant of a patent. Call it sensitivity to stare decisis or be cynical
and call it a form of judicial politics necessary to accommodate those on the Court who
instinctively equated patent monopoly with other monopolies, but the Court affirmed the
existence of constitutional limitations and noted that the "ultimate question of patent
validity is one of law."

Mr. Reed was Justice Clark's law clerk at the time Graham was decided. !d. at 2:301.
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question the court's perceived constitutional role as the final arbiter of our
patent system. The Federal Circuit may view Chevron as not only weakening
its duty ·as an Article ill court "to say what the law is," but also its perceived
function as the gatekeeper of Article I, Section 1, Clause 8. This contention is
buttressed by the fact that the Federal Circuit has applied Chevron to an appeal
from the TTAB.l 18 Trademark law is not inextricably linked with a
CQP§P11Jtional di~, as is patent}aw,ll? yet, as I will discuss below, 120 the
Commissioner derives his delegated authority, as it pertains to patent law and
trademark law, from the same statutory source;121 and the statutory provisions
pertaining to the 'ITAB and BPAI are very similar.122
Therefore, it is somewhat doctrinally disingenuous to characterize patent
validity as a question of law and then refuse to invoke the Chevron doctrine
because, according to the Federal Circuit, it is the court's "responsibility ...
to apply the law correctly; without deference to Board determinations. " 123
How can the Federal Circuit justify applying the Chevron doctrine to questions
of law arising from the TIAB, but not applying such to questions of law on
appeal from the BPAI? Perhaps the underlying reason is that the Federal
Circuit, in response to the Chevron doctrine and all that it implies,
characterizes patent validity as a question of law in order to maintain its sense
of constitutional integrity that Chevron seemingly threatens.
Yet, what is truly being threatened by the Federal Circuit's resistance to
118 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Bell & Howell Document Management Prods. Co.,
994 F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
11 9 It is generally thought that Congress derives its authority to legislate in the area of
trademark law from Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the Constitution (i.e., the Commerce
Clause). See PAUL GoLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHf, PATENI', TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE
DocrRINEs 20 (rev. 3d ed. 1993). Thus, the Federal Circuit is perhaps more willing to
apply the OJevron doctrine to an appeal from the TIAB because the empowering
constitutional provision is not as explicit as Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 (i.e., "to promote
the Progress of [the] useful Arts.")
120 See infra notes 151-53.
121 Specifically, 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) states that "[t]he Commissioner ... shall
superintend or perform all duties required by law respecting the granting and issuing of
patents and the registration of trademarks." See infra note 153.
122 See 35 U.S.C. § 7 (1988) and 15 U.S.C. §§ 1067, 1070 (1988); see also infra note
149. Also of relevance is the Federal Circuit's recent decision holding that BPAI members
are not independent of the Commissioner, but are "examiner-employees of the PTO, and
the ultimate authority regarding the granting of patents lies with the Commissioner." See In
re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1535 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Given the virtually identical statutory
provisions, it stands to reason that the TIAB, like the BPAI, also lacks independence from
the Commissioner.
123 See In re McCarthy, 763 F.2d 411, 412 (Fed. Cir. 1985).

OHIO STATE LAW JOliRli!AL

1448

[VoL 56:1415

Chevron is the PTO's explicit congressional delegation to "superintend or
perform all duties required by law respecting the granting and issuing of
patents."l24 Granted, the Federal Circuit's de novo review of questions of law
appears to have impressive support The Administrative Procedure Act states
that "the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law," 125 and
Chief Justice Marshall, in Marbury v. Madison, instructed us that "[i]t is,
en1phatically, the prov"ip,ce. and ~uty .of""tJle judicial <l~artJ.:nent, to say what the
law is. " 126 However, in the post-Ozevron era, the question of law is one of
delegation. 127 One of the reasoP.s Chevron is so welcomed in my opinion is
124 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (1988). See ilifra notes 141-43.
125

5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988). But see COMMITIEE

ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE,

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GoVERNMENT AGENCIES, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st

Sess. 90-91 (1941) (appointed by the Attorney General):
The question of statutory interpretation might be approached by the court de novo
and given the answer which the court thin.lcs to be the "right interpretation." Or the
court rnigt'it appr-oach it, some-vvl"-Uit as a question of fact, to ascertain, not the "rig!1t
interpretation," but only whether the administrative interpre!lltion has substantial
support. Certain standards of interpretation guide in that direction. Thus, where the
statute is reasonably susceptible of more than one interpretation, the court may accept
that of the administrative body. Ag-,J.n, the adminisL-at.:.ve interpretation i;; to be given
weight not merely as-opinion of some men or even of a lower tribunal, but as the
opinion of the body especially familiar with the problems dealt with by the statute and
burdened with the duty of enforcing it. This may be particularly significant when the
legislation deals with complex matters calling for expert lmowledge and judgment.

/d. (footnote omitted); see also Scalia, supra note 5, at 512-13 (asserting the Attorney
General's Report "formed the hasis for enactment of" the APA); Sunstein, Law and
Administration, supra note 5, at 2086 ("The APA's provision for independent judicial
interpretation of law is not inconsistent . . . with Chevron's deference to the agency's
interpretation if Congress has, under particular statutes, granted the relevant authority to
administrative agencies.").
126 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).

127 See Henry

P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L.

REv. 1, 27 (1983):
The court's task [in reviewing an administrative action] is to fix the boundaries of
delegated authority, an inquiry that includes defining the range of permissible criteria ..
. . [T]he judicial role is to specify what the statute cannot mean, and some of what it
must mean, but not all that it does mean. In this context, the court is not abdicating its
constitutional duty to "say what the law is" by deferring to agency interpretations of
law: it ill simply applying the law as "made" by the authorized law-making entity.
Indeed, it would be violating the legislative supremacy by failing to defer to the
interpretation of an agency to the extent that the agency had been delegated law-making
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that it has shifted the focus from the law-fact distinction, which is nothing short
of confounding at times, 128 to the scope of the agency's delegation. As the
Supreme Court has held: "[a] precondition to deference under Chevron is a
congressional delegation of administrative authority. " 129 The issue that is
unquestionably within the province of the judiciary is to determine the extent to
which Congress has delegated "administrative authority" to an agency. In this
vein, Chevron ~as relegau;~!-:tl:!-~ juc:liciarY: ,~ policing th,e boundaries of the
agency's delegation. 130
-- ·
··

c. The "Comparative Competence" Challenge
This third challenge, which primarily emanates from the private patent bar,
asserts that the Federal Circuit is more competent than the PTO to make
patentability determinations. There is a wide spread belief among members of
the patent bar that the PTO is in need of greater technological expertise and,
for the most part, view the Federal Circuit as a "court of correction." Because
my response to this challenge is grounded in policy considerations and focuses
on the comparative advantages of the PTO, I will defer my discussion until Part
authority.

/d.; see also DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 37, at 114-15 (asserting that Marbury is consistent
with Orevron).
128 See supra notes 29-31.
129 See Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649 (1990).
130 See Monaghan, supra note 127, at 6 (When reviewing administrative action, "[t]he
court's interpretational task is •.. to determine the boundaries of delegated authority."); see
also Starr, supra note 5, at 308; Scalia, supra note 5, at 516:
"The extent to which courts should defer to agency interpretations of law is
ultimately 'a function of Congress' intent on the subject as revealed in the particular
statutory scheme at issue." An ambiguity in a statute committed to agency
implementation can be attributed to either of two congressional desires: (1) Congress
intended a particular result, but was not clear about it; or (2) Congress had no particular
intent on the subject, but meant to leave its resolution to the agency. When the former is
the case, what we have is genuinely a question of law, properly to be resolved by the
courts. When the latter is the case, what we have is the conferral of discretion upon the
agency, and the only question of law presented to the courts is whether the agency has
acted within the scope of its discretion-i.e. , whether its resolution of the ambiguity is

reasonable.

/d. (quoting Process Gas Consumers Group v. United States Dep't of Agric., 694 F.2d n8,
791 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (en bane) (quoting Constance v. Secretary of Health & Human
Servs., 672 F.2d 990, 995 (1st Cir. 1982)), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 905 (1983)).
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IV of this Article. For present purposes, however, I will make two comments:
First, I agree with those members of the bar who believe that the PrO could be
more efficient and technologically savvy .m Indeed, this is a serious concern.
Yet, it does not necessarily follow that the balance of interpretive power should
lie with the court. There are other policy concerns which must be considered
like judicial efficiency, security in property rights, and the economics of
patentability, 132 and it should be kept)p .nlind that gr~er defernece does not
mean blind faith. In short, our inquiry should be framed 'in terms of what is the
optimal balance of interpretive power. Second, if there is a competency
problem with the PTO, the answer, in all due respect, does not lie with twelve
judges in black robes. 133 Agency incompetence is a congressionai and
executive concern.

4. Applying Chevron to a Patentability Detennination
In order to demonstrate t."'e application of the 01evron doctrine to the issue
34
of patentability, I will continue focusing on a nonobviousness determination.I
As stated earlier, the Federal Circuit characterizes the nonobviousness
requirement as ultimately a question of law with underlying factual
considerations. 135 As such, the judicial review analysis is bifurcated, whereby
the court reviews the factual issues under the clearly erroneous standard and the
legal issues de novo. Instead of these standards, however, what I propose is
that the Federal Circuit review the underlying factual considerations under the
"arbitrary and capricious" standard, 136 and apply the Chevron doctrine to the
ultimate question of no:nobviousness (i.e., a question of law). 137 This approach
131 It should be pointed out, however, that these claims of incompetency are difficult
to sustain in view of the FIO's 89% affirmance rate with respect to patent validity.
132 See part IV. infra for a detailed discussion of these policy considerations.
133 See Interview with Judge Plager, supra note 1, at 6:
Some people say that the PTO is the most wonderful place in the world; other
people say it's a nightmare. I don't know what it is. But, as an appellate judge, I really
='t operate under either of those theories . . . . I have to assume that the executive
branch of the federal government is doing its job. I ='tact on the basis of what are
essentially allegations, or gossip, or hearsay ....

134 The analysis that follows is also applicable to an "enablement" determination under
35 U.S.C. § 112. The Federal Circuit characterizes nonobviousness and enablement as
questions of law reviewed under the de novo standard of review. See supra note 76.
!35 See cases cited supra in note 76.
136 See infra part TI.B. for a discussion of the "arbitrary and capricious" test.
137

See infra part ll.A.4.a.-c.
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can best be illustrated by constructing a hypothetical.
Mary invents a treatment for cancer. She files a patent application for her
invention (ADRIO) with the PTO. Mary's invention is a composition of matter,
which is comprised of 10% X, 50% Y, and 4{)% Z. Upon conducting a prior
art search, the examiner, who has a master's degree in organic chemistry,
discovers two scientific articles which were published before Mary invented
ADRIO. One of the articles diScloses a COilli!Qsig~:m of ~ccomprisingepf .·. .
10% X and 50% Y, but'says notlling.ofZ. Article- two discloses chemical W.
and suggests that if mixed with chemicals X and Y the resulting composition of
matter may have cancer fighting effects. Further research into the chemical
literature reveals that Z and W are chemically interchangeable. As a result, the
examiner, based on his interpretation of the legislative requirement put forth in
35 U.S.C. § 103,1 38 rejects Mary's patent application, stating in his office
action that Mary's invention "would have been obvious at the time the
invention was made to a person of ordinary skill in the art. " 139 After
unsuccessfully amending her application, Mary appeals the examiner's rejection
to the BPAI. The BPAI's interpretation of the nonobviousness requirement
leads to an affirmance of the examiner's rejection. Dissatisfied with the BPAI's
decision, Mary files an appeal with the Federal Circuit.

a. Has Congress Delegated to the PTO the AUJhority to Administer the
Statutory Provisions Pertaining to Patentability?
In order for Chevron to apply, it must first be determined if the PTO has
been granted the authority to administer the applicable statute. 140 The PrO's
organic statute states:
The Commissioner, under the direction of the Secretary of Commerce, shall
superintend or perform all duties required by law re-specting the granting and
issuing of patents ... shall have the authority to carry on studies, programs, or
exchanges of items or services regarding domestic and international patent . . .
law or the administration of the Patent and Trademark Office, including
programs to recognize, identity, assess and forecast the technology of patented
inventions and their utility to iridU.stry; and shall have charge of property
belonging to the Patent and Trademark Office. He may, subject to the approval
138 Recall, the Graham opinion, "for the most part, merely restates the language of
section 103." CHISUM& JACOBS, supra note 12, at 2-58.
139 This statement would be part of a much larger and more detailed analysis of the
prior art and claimed invention and would also provide the patent applicant with a detailed
analysis as to why her claimed invention is "obvious." See 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.104--1.107
(1994).
140 See Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649 (1990).
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of the Secretary of Commerce, establish regulations, not inconsistent with law,
for the conduct of proceedings in the Patent and T mdemark Office. 141

Furthermore, the Commissioner shall cause an examination to be made of
the application and the alleged new invention; and if on such examination it
appears that the applicant is entitled to a patent under the law, the
'?'"Commissioi_l~r ~hall issue a patent therefor.142
With respect to the BPAI, the statute states: "The Board of Patent Appeals ".·
and Interferences shall, on written appeal of an applicant, review adverse
decisions of examiners upon applications for patents .... Each appeal . . .
shall be heard by at least three members of the [BPAI], who shall be designated
by the Commissioner. "143
Thus, the Commissioner has the explicit authority to (1) "superintend or
perform all duties required by law respecting the granting and issuing of
patents . . . . "; (2) examine a patent application and determine if an applicant is
entitled to a patent "under the law"; (3) "establish regulations, not inconsistent
with law, for the conduct of proceedings in the [PTO]"; and (4) appoint BPPJ
panels to review an examiner's rejection. 144 As a result, the PrO has both
adjudicatory and rulemaking authority .145
141 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (Supp. 1993). See aiso 48 Fed. Reg. 14735, § 3.01:
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary of Commerce by 35 U .S.C. 3 ...
the functions of the Patent and Trademark Office and its officers specified in Title 35 of
the U.S. Code, as amended, are hereby vested in the Secretary of Commerce and
redelegated to the Assistant Secretary [Commissioner of the Patent and Trademark
Office].

ld.; see also 48 Fed. Reg. 14,735, § 4.14 (1983) (The Commissioner of the PTO is to
"[p]erform . . . functions required, or which the [Commissioner] deems necessary and
proper, in exercising the authority delegated herein."); Alan L. Koller, The Role of the

Patent Commissioner in Designating Paneis from the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences, 34 IDEA: J.L. & TECH. 185, 199 (1994) ("The Commissioner is charged
with superintending or performing all duties required by law respecting the granting and
issuing of patents. He or she has responsibility for steering the agency according to a
multitude of legal, logistical and political concerns.").
142 35 u.s.c. § 131 (1988).
143 ld. § 7(b).
144 It is important to note that the BPAI, as will be di~ussed below, is subservient to
the Commissioner and the· latter has authority to appoint the BPAI panel to any given case
or to. reconsider a case that was originally decided contrary to PTO policy. See infra notes
164-69.
145 The rules to which I am referring are embodied in Title 37 of the Code of Federal
Regulations and fit within the meaning of "rule" as defined by the APA: "[T]he whole or a
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Although some commentators have asserted that the Commissioner's
rulemaking authority is limited to issuing interpretive rules, 146 the exact nature
of the Commissioner's rulemaking power is unclear, at best.147 In fact, an
argument can be made that the Commissioner is authorized to promulgate not
only interpretive rules, but legislative rules, as well. 148 The Commissioner's
··~

part ~f..an agency.·statement of-general or particular applicability and future effect·designed
to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or descnoing the organization,
procedure, or practice requirements of an agency." 5 U.S. C. § 551(4) (1988).
146 See, e.g., Rayan Tai, Substantive Versus Interpretive Rulemaking in the United
States Patent and Trademark Office: The Federal Orcuit Animal League Defense Fund
Decision, 32 IDEA: J.L. & TEcH. 235,247 (1992); Moy, supra note 18, at 427.
147 The distinction between interpretive and legislative ~es iB very important, in that
the latter iB entitled to the force and effect of the law and are accorded greater deference
than interpretive rules. See Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 424-26 (1977); DAVIS &
PIERCE, supra note 37, § 6.3; ScHwARTZ, supra note 75, § 4.8. One of the reasons that
legislative rules are given greater deference iB that an agency can only promulgate a
legislative rule pursuant to a congressional delegation and after a notice and comment
proceeding under § 553 of the APA. To issue an interpretive rule, neither delegated
authority, nor notice and comment proceedings are required. See DAVIS & PIERCE, supra;
ScHwARTZ,

supra.

148 For instance, as authority for the proposition that the Commissioner is limited to

issuing interpretive rules, commentators point to Animal League Defense Fund v. Quigg, 18
U.S.P.Q.2d 1677 (Fed. Cir. 1991), and its interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 6(a). In Animal
League, the Federal Circuit held that the language in§ 6(a) (i.e., "establish regulations ...
for the conduct of proceedings in the [PTO]") does not authorize the Commissioner to issue
legislative rules. /d. at 1686. However, the court did not deny that the Commissioner
possessed the authority to promulgate legislative rules:
[T]he authority granted in section 6 iB directed to the "conduct of proceedings" before
the [Pro]. A substantive declaration with regard to the Commissioner's interpretation
of the patent statutes . . . does not fall within the usual interpretation of such statutory
language .... Thai is 110110 say that the Conunissioner does 1101 have aurhority to issue
such a [rule] but, if not issued under the statutory grant, the [rule] cannot possibly have
the force and effect of law.

/d. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The court, unfortunately, did not specifY from
where exactly the Commissioner derives biB authority to issue legislative rules if indeed §
6(a) limits the Commissioner to interpretive rulemaking. See also Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg,
849 F.2d 1422, 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("Consistent with its legislative function, Congress
'may leave it to administrative officials to establish rules within the prescribed limits of the
statute.' •.• In thepatent field, Congress has done precisely that by [enacting 35 U.S.C. §
6(a)]." The court, citing Olevron, proceeded to state that "'the validity of a regulation
promulgated thereunder will be sustained so long as it is "reasonably related to the purposes
of the enabling legislation."'") (citations omitted).

-~,

.,, ".~:'
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Second, § 19 of the Patent Act of 1870 is the first expres-s statutory grant authorizing
rulemaking by the Commissioner. The wording of § 19 and § 6(a) of the present Patent Act
is virtwilly identical. However, the iegislative history of§ 19 and §6(a) offers little g-uidance
as to the meaning of the phrase "for the conduct of proceedings in the [PI'O]." See Herbert
C. Wamsley, supra note 8, at 49'1...-97 (1982). One reading of thlll provi..sion is that given by
the Federal Ci.n;uit in AniJnr.l League (i.e., .. Collliilissioner may only issue intetpretive rules
under § 6(a)). Howeve~, .another reading is put forth by Herbert C. Wamsley, who at the
time of writing the following was Director of the Trademark Examining Operation at the
PTO:
[S]ince the Commissioner's main duty is "conduct of proceedings" concerning patent
and trademark rights, he can establish regulations on both substantive [legislative] and
procedural [mterpretive] matters relating to that duty. This is the view that was taken by
the CCPA [the Federal Circuit's predecessor] ....

This broader reading of section 6(a) would be upheld by most courts today. Tne
Commissioner has the power to promulgate rules on rnatters of substa..r1tive patent a.11d
trademark law. According to the doctrine of National Petrolewn Refiners, he could
adopt a legislative rule on any matter that the Office has the power to adjudicate. Any
such rule should be upheld if reasonably related to the pmposes of the patent and
trademark laws.
Herbert C. Wamsley, The Rulemaldng Power of the Commissioner of Patents and
Trademarks (Part 2), 64 J. PAT. OFF. Soc;Y 539, 555-56 (1982). Wamsley asserts: "If the
rulemaking power is limited merely to establishing procedures, why the debate in Congress
in 1870 over whether to give the Commissioner the power, inasmuch as he had already
established procedural regulations [prior to the 1870 Act] .... " Jd. at 555.
Finally, legislative rules are distinguishable from interpretive rules in that the former
must be promulgated after notice and comment proceedings and pursuant to an agency's
congressionally delegated authority. See supra note 147. Ever since the Supreme Court in
Olevron held that Congress may impJidtly delegate to an agency the authority to interpret a
statutory provision, legislative and interpretive rules have merged to a certain extent and the
distinction between the two is not as clear as it once was. That is, if an agency is given an
implicit congre..."llional delegation to interpret a statute, interpretive rules issued by an agency
may have legislative effect. See Kevin W. Saunders, Interpretive Rules With Legislative
Effect: An Analysis and a Proposal for Public Participation, 1986 DUKE L.J. 346, 352-58;
see also Arrow Air, Inc. v. Dole, 784 F.2d 1118, 1122-26 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (applying
Olevron deference and giving legislative effect to interpretive rules (rules issued without
notice and comment)); General Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d 1561, 1564-67
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (en bane), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1074 (1985) (applying 01evron
deference and giving legislative effect to interpretive rules (rules issued without notice and
comment)). Thus, an argument can be made that the statutorily ambiguous patentability
requirements are an implicit delegation authorizing the PTO to promulgate legislative rules,
or interpretive rules with legislative effect.
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ability to issue legislative rules, 149 coupled with adjudicative authority, would
strongly indicate that Congress has authorized the PTO to "administer" the
patent statute as it relates to patentability determinations.
Regardless of the Commissioner's rulemaking authority, the above
mentioned provisions of the PTO' s organic statute indicate that the PTO has the
authority to "administer" the applicable statutory provisions relating to
150 ,~pec:ially ~m.ce the Feq"eral Circuit has given Cheyron
patentability,
.
'
.
'· .
. .....
'-"7'.:~·

~.

~.

~

149 Even if the Commissioner were not authorized to promulgate legislative rules,

there are cogent policy reasons for deferring to the Commissioner's interpretive rules. As
Professors Davis and Pierce state:
An agency often has devoted considerable thought to ~ issue before it publishes
an interpretive rule that addresses the issue. The agency often has considered carefully
how potential altern!ltive resolutions of the issue relate to the language and legislative
history of the statute it is implementing. The agency's position may reflect careful
consideration of the relationship between alternative resolutions of the issue and the
resources the agency has available to enforce its statute. 1, all these respects, the agency
has unique advantages over a court because of its day-to-day efforts to implement its
statutory mission. A court would be foolish not to give serious consideration to the
views expressed by an agency in an interpretive rule, even though the rule has no
binding effect.

& PIERCE, supra note 37, at 243; See also ScHwARTZ, supra note 75, § 4.9. The
Federal Circuit has deferred to the PTO when the latter promulgates rules pertaining to
patent practice. See, e.g., Gerritsen v. Shirai, 979 F.2d 1524, 1527-28 (Fed. Cir. 1992):
DAVIS

When a decision pursuant to a permissive statute concerns only PrO practice, we
review the decision for abuse of discretion .... AB the Commissioner established 37
C.F.R. §1.616 under the authority of 35 U.S.C. § 6(a), we see no reason in law or
logic to apply a different standard of review to the Board's decision merely because it
acted directly under a permissive regulation, rather than a permissive statute. Congress
granted the Commissioner broad powers over PrO practice. By imposing an unduly
expansive standard of review, which in effect limits that discretion, we would be acting
contrary to the statute and congressional intent.

/d. (citation omitted); see also Morganroth v. Quigg, 885 F.2d 843, 848 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
("The Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks is primarily responsible for the application
and enforcement of these narrow technical and specialized statutory and regulatory
provisions [35 U.S.C. §§ 133, 41(a)(7), and 37 C.F.R. § 1.137(b)] governing abandonment
and revival of patent applications. His interpretation of those provisions is entitled to
considerable deference.").
150 In an international trade case on appeal from the ITC, the Federal Circuit implied
that the PTO administers the Patent Code. In Corning Glass Works v. International Trade
Comm'n, 799 F.2d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1986), althGugh the main issue related to international
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deference to the TIAB.lSl The Commissioner's delegated authority pertaining
to the granting and issuing of patents and trademarks stems from the same
statutory provision; 152 and the statutory provisions relating to the ITAB and
BP.A.J parallel one another in significant ways.153

trade, there was a secondary issue pertaining to patent validity. The Federal Circuit deferred
to the ITC on the trade issue, but not on the patent issue. In footnote 5 of the opinion, the
court explained why: "In contrast [to the Tariff Act], the Commission is not charged with
administration of the patent statute, 35 U.S.C. § 1 et. seq. Thus we do not defer to its
interpretation of patent law." Jd. at 1565 n.S. Implicit in this footnote is that the Federal
Circuit would defer to the PTO's interpretation of the patent statute. If the PTO does not
administer the patent statute, then who does?
151 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Bell & Howell Document Management Prods. Co.,
994 F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
152 See 35 U.S.C. · § 6(a) (Supp. 1993) ("The Commissioner ... shall superintend or
perform all duties required by law respecting the granting and issuing of patents and
trademarks .... ");supra note 141 and accompanying text. Furthermore, the last sentence
of § 6(a) has a parallel provision in the trademark statute: "The Commissioner shall make
rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the conduct of proceedings in the Patent
and Trademark Office .... " 15 U.S.C. § 1123 (1988); see also 48 Fed. Reg. 14,735 § 4
(1983). This section warrants that the Commissioner shall perform the following functions:
"Examine applications for patents to determine if they meet the requirements of law for the
issuance of patents and, upon such determination, grant patents." Jd. § 4.01. "Examine
applications for the registration of trademarks to determine their entitlement to registration
under the law .... " Jd. § 4.06.
153 Compare 35 U.S.C. §7(1988)with the TTAB's governing provision, 15 U.S.C. §
1067 (1988). Section 7 states: "The Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner, the Assistant
Commissioners, and the examiners-in-chief shall constitute the [BPAI] .... Each appeal ..
• shall be heard by at least three members of the [BPAI], who shall be designated by the
Commissioner." Section 1067 states: "The [TTAB] shall include the Commissioner, the
Deputy Commissioner, the Assistant Commissioners, and members appointed by the
Commissioner . . . . Each case shall be heard by at least three members of the Board, the
members hearing such case to be designated by the Commissioner." /d.
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b. Has Congress Directly Spoken to the Precise Question at Issue?
The Commissioner has the explicit authority to determine which claimed
inventions are patentable "under the law." The relevant law are those statutory
sections pertaining to patentability, which include 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103,
and 112. We are concerned with § 103 (nonobviousness) for our
hypothetical:154
''"'-''-'"~--- _,_,~ . ,,.,;:""''"
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed
or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between
the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the
subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention
was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject
matter pertains.155
,

Given the relevant statutory provisiOn, the Chevron two-step can be
applied: (1) Has Congress directly spoken to the precise question at issue? That
is, has Congress defined "obvious"? If the statutory term "obvious," as defined
by Congress, is unambiguous that is the end of the matter. If, however, the
Federal Circuit determines that 35 U.S.C. § 103 is silent or ambiguous with
respect to the term "obvious," then, (2) the Federal Circuit must ascertain
whether the PTO's patentability determination under§ 103 is reasonable.
It is evident from a review of § 103 and Title 35 that Congress did not
define "obvious, " 156 especially when one considers that § 103 embodies a
154 An "enablement" determination under 35 U.S.C. § 112, characterized by the
Federal Circuit as a question of law, would be equally appropriate because it too is an
ambiguous and undefined term.
155 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988) (emphasis added).
156 In the context of administrative iaw, the term "obvious" is similar to the phrase
"just and reasonable" embodied in the Natural Gas Act (NGA). See 15 U.S.C. § 717
(1988). The NGA of 1938 was an attempt to regulate natural gas. The Federal Power
Commission (the predecessor of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission) was
empowered through the NGA to ensure that the rates charged by the natural gas companies
for the sale and transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce were "just and
reasonable." Due to the gas shortage of the 1970s and resulting increase in gas prices,
Congress enacted the Natural Gas Policy Act (NGPA) in 1978. In order to encourage an
increase in natural gas production, the NGPA allowed the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERq to set higher price ceilings on the price companies can charge for
natural gas. The only limitation on the FERC was that the new ceilings had to be "just and
reasonable" within the meaning of the NGA. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 3314(b)(1), 3316(a) (1988).
In Mobil Oil Exploration and Produdng Southeast, Inc. v. United Distribution Co. , the
price ceiling set by the FERC was challenged as not being "just and reasonable." The
Court, holding that the price ceiling was "just and reasonable," stated: "The Court has

OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL

[VoL 56:1415

requirement, not a defined standard. 151 Implicit in this statutory ambiguity is a
congressional delegation to the PTO to interpret the term "obvious," or in

· ··

repeatedly held that the just and reasonable standard does not compel the Commission to use
any single pricing formula . . . . By incorporating the "just and reasonable" standard into
the NGPA, Congress clearly meant to preserve the pricing flexibilit'J the Com.mission had
his'.orically exercised under the NGA." 498 U.S. 211, 224-25 (1991)(citations omitted); In
a footnote, the Court, citing O!evron, spoke to the issue of deference to the Commission:
"Even had we concluded that §§ 104(b)(2) and 106(c) failed to sp"...ak unambiguously to the
ceiling price question, we would nonetheless be compelled to defer to the Commission's
interpretation." Id. at 225.
157 See PJ. Federico, Further Comments and Observations on the Origins of Section
103, in NONOBVIOUSNESS-THE ULTIMATE CONDITIONOFPATENI'ABILITY, supra note 85, at

1:304:
I look at Section 103 as a requirement or a condition for patentability, rather than a
standard. A requirement and a standard could be the same thing, and often are, but in
tl·Js pw...ddcular case t.'le section to me not a standa..~ . . . . There no staitda.a-rU brt this
section. It se!!l up a requirement (in a negative manner); hovJ one is going to determine
whether the requirement has been met is not answered by the section.

m

m

u

JU.

Federico, as well as Judge Giles S. Rich, was one of the principal authors of the 1952
Patent Act, including § 103. See also P.J. Federico, Origins of Section 103, in
NONOBVJOUSNESS-THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY, supra note 85, at 1:109,
quoting a speech given by Judge Giles S. Rich on

§ 103:

Section 103 is one of those matters of major importance: The statutory inclusion of a
requirement for invention, which has never been dealt with in the statutes. Since it is
firmly established as a prerequisite to patent-ability, it was felt that it was desirable to
include it in the codification. And in doing so, certain troublesome matters were dealt
with; b11t withouJ any anempt to define "invention," the undefinable.

!d. (emphasis added). Furthermore, in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966), the
Supreme Court recognized that:

This is not to say, however, that there will not be difficulties in applying the nonobviousness test. What is obvious is not a question upon which there is likely to be
uniformity of thought in every given factual context. The difficulties, however, are
comparable to those encountered daily by the courts in such frames of reference as
negligence and scienter, and should be amenable to a case-by-case development.

ld. at 18. See also Reiner v. I. Leon Co., 285 F.2d 501, 503 (2d Cir. 1960) (Hand, J.)
(referring to the nonobviousness requirement as "misty"), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 929
(1961).
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other words, to define the standard by which claimed inventions will be judged
for nonobviousness. 158 In fact, this implicit delegation makes a patentability
detemiination or patent validity not so much a question of law, as it does a
question of policy, 159 which must take into consideration the relevant statutory
158 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,

inc., 467 U.S.

837,

-~-O~IW):
,, ..
,,::,~·-:.w:·t~.!i""O'!-

Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit
rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction of a
statutory provision fc;>r a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an
agency.
. . . We have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an
executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer,
and the principle of deference to administrative interpretations has been consistently
followed by this Court whenever decision as to the meaning or reach of a statute has
involved reconciling conflicting policies, and a full understanding of the force of the
statutory policy in the given situation has depended upon more than ordinary knowledge
respecting the matters subjected to agency regulations.

Jd.; see also Starr, supra note 5, at 310:
Many statutes . . . contain terms that are intentionally imprecise. Examples of this
studied imprecision are the term "public interest," which figures prominently in such
measures as the Communications Act of 1934 administered by the Federal
Communications Commission·, and the phrase "closely related to banking," which
figures prominently in the Bank Holding Company Act administered by the Federal
Reserve Board.... In my view, Chevron quite properly recognized that such terms
constitute an implicit, but nonetheless valid, delegation of authority to the agency.

Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Anthony, supra note 5, at 33; National Fuel Gas Supply
Corp. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 811 F.2d 1563, 1569 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(Bork, J.); Drummond Coal Co. v. Hodel, 796 F.2d 503,507 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Silberman,
J.), cert. denied, 480 u.s. 941 (1987).
159 See ~vron, 467 U.S. at 843-44; Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S.
680, 696 (1991) ("As Orevro11 itself illtisti'ates, the resolution of ambiguity in a statutory
text is often more a question of policy than of law."); NLRB v. Bell Aero8pace Co., 416
U.S. 267, 292-95 (1974) (agency adjudication is a mechanism for policy formulation);
Lasko Metai Prods., Inc. v. United Staies, 43 F.3d 1442, 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1994):
In situations in which a statute does not compel a single understanding, the
Supreme Court and this court have held that "our duty is not to weigh the wisdom of,
or to resolve any struggle between, competing views of the public interest, but rather to
respect legitimate policy choices made by the agency in interpreting and applying the
statute."
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Jd. (citations omitted); see also Suramerica de Aleaciones Lamin<>das, C.A. v. United
States, 966 F.2d 660, 665 (Fed. Cir.1992); Homemakers North Shore, Inc. v. Bowen, 832
F.2d 408, 411 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J.) ("An ambiguous legal rule does not have a
single 'right' meaning; th.erejs a range of possible meanings; the selection from the range is
an act ofpolicymaking. ");Pierce, Chevron and Its 4ftennath, supra note 5, at 305-06:
Whelf a court "interp~.iJillprecise, anioiguous, or conflicting s<Latutory language
in a particular manner, the court is resolving a policy issue. Courts frequently resolve
policy issues through a process that purports to be statutory interpretation but which, in
fact, is not. For lack of a better term, this process will be referred to as "creative"
interpretation.

Jd. (footnote omitted); see also DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 36, at 113 (mterpreting step
two of Chevron to mean that "policy disputes within the scope of authority Congre..«s has
delegated an agency are to be resolved by agencies rather than by courts."); Lawrence H.
Silberman, Chevron: The Intersection ofLaw & Policy, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 821, 823
(1990) (Because agencies have a comparative institutional advantage to interpret ambiguous

legislation, Judge Silberman stated that "[a]mbiguous legislation ... typically suggests that
Congress has not concretely resolved the policy issue that the case presents."); Sunstein,
Law and Administration, supra note 5, at 2086-88:
[fjhe Chew·on approach rr1.igi1t well be defended on the ground that the resolution of
ambiguities in sllitUtes is sometimes a question of policy as much as it is one of law,
narrowly understood, and that agencies are uniquely well situated to make the relevant
policy decisions .... If regulatory decisions in the face of ambiguities amount in large
part to choices of policy, and if Congress has delegated basic implementing authority to
the agency, the Chevron approach might reflect a belief, attributable to Congress in the
absence of a clear contrary legislative statement, in the comparative advantages of the
agency in making those choices.

!d.
See infra part IV. for a detailed discussion of the "comparative advantages" of the
PTO. See also Rich, supra note 102, at 1:413, n.36: "The presence or absence of
'invention' before 1953 was always, in my judgment, the determination of an issue of public
policy-what inventions should be patented. As such it is a 'question of law.' This policy
has now been legislatively expressed in section 103." At the time Judge Rich wrote these
comments (i.e., pre-Ozevron), be was perhaps correct in stating that the question of
"invention" was a "question of law." This assertion, however, is questionable in the post-

[The standard of invention] ... left every judge practically scott-free to decide this often
controlling fuctor according to his personal philosophy of what inventions should be
patented, whether or not he had any competence to do so or any knowledge of the
patent system as an operative socioeconomic force. This was too great a freedom
because it involves national policy which should be declared by Congress, not by
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proviSions, technology at iSsue, economic considerations as they pertain to
research and development practices of a particular industry, and the potential
benefit to society .16° In short, the PTO must ascertain whether the claimed
invention at issue "promote[s] the Progress of [the] useful.A...rts. "161
The assertion that patentability is a question of policy is reinforced in light
of the Federal Circuit's recent decisions in In re Alappatl62 and Eastman
KotJak.l63 In Alappat, a thrre-member panel of the ijfAl reversf:(:L,an
examiner's nonstatutory subject matter rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 10Ll64
The examiner requested reconsideration, arguing that the board's decision was
contrary to PTO policy under § 101. The Commissioner, pursuant to 35
U.S.C. § 7(b), designated an eight member panel, which not only granted the
examiner's request for reconsideration, but reversed the original board's
decision. Section 7 states:
(a) . . . The Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner, the Assistant
Commissioners, and the examiners-in-chief shall constitute the [BPAI].
individual judges or even groups of judges on multiple-judge courts . . . . Those most
intimately concerned with the writing and expounding of the new patent act in 1952 ...
knew they were not making a definition but rather a statement of policy, a specific
required approach to a difficult problem ....

Giles S. Rich, The Vague Qmcept of "Invention" as Replaced by§ 103 of the 1952 Patent
Act, Kettering AWard Address, The Paterit, Trademark, and Copyright Research Institute
144-45 (1964) (emphasis in original). See Comment, Appellate Review ofDetenninations of
Patentable Inventions, 29 U. Cm. L. REv. 185, 195-97 (asserting that patentability is
largely a question of policy).
160 The comparative advantages of the PTO suggest that the PTO is in a considerably
better position to evaluate these factors. See infra part IV for a discussion of the
comparative advantages of the PTO.
161 See, e.g., Reiner, 285 F.2d at 503 ("It is not for us [the judiciary] to decide what
'discoveries' shall 'promote the progress of science and the useful arts' sufficiently to grant
any 'exclusive right' of [sic] inventors. Nor may we approach the interpretation of§ 103 ..
• with a predetermined bias.") (citation omitted); see also Interview with Lehman, supra
note 20 (According to the Commissioner: "Intellectual property law is a major area of
intellectual property policy, and policy making is reserved for the executive and legislature,
not the courts.").
162 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
163 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Bell & Howell Document Management Prods. Co., 994
F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
164 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) states: "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and
requirements of this title."

!.i
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(b) The [BPAIJ s.hall ••• review adverse decisions of examiners upon
applications for patents . . . . Each appeal . . . shall be heard by at least three
members of the [BPAI], who shall be designated by the Commissioner. Only
the [BPAI] has the authority to grant rehearings.165

The appellant in Alappat argued that, under § 7(b), only the BPAI has the
authority to grant rehearings. The Federal Circuit disagreed: "We . ~ . interpret
th€"Commissioner's express statutory authority to designate the members of a
pane! hearing an appeal as extending to designation of a panel to consider a
.
request for a rehearing .... "166
Tnerefore, the court found "the Commissioner's interpretation of section 7
to be a reasonable one entitled to deference. " 167 In so doing, the Federal
Circuit spoke in tenns of the BPAI's institutional subservience. The court
stated that "[e]ven though Board members serve an essential function, they are
but examiner-employees of the PrO, and the ultimate authority regarding the
granting of patents lies with the Commissioner. " 168 Furthermore, although
"the Commissioner may not unilaterally overturn a decision of a Board pa.1el
or instruct other Board members how to vote[,] ... Congress clearly did not
intend the Board to be independent of any and all oversight by the
Commissioner. " 169
This holding is significa.nt with re..spect to the Federal Circuit's conception
and application of the deference doctrine. Recall, In re Alappat centered around
the issue of patentable subject matter under § 101. The statutory terms
pertaining to patentable subject matter in § 101, not unlike the term ''obvious,"
are undefined; and it is the responsibility of the PrO to initially interpret these
terms and determine if the claimed invention fits into one or more of the
enumerated subject matters. The Commissioner, in Alappat, designated a new
BPAI panel and reversed the original panel's interpretation of§ 101 as contrary
to PTO policy. Thus, the Federal Circuit's holding that the BPAI is not
independent of the Cominissioner implies that the Commissioner is the ultimate
authority regarding matters of policy, including patentability determinations.
This implication further implies that the BPAI's patentability detenninations
warrant Chevron deference.170
165 35 U.S.C. § 7(b) (1988) (emphasis added).
166 Aklppat, 33 F.3d at 1533.
ioi /d. at 1532-33.

168 /d. at 1535.
169 /d. at 1535-36.
170 Interestingly, the court recognized that the Commissioner's interpretation of§ 7(b)
was a matter of policy:
Our responsibility ... is to adjudge whether the Commissioner's designation practices
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What makes this conclusion more compelling is the Federal Circuit's
decision in Eastman Kodak, which accorded Olevron deference to the
1TAB. 171 As mentioned earlier, the Commissioner derives his authority
concerning the granting and issuing of patents and trademarks from the same
statutory source (i.e., 35 U.S.C. § 6(a)); 172 and the statutory provisions
pertaining to the BPAI and TIAB parallel one aoother in significant ways,
~v,;;:specifically 3s,;·.U.S.C.: § ~1,;md 15 U.S.C. § 1067. Section 7 t:ea9s: The""!.
Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner, the Assistant Commissioners, and
the examiners-in-chief shall constitute the [BPAI]. . . . Each appeal . . . shall
be heard by at least three members of the [BPAI], who shall be desiglUlted by
the Conunissioner. 173
Section 1067 states: "The [TIAB] shall include the Commissioner, the
Deputy Commissioner, the Assistant Commissioners, ·and members appointed
by the Commissioner .... Each case shall be heard by at least three members
of the [TIAB], the members hearing such case to be desiglUlted by the
Commissioner. "174
If, as In re Alappat held, the BPAI is not independent of the
Commissioner, it logically follows that the 1TAB lacks independence as well.
Therefore, the BPAI, like the TIAB, is a mere adjudicatory arm of the
Commissioner and, like the TTAB, is entitled to Olevron deference. This
conclusion prompted a dissent by Judge Mayer in In re Alappat:
they were applied in this particular CSBe resulted in a valid decision over which this
court may exercise subject matter jurisdiction, not to assess whether they were sound
from a public policy standpoint. We leave to the legislature to determine whether any
restrictions should be placed on the Commissioner's authority in this regard. Absent
any congressional intent to impose such restrictions, we decline to do so sua sponle.
8B

Jd. at 1536. However, the court did not appear to appreciate the significance of its holding
because it proceeded to interpret 35 U.S.C. § 101 (a patentability provision) without
according any deference to the decision of the eight-member BPAI panel, which reversed
the original BPAI's decision on policy grounds. Although the Federal Circuit recognized

that the Commissioner's interpretation of § 7(b) is a matter of policy, and implicitly
recognized that the reason the Commissioner redesignated the original BPAI panel is that he
believed the board's patentability determination was contrary to PTO policy, the court
nevertheless reviewed the board's patentability decision de novo.
171 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Bell & Howell Document Management Prods. Co.,
994 F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
172 See supra note 152 (35 U.S.C. §6(a) states: "The Commissioner . . . shall
superintend or perform all duties required by law respecting the granting and issuing of
patents and trademarks • , • . ").
173 35 U.S.C. § 7 (1988) (emphasis added).
174 15 U.S.C. § 1067 (1988) (emphasis added).
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H the Commissioner is correct, as the court apparently thinks, the [BPAI] nrust
be seen as simply an extension of the Commissioner's policy-making authority
and thus not independent. H this is so, the standard by which this court reviews
decisions of the board is questionable. It is now the practice, dubious from the
start, to review the board under the same standard as we review a district court.
Questions of law are reviewed de novo, while findings of fact are examined to

determine whether they are clearly erroneous. But if the board is simply
imPlementing pijlic:Y' Set
by die 'Conlmissioner, its decisions . cannot be

out

considered "legal" but must be subject to review as statements of agency
policy. . • • [l}t 'at least may be said that the standard of review applied by this

court to the boaid should include a good deal more deference than has been
applied heretofore'[citing Eastman Kodak and Chevron].
The court seems inclined to let this matter slide, but I believe that decision
today upholding jurisdiction puts the issue squarely before us, and the
ramifications of the decision should not go quietly unnoticed. We should not
pretend we are reviewing judicial decisions if they are really nothing more than
policy actions.J75
.

c. Is the PTO 's Pateniability DetennilUllion Reasonable?
Step two of the Chevron doctrine is a test of reasonableness; virtually the
same test the PTO argued for in In re McCarthy, 176 but with, perhaps, a harder
look. Some commentators and appellate decisions have asserted that step two is
equivalent to the arbitrary and capricious standard put forth in § 706(2)(A) of
the APA.l77 If step two of Chevron is reached, however, by no means is it a
175 In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1576-77 (Mayer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added)

(citations omitted).
176 See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
177 See Silberman, supra note 159, at 827-28 (citing decisions of the D.C. Circuit
which equate step two of O!evron with the arbitrary and capricious test); Sunstein, Law and
Administration, supra note 5, at 2105.
As an alternative to the O!evron doctrine, an argument can be made that the "arbitrary
and capricious" test of§ 706(2)(A} should apply to the BPAI's informal adjudications. This
alternative is alluring for two reasons: First, a nonobviousness determination is really a
mixed question of law and fact or laW application to fact, not unlike the issue of whether
newsboys were "employees" under the NLRA. See NLRB v. Hearst Publications Inc., 322
U.S. 111, 131 (1944) ("[W]here the question is one of specific application of a broad
statutory term in a proceeding in which the agency administering the statute must determine
it initially, the reviewing court's function is limited .... [T]he Board's determination ... is
to be accepted if it has 'warrant in the record' and a reasonable basis in law."); see also
Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 891 (1984) ("Since the task of defining the term
'employee' is one that 'has been assigned primarily to the agency created by Congress to
administer the Act,' . . . the Board's construction of that term is entitled to considerable
deference, and we will uphold any interpretation that is reasonably defensible.") (citation
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given that the court will defer to the agency interpretation. In fact, as I will
discUss below in Part ll.B., the court will review (1) the decision making
process of the agency and its explanation for its decision; (2) whether the
agency's decision was based on consideration of the "relevant factors"; and (3)
whether the agency made a "clear error. "178 This "hard look" at agency
decisions, while deferential, is not as easily overcome as one would initially
think.
~~"-'--·''""'' ..
' .·..,

5. Applying Chevron to ITC Detenninations
The Federal Circuit's judicial review of lTC decisions is worthy of some
discussion because it provides a sound approach, which should be applied to
the BPArs patentability determinations, to questions of law and fact.
In Corning Glass Works v. United States International Trade
Commission,l19 the lTC, in interpreting § 337(A) of the Tariff Act of 1930,
held that a particular activity constituted an "injury to a domestic industry" and
therefore was illegal. This subsection of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended in
1988, 180 prohibits:
Unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation of articles
(other than articles provided for in subparagraphs (B), (C), and (D)) into the
United States, or in the sale of such articles by the owner, importer, or
consignee, the threat or effect of which is-

omitted); Sunstein, Law and Administration, supra note 5, at 2094-95.
Second, "obvious" is an ambiguous and undefined term, and thus it doesn't matter
whether the "arbitrary and capricious" test or the Olevron doctrine is applied because
nonobviousness will always be decided under step two of Olevron (i.e., reasonableness).
However, there are at least two problems with discarding the Olevron doctrine and solely
applying the "arbitrary and capricious" test to the BPAI's informal adjudications. First,
Title 35 has statutory terms which are unambiguous and clearly defined by Congress. As
such, cases pertaining to these unambiguous terms can be decided at step one of Olevron
without concern for the PTO's action. Second, it is difficult at times to distinguish law and
fact. The Olevron doctrine circumvents this line drawing analysis. See Sunstein, Law and
Administration, supra note 5, at 2095 ("[T]he line between purely legal and mixed questions
is extremely thin. In some cases it will be hard to tell on which side of the line a particular
question falls. A broader approach to Olevron, applying the rule of deference in all cases,
has the virtue of simplicity and ease of application."); see also supra notes 29-31.
178 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
43 (1983); Citizens to Protect Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
179 799 F.2d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
180 19
§ 1337 (1988).

u.s.c.
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(i) to destroy or substantially injure an industry in the United States ... _181

In ruling on the ITC's statutory construction of subsection (A), the Federal
Circuit stated:
Under [the APA] a reviewing court "shall decide all relevant questions of
law." Thus, this court is not bound by the Commission's interpretation of
statutory provisions. However, even though an issue limy he denolllinatM one
of law, the court is not free simply to substitute its view for that of the
Commission. Deference must be given to an interpretation of a siatute by the
agency charged with its administrntion, United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes, Inc., ... 106 S.Ct 455, 461 (1985) [citing Chevron]. With respect to
the meaning of the statutory requirements that an unfair method of competition
must have the "effect or tendency . . . to destroy or substantially injure a
domestic industry . . . in the United States," it is particularly within the
province and expertise of the Commission to define those phrases. Our
function then becomes to decide whether the Commission's definitions or
standards are reasonable in light of the language, policies and legislative
historj of the statute. I 82

Having established that the ITC is entitled to deference in deciding whether
an injury has occurred to a domestic industry, the court went on to bifurcate
the factual and legal questions involved in the ITC determination:
Moreover, the determination of injury necessarily must be based upon the
particular facts of each case. In view of these considerations, the appropriate
function of this court is to review an injury determination to decide whether
substantial evidence supports the facts relied on and whether the
Commissioner's determination, on the record, is arbitrary, capricious, or an
abuse of discretion. In other words, we must decide "whether the decision was
ba..~ on a considera..tion of the relevant factors and whether there has been a
clear error of judgement." 183

Thus, the Federal Circuit reviewed the fact findings of the ITC under the
substantial evidence testl 84 and the legal question (i.e., statutory interpretation
of "injury to a domestic industry") under the Chevron doctrine. Once the court
18 1 Prior to the 1988 amendment, subsections (B)-(D) also required the activity in

question to have an "injurious effect." Presently, only subsection (A) requires an "injury."
Although Corning Glass was decided before the 1988 amendment, it was based on
subsection (A).
1!12 Corning Glass, 799 F.2d at 1565 (citations omitted).
183 !d. at 1568 (citations omitted).
l8 4 The substantial evidence and arbitrary and capricious tests are roughly equivalent.
See infra part ll.B.
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concluded that deference was due, it judged the ITC's determination under step
two of Chevron, which, as stated above, is a reasonableness test.
The ITC's domestic injury determination is very similar to a
nonobviousness determination. Both involve (1) agencies which administer
their respective statutes; (2) ambiguous statutory provisions; (3) an ultimate
question of law with underlying factual considerations; and (4) determinations
· .;:::-which require· a great deal of expertise as well as consideration o/;.otl:ler, policy
factors.

B. Appeals from the BPAi: Questions of Fact and Clearly Erroneous

Review
1. The Federal Circuit and the "Qearly Erroneous" Standard
Traditionally, administrative law prescribes that questions of fact are to be
reviewed under either the "substantial evidence" 185 or "arbitrary and
capricious"l 86 tests. The former has been compared to the scope of review
judges apply to jury verdicts, 187 while the latter, at one time thought to be
more deferential than substantial evidence, 188 is now generally considered, at

185 See, e.g., Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487-88 (1951). The
substantial evidence standard applies to formal proceedings. According to § 706(2)(E) of the
APA, "Substantial evidence" applies to cases "subject to sections 556 and SST' of the APA
"or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency bearing provided by statute."
186 See, e.g., Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973); Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971). The "arbitrary and capricious" standard,
unlike that of "substantial evidence," applies to any agency proceeding, including informal
rulemaking and adjudication.
l87 See, e.g., Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 619-20 (1966)
("We have defined substantial evidence as 'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.' 'It must be enough to justify, if the trial
were· to ajury, a refusal to direct a verdict when the conclusion sought to be drawn from it
is one of fact for the jury;'")(citations omitted); SCHwARTZ, supra note 75, § 10.11 ("The
test of review of a jury verdict is also usually stated in terms of substantial evidence. This
leads to the conclusion that the scope of review of jury verdicts and of agency findings is the
same.")
188 See, e.g., American Paper Inst. v. American Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 461 U.S.
402, 412 n.7 (1983); Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 143 (1%7) (Substantial
evidence is "a considerably more generous judicial review than the 'arbitrary and
capricious' test."). See generally American Trucking Ass'n v. United States, 344 U.S. 298,
314-16 (1953); Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 2% U.S. 176 (1935); CASS ET
AL., supra note 9, at 216.
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least by appellate courts, to be roughly equivalent. 189 In fact, any "distinction
between the substantial evidence test and the arbitrary or capricious test is
largely semantic. " 190 These standards of review subject the factual findings of
an agency to a reasonableness or rational basis standard; 19 1 however, it should
189 This is still a matter of some debate. However, the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals ili an opinion writtiinby then Judge Scalia essentially equated the two standards.
Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys., 745 F.2d 677, 683-84 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("When the arbitrary or capricious standard
is performing that function of assuring factual support, there is no substantive difference
between what it requires and what would be required by the substantial evidence test, since
it is impossible to conceive of a 'nonarbitrary' factual judgment supported only by evidence
that is not substantial in the APA sense-i.e., not 'enough to justify, if the trial were to a
jury, a refusal to direct a verdict when the conclusion sought to be drawn ... is one of fact
for the jury.") (citations omitted). Furthenno~e, the Supreme Court, in Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983), has implicitly suggested that
the substantial evidence and the arbitrary and capricious tests are the same. For instance, at
one point in the opinion, the Court stated that: "For purpn-ses of these cases, it is also
relevant that Congress required a record of the rulemaking proceedings to be compiled and
submitted to a reviewing court, 15 U.S.C. § 1394, and intended that agency findings under
the Act would be supported by "substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole."
ld. at 43-44. Subsequently, the Court stated: "The ultimate question before us is whether
NHTSA's rescission of the passive restraint requirement of Standard 208 was arbitrary and
capricious." ld. at 46 (emphasis added); see also RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 341-42 (2d ed. 1992) (asserting the substantial
evidence and arbitrary and capricious tests are virtually identical).
With respect to the Federal Circuit, although the court has suggested that the "arbitrary
and capricious" test is "less stringent" than the "substantial evidence" standard, see Hyundai
Elec. Indus. Co. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 899 F.2d 1204, 1208 (Fed. Cir.
1990), it has defined both tests in terms of reasonableness. ld. at 1209 (The "touchstone" of
the arbitrary and capricious test is "rationality."); see Jacobs v. Department of Justice, 35
F.3d 1543, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding that the "substantial evidence" test is one of
reasonableness).
190 See Association of Data Processing, 745 F.2d at 684 (citations omitted). The
substantial eviden9e and arbitrary and capricious tests are identical with respect to the
degree of factual support that is needed to maintain the agency decision. However, these
tests diverge with respect to what is reviewed to measure factual support. That is,
"substantial evidence [is] to be found within the closed-record proceedings" which is a much
more defined and structured record than the "administrative record" to which the arbitrary
and capricious test applies. ld. Furthermore, the substantial evidence and arbitrary and
capricious test differ in that the latter is a "catch-all"; that is, "an agency action which is
supported by the required substantia! evidence may in another regard be 'arbitrary [and]
capricious ... '-for example, because it is an abrupt and unexplained departure from
agency precedent." ld. at 683.
191 In Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951), the Court
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be noted that the Supreme Court has applied the "arbitrary and capricious"
standard with increasing intensity .192 Nevertheless, the fact findings of agencies
defined "substantial evidence" as follows: "[S]ubstantial evidence is more than a mere
scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion." See also Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229
(1938) (fiFa pte-APA tl'eci.Sion, Chief'JtiSttee Hughes described substantial evidence as
"such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.); Jacobs, 35 F.Jd at 1545; Atlantic Sugar, Ltd. v. United States, n4 F.2d
1556, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1984). It is worth noting that later in the Universal Camera opinion,
Justice Frankfurter stated:
[T]he Board's findings are entitled to respect; but they must nonetheless be set aside
when the record before the Court of Appeals clearly precludes the Board's decision
from being justified by a fair estimate of the worth of the testimony of witnesses or its
infonned judgment on matters within its special competence or both.

Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 490. Thus, for a reviewing court to overturn an agency's
factual finding, the record must clearly preclude the board's decision on a fair reading of
the record.
By comparison, the Supreme Court has held that in determining whether an agency's
decision is arbitrary and capricious:
[T]he court must consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the
relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment. Although this
inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a
narrow one. This court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the
agency.

Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416 (citations omitted). While the "clear error of judgment"
language has been criticized as destroying "the whole structure of established case law about
scope of review of juries, judges, and agencies," 5 KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINJSTRATNE
LAw TREATISE § 29.5 (2d ed. 1984), it is generally considered that the "arbitrary and
capricious" test is one of reasonableness. BREYER & STEWART, supra note 9, at 359 n.102
(stating that scholars regard arbitrary and capricious test as. a reasonable test); SOIWARTZ,
supra note 75, § 10.13 (mterpreting arbitrary and capricious test as one of reasonableness);
see also Hyundai, 899 F.2d at 1209; Horizons Int'l, Inc. v. Baldrige, 811 F.2d 154, 162 (3d
Cir. 1987).
192 See State Famz, 463 U.S. at 42-43 (The Court seemed to heed the language in
Overton Park that the "inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful. ... " Thus,
according to Justice White, "an agency changing its course by rescinding a rule is obligated
to supply a reasoned analysis for the change beyond that which may be required when an
agency does not act in the first instance. But the majority went on to state that a change of
course does not demand stronger judicial review and [w]e will . . . 'uphold a decision of
less than ideal clarity if the agency's path may reasonably be discerned.'" (quoting Bowman
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are generally accorded considerable deference.193
These standards of review, however, are not part of Federal Circuit
parlance when the fact findings of the BPAI are at issue. Instead, the Federal
Circuit reviews the BPAI's factual determinations under the "clearly
erroneous" standard of Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.194
This standard of review is applied by federal appellate courts to the factual
____ findings of district couns; 195 and,, Jt _is _less ,qe(erenti;,d tha,n,,.,either the-- _
"substantial evidence" or "arbitrary and capricious" tests. 196 In essence, the
Federal Circuit is treating the PTO, namely the BPAI, as if it were an Article
m Court.197
The use of the "clearly erroneous" standard is even more puzzling
Transp. Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys. Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286 (1974)). This "hard
look" approach has its origins in SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943), wherein the
Court required the agency to furnish an adequate explanation of its action. See Mullins v.
United States Dep't of Energy, 50 F.3d 990, 992 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("It is well established
that agencies have a duty to provide reviewing courLS with a sufficient explanation for their
decision so that those decisions may be judged against the relevant statutory standards, and
that failure to provide such an explanation is grounds for striking down the action." (citing
Olenery, 318 U.S. at 80)); see also Harold Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaldng and
the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 509 (1974).
193 The deference accorded to the fact findings of an agency is based in part on agency
expertise. See, e.g., Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966)
(asserting that the "substantial evidence" rule frees the courts from the burden of weighing
the evidence, respects administrative expertise, and promotes the uniform application of
statutes); AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 77, § 13.4.1 ("Deference to agencies, . . . is
justified in part out of respect for agency expertise.") Another reason for agency deference
is that agencies are politically accountable and have a congressional delegation to administer
a statutory scheme. On the other hand, a court, unlike an agency, does not possess the
expertise or degree of political accountability to warrant equal or greater deference.
194 See infra notes 204-10.
195 See, e.g., Anderson v. City ofBessemer City, 470 U.S. 564,573 (1985).
196 See, e.g., United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)
("Since judicial review offindings of trial courts does not have the statutOry or constitutional
limitations on judicial review of findings by administrative agencies or by a jury, this Court
may reverse findings of fact by a trial court where 'clearly erroneous.'"); SSlli Equip. S.A.
v. United States, 718 F.2d 365, 382 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (Nies, J., concurring) ("'A substantial
evidence' standard restricts an appellate court to a greater degree than 'clearly erroneous'
review."); Orvis v. Higgins, 180 F.2d 537, 540 (2d Cir.) ("[E]vidence sufficient to support
a jury verdict or an administrative finding may not suffice to support a trial judge's
findings."), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 810 (1950); DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 37, § 11.2.
l97 See, e.g., In re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("Our review of a
finding of anticipation [which is a finding of fact] is the same whether it was made by the
board [BPAI] or by a district court.")
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considering that the Federal Circuit employs the deferential "substantial
evidence" or "arbitrary and capricious" tests when reviewing the fact findings
of other agencies, namely the (1) Boards of Contract Appeals (BCA);l98 (2)
Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB);l 99 and (3) IntMlational Trade
Commission (ITC).200 Although the standard of review, as applied to the 1act
findings of the MSPB, BCA, and lTC, is statutorily defined2° 1 and the Patent
Code is,-:~.ile!}t in this regard, nothing prevents the Fed~,al;,J:irq~it from>
abandoning the less deferential "clearly erroneous" standard. it applies to--the ·
fact findings of the BPAI. 202 The PTO is the only agency to which the Federal
Circuit does not apply either the substantial evidence or arbitrary and
capricious standards. The Federal Circuit's dual standards of review are
inexplicable, especially since the degree of expertise associated with PTO
determinations is relatively greater than that required by the above mentioned
198 See, e.g., West Coast Gen. Corp. v. Dalton, 39 F.3d 312, 314 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
("This court will not set aside the Board's factual determinations unless they are 'fraudulent,

or arbitrary or capricious, or so grossly erroneous as to necessarily imply bad faith, or ...
not supported by substantial evidence. "'(quoting 41 U.S.C. § 609(b) (1988))); Triax-Pacific
v. Stone, 958 F.2d 351, 353 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
199 See, e.g., Chauvin v. Department of Navy, 38 F.3d 563, 565 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
("Under our narrow standard of review, we affirm decisions of the board unless they are (1)
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2)
obtained without procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having been followed; or
(3) unsupported by substantial evidence."); Jacobs v. Department of Justice, 35 F.3d 1543,
1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
200 See, e.g., SSIH Equip., 718 F.2d at 379 (In a concurring opinion, involving an
appeal from the International Trade Commission ("lTC"), Judge Nies stated, "[t]o be sure,
on judicial review of agency action, administrative findings of fact must be sustained when
supported by substantial evidence .... "); see also Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States
Int'l Trade Comm'n, 988 F.2d 1165, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("We review the Commission's
factual findings under the substantial evidence standard."), dismissed, 1994 WL 745517
(Fed. Cir. 1994).
20 1 The Federal Circuit's standard of review of BCA, MSPB, and lTC decisions is
governed by 41 U.S.C. § 609(b), 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c), 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c), respectively.
202 As Commissioner Lehman has stated:
The Federal Circuit has sent a clear signal that they don't intend to grant greater
deference to us; and you know, I don't know why that is. I think there are a range of
opinions on the part of judges but some genuinely feel that a change in the standard of
review should not be made except by statute, except the Federal Circuit does not apply
a statutory standard. They could change the standard without legislation, and in my
opinion, would have every justification and right to do so.
Interview with Lehman, supra note 20.
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agencies in their respective enterprises. 203
It appears that the Federal Circuit first articulated the "clearly erroneous"
standard in the 1984 case of In re De Blauwe, 204 and has since applied it to a
number of the BPP.J:'s factual determinations relating to patentability: (1)
utility;205 (2) anticipation;206 (3) best mode; 207 and (4) written description.20!l
Although these patentability requirements are ll..l1doubtedly factual in nature, 209

203 With respect to the MSPB, the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) of 1978 was
designed to provide a statutory framework governing the labor relations between federal
agencies and their employees. As stated by the Federal Circuit, the central purpose of the
CSRA "was to give agencies greater ability and flexibility to remove or to discipline
employees who engage in misconduct . . . or whose work performance is unacceptable . . .
. ,. Lisiecki v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd., 769 F.2d 1558, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1108 (1986). Certainly an argument can be made that the degree of
expertise required to deal with agency labor relations does not approach that which is
nece...c:...<:a..ry to make patentability determinations, which involves, not infrequently, an
analysis of state of the art technology. Whether it was proper to reduce the pay of a
government employee does not require the technical expertise needed to determine the
utility of a DNA sequence or whether a semiconductor chip is anticipated by a prior art
reference. As for the BCA, the Contracts Disputes Act (CDA) of 1978 pertains to
contractual disputes between an aggrieved contractor and the United States government.
The Federal Circuit has recognized the experience and expertise of the BCA in construing
government contracts. See, e.g., West Coast Gen. Corp. v. Dalton, 39 F.3d 312, 314-15
(Fed. Cir. 1994); United States v. Lockheed Corp., 817 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
This recognition of expertise reflects the deferential nature of the statutory standard of
review for BCA fact findings. However, as with the MSPB, the expertise associated with
construing contracts does not compare with the technological expertise involved in a
patentability determination. One could further argue that the Federal Circuit is as qualified
as the BCA to interpret a contract; whereas the same could not be said with respect to
patentability determinations.
204 736 F.2d 699, 703 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
205 See, e.g., In re Ziegler, 992 F.2d 1197, 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("The first issue
thus is whether the [BPAI's] determination that Ziegler did not establish that the German
application disclosP...d a practical utility for the polypropylene was clearly erroneous.").
206 See, e.g., In re Paulsen; 30 F.3d 1475, 1478 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("Anticipation is a
question of fact subject to review under the 'clearly erroneous' standard."); In re Baxter
Travenol Labs, 952 F.2d 388, 390 (Fed. Cir. 1991); In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 833 (Fed.
Cir. 1990).
207 See, e.g., DeGeorge v. Bernier, 768 F.2d 1318, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("Best
mode is a question of fact. Hence, our review of the board's best mode determination is
under a clearly erroneous standard.") (citations omitted).
208 See, e.g., Fiers Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1170 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("Compliance
with the written description requirement is a question of fact which we review for clear
error."); In re Spina, 975 F.2d 854, 857 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
209 For instance, to prove anticipation, a patent examiner usually reviews several prior
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the "clearly erroneous" standard is not the proper standard of review in that it
contravenes the APA210 and established caselaw.211

2. Overton Park, State Farm, and the "Relevant Factors"
The patent examination process is a form of informal adjudication.212 In
- Citizens toPresenie:()vertonPark/Ittc~ v. Volpe;'l.l3 the Supreme Court applied
the deferential "arbitrary and capricious" standard embodied in § 706(2)(A) of
the APAto an informal adjudication.214
In Overton Park, the Secretary of Transportation approved the use of
federal funds to construct an interstate highway. Justice Marshall held that the
Secretary's decision was not an exercise in rulemaking, and therefore, § 553 of
the APA did not apply.2 15 Thus, the decision was ·a form of adjudication.
Because the secretary's decision was not statutorily required to be on the record
after an opportunity for a hearing, the adjudication was informal in nature.216
With respect to the scope of review, once it was ascertained that informal
adjudication was at issue, the "substantial evidence" and de novo tests were
inapplicable.217 By process of elimination, the Court held that the proper scope
of review for informal adjudication is the "arbitrary and capricious" test set
forth in § 706(2)(A) of the APA. 218 Yet, before addressing the "arbitrary and
capricious" issue, the Court posed a preliminary question pertaining to "scope
of authority." In essence, the Court bifurcated the judicial review analysis, as
follows:

art references to see if one of them discloses each and every element in the claimed
invention. To illustrate, if Mary were to file a patent application with the PTO claiming a
composition of matter comprising 50% aluminum and 50% zinc, an examiner, to show that
Mary's invention is anticipated, must find a single prior art reference (e.g., a patent or
printed publication) which discloses a composition of matter with 50% aluminum and 50%
zinc. Analyzing the prior art reference and comparing each element in the reference to the
claimed invention is factually intensive.
210 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1988).
211 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29
(1983); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
212 See suvra note 56.
213 401
402 (1971).
214 This holding was subsequently affirmed in Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 141-42

u.s.

(1973).

215 Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 414.
21 6 Id. at 415.
217 Id.; see also 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E), (F) (1988).
218 Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416.
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[1] The court is first required to decide whether the Secretary acted within the
scope of his authority. This determination natumlly begins with a delineation
of the scope of the Secretary's authority and discretion....
[2] Scrutiny of the facts does not end, however, with the determination that the
Secretary has acted within the scope of his statutory authority. Section
706(2XA) requires a finding that the actual choice made was not "arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."
To make this finding the court must consider Whether thcfdeeision was based·
on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear
error of judgment. Although this inquiry into the facts is to be searching and
careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one. The court is not
empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.219
To summarize, after the "scope of authority" issue is settled, the agency
decision is reviewed under the "arbitrary and capricious" test. In so doing, the
court, engaging in a "searching an<i careful," yet "narrow" inquiry, asks
whether the agency decision was based on "a consideration of relevant
factors," and whether the agency has made "a clear error of judgment."
Despite its rollercoaster language, the "arbitrary and capricious" test is one of
reasonableness.22o However, ever since Motor Vehicle Manufacturers
Association v. State Fann Mutual Insurance Co., 221 the hurdle has been raised
with respect to this reasonableness standard and the arbitrary and capricious
test has been applied with increasing intensity. As the Court in State Farm
held:
Normally, an agency role would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has
relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed
to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its
decision that runs. counters to the evidence before the agency, or is so
implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product
of agency expertise. 222
With the Overton Park and State Farm cases in mind, the arbitrary and
capricious test can be thought of as comprising three components. This
tripartite standard focuses on: (!)whether the agency decision was based on "a
consideration of the relevant factors"; 223 (2) whether the agency made a "clear
219 !d. at 415-16 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
220 See supra note 191.
221 463 u.s. 29 (1984).
222 !d. at 43.
223 The obvious question is what exactly is a "relevant fuctor" and who determines
such? In some instances the governing statute sets forth which fuctors are relevant and an
agency may discern what those fuctors are from the statute.
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error of judgment";224 and (3) the rationale and decision making process of the
agency~ Under this last component, the agency decision may be reversed or
remanded either because the agency's rationale was inadequate225 or the agency
failed to reflect upon alternative considerations.226

3. Applying the Arbitrary and Capridous Test to the Fact Findings of the
-2~c-

''''"'~"

BPAJ

c;i

The Overton Park/State Fann analysis provides the Federal Circuit with a
befitting and doctrinally sound framework within which the fact findings of the
BPAI can be reviewed. 227 In applying this framework to the fact findings of a
224 As a test of reasonableness or rational basis, reviewing courts are very reluctant to
overrule an agency decision as "arbitrary and capricious" based on "clear error of
judgment." As then Judge Breyer and Professor Stewart stated:
Courts have been reluctant to overrule a particular agency decision on the ground that
the agency has made a "clear error of judgment," and for that reason its policy choice
is "arbitrary." This reluctance is reflected in Overton Park's admonition that the
"ultimate standard of review" under the arbitrary and capricious standard is a "narrow
one" and that a reviev.ing court "is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of
the agency."
. . . In the thousands of federal court decisions annually reviewing federal
administrative action, only a few invalidate agency action on this ground. Litigants
attempting to persuade a reviewing court that the balance struck by an agency among
relevant factors is arbitrary and capricious' must be prepared to persuade the court that
the agency's decision has no rstional basis whatsoever. Given the artfulness of agency
opinion writers, the skills of government lawyers, and the plausibility of agency claims
of 'expertise,' this is a difficult burden to carry.
BREYER & STEWART, supra note 9, at 361-62. Given the improbable nature that an
agency's decision will be overturned because of a "clear error of judgment," it seems that
the battleground revolves around the "relevant factor" portion of the "arbitrary and
capriCioiis" test, as well as the decision making process of the agency.225
'
'
.
See, e.g., Center
for Auto Safety v. Peck, 751 F.2d 1336, 1373 (D.C. Crr. 1985);
New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution v. NRC, 727 F.2d 1127, 1130-31 (D.C. Cir.
1984); Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 715 F.2d 653, 660-61 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see also Patricia

M. Wald, The Contributions ofthe D.C. Orcuit to Administrative Law, 40 ADMIN. L. REv.
500, 528 (1988) (stating that the D.C. Circuit has reversed 67 out of 222 agency decisions
in 1987 because of the agency's inadequate rationale).
226 See, e.g., City of Brookings Mun. Tel. Co. v. FCC, 822 F.2d 1153, 1169-70
(D.C. Cir. 1987); Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Tyson, 796 F.2d 1479, 1507
(D.C. Cir. 1986).
227 The Federal Circuit has adopted the Overton Park version of the "arbitrary and
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patentability determination, the first question is whether the Commissioner,
who delegates the examination of patent applications to patent examiners and
the BPA.i, "acted within the scope of his authority." As stated earlier, the
Commissioner has a congressional delegation to examine and issue patents. 228
With such a clear delegation, the Commissioner's authority should not be a
concern.
Witl:kstep one of Qverton Park satisfied, .the issue becomes whether the
factual determinations involved in a patentability decision are "arbitrary and
capricious." The Federal Circuit should ascertain whether the BPAI considered
"the relevant factors" and "whether there has been a clear error of
judgment, "229 keeping in mind that "[a]lthough this inquiry into the facts is to
be searching and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow
one ... [and t]he court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of
the agency. "230 In addition, the Federal Circuit must be mindful of State Farm,
which dictates that the reasoning or decision making process of the BPAI
should be reviewed to determine if the board failed to ::~rlequately explain its
decision. 231
The one poL11t X want to emphasize is that although the arbitrary and
capricious test is more deferential than clearly erroneous review and should be
applied to the factual determinations of the PTO, it is by no means an empty
standard. TI1e Overton Park and State Fann fnuuework subject the agency's
decision to a searching and thorough review and require the agency to
adequately explain its decision.

capricious" test when reviewing the fact findings of the: (1) ITC, see Hyundai Elec. Indus.
Co. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 899 F.2d 1204, 1209 (Fed. Cir. 1990); (2)
MSPB, see Ginnodo v. Office of Personnel Management, 753 F.2d 1061, 1065 (Fed. Cir.),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 848 (1985); (3) Claims Court, see Hines v. Department of Health
and Human Servs., 940 F.2d 1518, 1527 <f:ed. Cir. 1991) (citing both Overton Parle and
State Fann); and (4) Court of International Trade, see Texas Crushed Stone Co. v. United
States, 35 F.3d 1535, 1539-40 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
228 See supra notes 154-61.
229 See Citizens to Preser;e Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
230 Jd.
.
231

See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,

43 (1983).
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C. Missed Opponunities or Avoiding the Inevitable?
1. The PT'O's Full Coun Press
Recently, the PTO has argued for greater deference in In re Brana232 and
In re Napier. 233 In both cases the court seemed amenable, with respect to
factual determinations'r,<W;•granting 'tB'e""PTO greater·' deference, but ultimately
failed, or refused, to fully address the issue.
For example, in In re Brana, the court stated:
In our consideration of this issue, there is a reality check: would it matter to the
outcome in a given case which formulation of the standard a court articulates in
aniving at its decision? . . .
. . . A preliminary question, then, is whether this is one of those cases in
which a difference in the standard of review would make a difference in the
outcome. 234

With respect to the factual issues, the court held that the BPAI must be
reversed no matter what standard of review was applied. Therefore, the court
did not feel compelled to discuss the standard of review issue. Furthermore, the
court held that the question of enablement under § 112 was a question of law
and therefore, "[u]nder [the court's] traditional standard or under the APA
standard no deference is owed the Agency on a question of law . . . ."23 5
Thereafter, the court nevertheless left the door open for furture assertions that
the PTO was entitled to greater deference. The court stated:
If the question concerning the standard of review, raised by the Commissioner,
is to be addressed meaningfully, it must arise in a case in which the decision
will tum on that question, and, recognizing this, the parties fully brief the
issue. This is not that case. We conclude that it is not necessary to the
disposition of this case to address the question raised by the Commissioner;
accordingly, we decline the invitation to do so.236

Shortly after In re Brana was decided, the Commissioner raised the issue
of greater deference once again in In re Napier. However, the court "decline[d]
the invitation," stating that:
232 51 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
233 55 F.3d 610 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
234 51 F.3d at 1569.
235 /d.

236/d.
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WhateveJr m...<>rit may lie in that position, the CommissioneJr will no doubt be
gratified to know that we were able to affum the Board in this instance under
ilie more stringoot standard. We thus find it unnecessary to address the
question of whether the APA standard is, in an appropriate case, the applicable
one.237

Why has the Federal Circuit avoided facing the issue of deference head on?
Were In re Brana and In re Napierreall)rinappropriatecases? Clearly, the
court in In re Napier could have articulated the appropriate standard of review
with respect to the factual considerations. The court conspicuously evaded the
deference issue by saying tt'1at the Board must be reversed no matter what
standard of review applied or that the board will be affirmed even under "the
more stringent standard" of review. Nevertheless, it seems that some judges on
the court are more amenable to granting the PTO greater deference, at least
with respect to questions of fact. Perhaps, these judges are in the minority and
view the timing of the cases, and not so much their appropriateness, as the
determining factor. ln any event, the issue of deference is something that the
court must inevitably address, and based on in re Brana and In re Napier, the
PTO will give the court as many opportunities as it desires.

2. Slwuld the "Arbitrary and Capricious" Test Apply to the Ultimate
Question of Patentability?
X have argued that the Chevron doctrine should apply to patentability
determinations. The PrO posits that the APA provides the proper standard of
review (i.e., the "arbitrary and capricious" test). I agree with the PTO that the
APA's "arbitrary and capricious" test should apply to questions of fact, but X
do not believe that such is the appropriate standard of review for patentability
determinations (i.e., questions of law).
This is not to say that the arbitraa.-y aa.J.d capricious test is without appeal.
An argument can be made that the "arbitrary and capricious" test of
§ 706(2)(A) should apply to the BPAI's informal adjudications. This alternative
is alluring for two reasons, especially in the context of a :nonobviousness
determination.. First, a nonobviousness determination is really a mixed question
of law and fact or the application of law to fact, not unlike the issue of whether
newsboys were "employees" un.der the NLRA. 233 Second, "obvious" is an
237 55 F.3d at 614.
23!! See NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1994) ("[W]here the
question is one of specific application of a broad statutory term in a proceeding in which the
agency administering the statute must determine it initially, the reviewing court's function is
limited . . . . [T]he Board's determination . . . is to be accepted if it has 'warrant in the
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ambiguous and undefined term, and thus it doesn't matter whether the
"arbitrary and capricious" test or the Chevron doctrine is applied because
nonobviousness will always be decided under step two of Chevron, which is, in
essence, an arbitrary and capricious standard.
However, there are at least two problems with discarding the Chevron
doctrine and solely applying the "arbitrary and capricious" test to the BPAI's
Jnfqrmal adjudications. First, Title 35. has statutofy ,-terms whieh are
unambiguous and clearly defined by Congress. As such, cases pertaining to
these unambiguous terms can be decided at step one of Chevron without
concern for the PrO's action. Second, it is difficult at times to distinguish law
and fact. The Chevron doctrine circumvents this line drawing analysis. 23 9

III. THE STATUTORY INTERPRETATIONS OF'THE COMMISSIONER:
PAYING LIP SERVICE TO CHEVRON
A. 1he Chevron-One Step?
Although the Federal Circuit has failed to apply the Chevron doctrine to
the decisions of the BPAI, the court has proven somewhat less reluctant to
invoke the doctrine when reviewing the Commissioner's statutory
interpretations not directly related to patentability. Despite the fact that the
Federal Circuit has applied, or at least addressed, the Chevron doctrine in three
such cases,2 40 the court has yet to apply step two of Chevron because its
"traditional tools of statutory construction," namely intentionalism241 and
record' and a reasonable basis in law."); see also Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883,
891 (1984) ("Since the task of defining the term 'employee' is one that 'has been assigned
primarily to the agency created by Congress to administer the Act,' the Board's construction
of that term is entitled to considerable deference, and we will uphold any interpretation that
is reasonably defensible."); see also Sunstein, Law and Administration, supra note 5, at
209~95.

239 See Sunstein, Law and Administration, supra note 5, at 2095 ("[T]he line between
purely legal and-mixed questions is extremely thin. In some cases it will be hard to tell on
which side of the line a particular question falls. A broader approach to OJevron, applying
the rule of deference in all cases, has the virtue of simplicity and ease of application."); see
also sources cited supra notes 29-31.
240 See Hoechst Aktiengesellschaft v. Quigg, 917 F.2d 522 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Glaxo
Operations UK Ltd. v. Quigg, 894 F.2d 392 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849
F.2d 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988). I discuss these cases in detail below.
24 1 Intentionalism has been defined as follows: "Intentionalism refers to the use of a
variety of tools, including legislative purpose and legislative history, in an effort to
determine the intent of the legislature when it included a particular word or phrase in a
statute." Pierce, New Hypertextuolism, supra note 5, at 750; see also Merrill, Textuolism,

~
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textualism,242 or what I refer to as "pseudo-textualism, "243 invariably lead to a
supra note 5, at 351-58.
The use of legislative history has been criticized for several reasons. For example, (1)
legislative history is result-oriented and may be manipulated to fit a judge's desired result;
(2) judges should not rely on unenacted texts; and (3) legislative history is indeterminate.
See, e; g. , Frru:iK 'H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11· ·
HARv. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 59 (1988); Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the Use qf
Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L.J. 371; Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism
& the l11terpretation of Federal Statutes, 32 WM. & M..A.R.Y L. REv. 827, 837 (1991). The
late Judge Harold Levanthal once stated that the use of legislative history is like "looking
over a crowd and picking out your friends." See Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on
the Use if Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Tenn, 68 IowA L. REv. 195, 214
(1983).
242 Textualism has been defined as that which: "refers to the use of a different set of
tools, including dictionary definitions, rules of grammer, and canons of construction, in an
effort to derive the putatively objective meaning of the statutory word or phra._.:e." Pierce,
New Hypertextualism, supra note 5, at 750; see aiso Merrill, Textualism, supra note 5, at
351-58. Textualism, unlike intentionalism, eschews the use of legislative history as an
interpretive aid and embraces the plain meaning rule. It is generally thought that Justice
Scalia is the leading advocate of textualism. See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490
U.S. 504, 527-30 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (same); Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S.
87, 97-100 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (criticizing the use of legislative history); Daniel
A. Farber & PhillipP. Frickley, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REv. 423,
455 (1988). But see Bradley C. Karkkainen, "Plain Meaning": Justice Scalia's
Jurisprudence of Strict Statutory Construction, 17 HARv. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 401 (1994)
(arguing that Scalia is not a pure textualist because he employs extratextual interpretive aids
(e.g., a dictionary) to derive meaning from a statutory provision). For articles criticizing
textualism, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Ihe New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621
(1990); John Ferejohn & Barry Weingast, limitation of Statutes: Strategic Statutory
Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 565 (1992); Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes, supra note 5, at
405; Patricia M. Wald, 17w Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing
Statutes in the 1988-89 Tenn of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REv. 277
(1990); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a
Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295 (1990).
243 This is a hybrid of intentionalism and textualism. For example, the Federal Circuit,
in two of the three statutory construction cases where Chevron was addressed, applied the
plain meaning rule and used a dictionary to discern the "ordinary, contemporary, common
meaning" of the statutory term. However, after finding no ambiguity, the court proceeded
to examine the legislative history to see "if Congress meant something other than what it
said statutorily." See Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Glaxo
Operations UK Ltd. v. Quigg, 894 F.2d 392, 395-96 (Fed. Cir. 1990). In the third statutory
construction case, the court began its analysis with the plain meaning rule, but after finding
statutory ambiguity, engaged in a searching review of the legislative history. Towards the
end of the opinion, however, the court returned to the plain meaning rule and attempted to
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finding that the statutory language in question is unambiguous.244
It is beyond the scope of this Article, and it is not my intention to propose
a theory of statutory interpretation; rather, I only wish to manifest the extent to
which the Federal Circuit will go to avoid deferring to the PTO and the
unconvincing decisions which result from this lack of deference. 245 The court,
contrary to a consistent and unitary theory of statutory construction, seems to
·. '" simply cas~a broa<l.·net of,int~retive .theories witb the intent of catching any
semblance of statutory clarity and unambiguity. 246 As Professor Davis and
Pierce have stated, because there are several interpretive theories, "judges can
support widely differing constructions by applying different sets of tools or
even by applying the same set of tools in different ways. "247 The Federal
bootstrap the "congressional intent" found in the legislative history into the plain meaning

rule by referring to the "plain meaning of the statute" and the "explicit" provisions of the
statute. See HoechSt Aktierigesellschaft v. Quigg, 917 F.2d 522, 528-29 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
244 Some commentators have convincingly argued that the use of textualism on the
Supreme Court will diminish, if not entirely eviscerate, the Oievron doctrine. See Merrill,
Textuolism, supra note 5, at 354 ("textualism poses a threat to the deference doctrine. For
those who believe that judicial deference to agency interpretation of law is a good thing, this
should be cause for concern, ..• "); Pierce, New Hype11extualism, supra note 5, at 752
("The Court rarely defers to an agency's construction of ambiguous statutory language in an
agency-administered statute because a majority of Justices have now begun to use textualist
methods of construction that routinely allow them to attribute 'plain meaning' to statutory
language that most outside observers would characterize as ambiguous or intemally
inconsistent."); Scalia, supra note 5, at 521 ("One who finds more often (as I do) that the
meaning of a statute is apparent from its text and from its relationship with other laws,
thereby finds less often that the triggering requirement for Oievron deference exists.").
245 I refer to the decisions as "unconvincing" in that the Federal Circuit's
interpretation of the statutory provision in question is no more convincing than that put forth
by the PfO (i.e., Commissioner).
246 In fact, the Supreme Court has inconsistently applied the Olevron doctrine, and
part of the problem is that the Court cannot agree on which "traditional tools of statutory
construction" to apply under step one of Oievron. See DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 37, §
3.6 ("The root of the problem is the absence ofagreement among Justices as to which of the
many available 'traditional tools of statutory construction' they should use when one or
more of those tools suggests a particular construction of an arguably ambiguous agencyadministered statute."); Pierce, New Hypenextuolism, supra note 5, at 750 "The Court's
inconsistency in applying the test is largely attributable to post-Oievron changes in the
Court's choice of 'traditional tools of statutory construction,' . . . . As the Court has
changed the mix of 'tools' it uses and the manner in which it uses those tools, it has
gradually ceased to apply step two of the Oievron test to uphold an agency construction of
ambiguous statutory language, because it rarely acknowledges the existence of ambiguity."
/d.
247 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 37 § 3.6.
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Circuit has done just that with little or no deference to the Commissioner. 24!!

1. Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg
The case of Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg249 is a prime example of the extent to
which the Federal Circuit will go to avoid deferring to the PTO. The issue
before the cou_rt in Ethicon was the meaning of the··phrase "special dispatch" in
35 u.s.c. § 305.250
In Ethicon, a patent ('591 patent) pertah1ing to a medical device was
assigned to United States Surgical
Corporation
(USSC). In 1981, USSC filed a
patent infringement suit against three parties in the District Court for the
District of Connecticut.25l The '591 patent was one of four patents alleged by
USSC to be infringed. The Connecticut trial ended in September of 1987 and
the parties were awaiting a decision. 252 USSC, in April of 1986, filed a second
patent infringement suit in Ohio against Ethicon alleging that Ethicon was
iP..:frLr1gi..P.g the '591 patent.253 Ethicon counterdaLrned asserting nor.in:fringement
and that the '591 patent was mvalid. On March 12, 1987, Ethicon, pursua...nt to
35 U.S.C. §§ 301-307, sought to re-exa.rnine the validity of the '591 patent;254
and, the followmg day, moved the Ohio court to stay the litigation pending
resolution of the reexamination. 255 The court denied Ethicon's motion to stay,
stating that "[i]f and when the [P'TO] moves relating to the validity of any of

248 See, e.g., Michel, supra note 3, at 9 ("[W]here the issue is one of pure law, as
statutory construction usually is, our [i.e., Federal Circuit] review is truly independent.
Then there is little or no deference to the court or Board being reviewed.").
249 849 F.2d 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
ZSO Specifically, this case involved statutory interpretation through rulemalcing.
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 6(a), the Commissioner promulgated 37 C.F.R. § 1.565(b), which
states, in relevant part: "If a patent in the process of reexamination is or becomes involved
in litigation . . . the Commissioner shall determine whether or not to stay the
reexamination . . . . "
According to the court, "[t]he ultimate question here is whether the Commissioner's
exercise of authority to stay a reexamination purportedly pursuant to section 6(a) conflicts
with" 35 U.S.C. § 305, which states in relevant part: "All reexamination proceedings under
this section ... will be conducted with special diq;atch with the Office." Ethicon, 849 F.2d
at 1423-24 (emphasis added).
251 Ethicon, 849 F.2d at 1423-24.
252Jd.

25J !d. The defendants in the Connecticut litigation had no relation to Ethicon, Inc., the
defendant in the Ohio litigation.
254 See supra note 109 for a discussion on reexamination.
255 Ethic~n, 849 F.2d at 1424.
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the patents in dispute, at that time this matter can be re-examined. "256 The
reexamination request was granted by the PTO on May 21, 1987, and again,
Ethioon moved the Ohio court to stay the litigation. In September of 1987,
however, USSC, pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 1.565257 and MPEP § 2286,258
asked the PTO to stay the reexamination of the '591 patent "in deference to an
ongoing trial being conducted in Connecticut," and advised the PTO that the
.·.·•. Connecticut trial had ended. 259 Tl:le PTO stay,~:Lthe ree:x:amin_ciDon pendingJhe
decision of the Connecticut court. The PTO cited § 2286 of the MPEP, which
is based on 37 C.F .R. § 1.565(b), as support for its decision to stay the
reexamination. 260 Thereafter, Ethicon sought to enjoin the Commissioner from
staying the reexamination, asserting that the stay was "unlawful and contrary to
the reexamination statute, particularly 35 U.S.C. § 305. "261 The District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia denied Ethicon's request and granted
summary judgment for the Commissioner. Ethicon appealed to the Federal
Circuit.
Recognizing this case as one involving an issue of statutory interpretation,
the Federal Circuit cited Chevron for the proposition that "an agency's
interpretation of a statute it administers is entitled to deference. "262 However,
the court's "traditional tools of statutory construction" and eventual decision
discounted the Olevron doctrine. The Federal Circuit expressly acknowledged
that "special dispatch" was not defined in the statute.263 Employing a textualist
interpretive aid, the court consulted a dictionary to determine the "ordinary,
contemporary, and common" meaning of "special dispatch. "264 Although this
256 Jd.
257 See supra note 250.
258 The MPEP is the Manual of Examination Procedure.§ 2286 states:

H the reexamination is ordered the reexamination will continue until the . . .
[PfO] becomes aware that a trial on the merits has begun at which time the
reexamination proceeding normally will be stayed, sua sponte, by the examining
group director unless a proper petition to stay has been filed which is not rendered
moot by the sua sponte stay.
PATENT & TRADEMARK OmCE, MANUAL OF EXAMINATION PROCEDURE§ 2286 (5th ed.
1983 & Supp. 1979).
259 Ethicon, 849 F.2d at 1424.
260 Jd.
261 Jd.
262 Jd. at 1425.
263 Jd. at 1426.
264 Jd. at 1426. The court stated: "According to Websters New World Dictionary,
special means distinctive, unique, exceptional, or extraordinary, and dispatch means to
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textualist approach led to a finding of "no ambiguity," the court proceeded to
explore the legislative history "to see if Congress meant something other than
what it said statutorily. "265 Not unlike the statute in question, the legislative
history was silent as to the definition of "special dispatch. "266
The Federal Circuit employed a dictionary as a means to establish "an
ordinary, contemporary, and common" definition and inferred an endorsement
<?f.this definition from the silence of the statute and le~lative history. But how
could an unambiguous definition of the phrase "special dispatch," as-used in §
305 of the Patent Act, be found in a dictionary where the statute and legislative
history are silent?267 As Professor Merrill has stated, "[t]extualism ... seems
to transform statutory interpretation into a kind of exercise in judicial
ingenuity. " 268 According to the Federal Circuit, if the statute did not suggest a
meaning of "special dispatch" opposite to that of the definition set forth in the
dictionary, the dictionary definition prevailed:
Whatever else special dispatch means, it does not admit of an indefinite
suspension of reexamination proceedings pending conclusion of litigation. If it
did, one would expect to find some intimation to that effect in the statute, for it
would suggest the opposite of the ordinary meaning. But there is none. 269

Needless to say, this method of statutory construction will rarely lead to a
finish quickly or promptly. Consequently, the ordinary, contemporary, and common
meaning of special dispatch envisions some type of unique, extr..ordinary, or accelerated
movement." ld.
265 ld.
266 ld.
267 Professor Pierce has referred to this aggressive use of textualism as
"hypertextualism." See Pierce, New Hypertextualism, supra note 5, at 752:
The [Supreme] Court has carried the transition into a new phase that I characterize
as ... hypertextualism. The Court now rarely defers to an agency's construction of
ambiguous statutory language because a majority of Justices have now begun to use
textualist methods of construction that routinely allow them to attribute "plain meaning"
to statutory language that most outside observers would characterize as ambiguous or
internally inconsistent.
168 See Merrill, Textualism, supra note 5, at 372. Furthermore, Professor l.Vfe.. Jl
stated that "the textualist interpreter does not find the meaning of the statute so much as
construd the meaning." Jd.; see also Pierce, Chevron and Its ~ermath, supra note 5, at
305-06 ("Courts frequently resolve policy issues through a process that purports to be
statutory interpretation but which, in fuct, is not. For lack of a better term, this process will
be referred to as 'creative' interpretation.").
269 Ethiam, 849 F.2d at 1426.
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·· finding of ambiguity, thus eviscerating the Chevron doctrine. 27°
The Federal Circuit, like the D.C. Circuit in Chevron, supplanted its own
construction for the agency's. However, in the face of congressional silence,
deference to the PTO was clearly warranted under the Chevron doctrine. 271 In
fact, the district court, citing Chevron, recognized an implicit congressional
delegation to the PTO to interpret "special dispatch":

There is no ~~it· that the ieex8mlDation procedure, adopted in 1980, was
designed to settle validity disputes more quickly and less expensively than
could be accomplished through protracted litigation. Use of the term "special
dispatch" exemplifies this design. But the term is not one of art; and its
meaning is nowhere discussed in the legislative history. The statute itself
provides little guidance . . . .
. . . It is only reasonable to assume that some admiriistrative interpretation
of the term "special dispatch" was contemplated by Congress. Courts have
long recognized an agency's authority reasonably to interpret enabling
legislation and to establish rules and regulations which carry out the act's

purpose.272
In addition, the Commissioner's decision to stay the reexamination
proceeding was consistent and reasonably related to the policy underlying the

reexamination statute; that is, to provide for a more efficient and cost-effective
procedural mechanism to settle validity disputes. 273 The Connecticut litigation
was completed just days after USSC petitioned the PTO to stay the
reexamination of the '591 patent.274 If the Connecticut court invalidated
'591 patent, the reexamination proceeding would become moot. The Federal
Circuit, in Ethicon, admitted as much, stating that "if a court finds a patent
invalid, and that decision is either upheld on appeal or not appealed, the PTO
may discontinue its re-examination. This is consistent with Blonder-Tongue

the

270 Merrill, Textualism, supra note 5, at 366-73; Pierce, New Hypertextualism, supra
note 5, at 750-52.
27l ~e Ch~vron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 843 (1984) ("[I]fthe statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the
question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction
of the statute.").
272 5 U.S.P.Q.2d 1138, 1140--41 (E.D.Va. 1987) (citations omitted), rev'd, 849 F.2d
1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
273 See H.R. 1307(1), %th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6460,6463.
274 The Connecticut trial was over on September 14, 1987, "and the parties there have
submitted their post trial briefs and proposed findings of filet to the court." Ethicon, 5
U.S.P.Q.2d at 1140.
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Laboratories, Inc. v. University oflllinois Foundation. "275
Thus, there was a distinct possibility that a reexamination proceeding of the
'591 patent would be conducted with very "special dispatch." That is, no
reexamination proceeding at all. The district court recognized this possibility:
The court concludes that [37 C.F.R. § 1.565(b) and MPEP § 2286] are well

within the statutory mandate of the reexamination statute because they are
t(j"'' ~,. pui})oSe8""bf~'"the .enabling"~ IegiSiatian," namely
"reasonably
expeditious and non-duplicating resolution of validity issues. . ..
Here the case in Connecticut is not just in trial; the trial bas been
completed and post trial briefs and proposed findings and conclusions of law
have been submitted. If ever there was a situation where the PTO 's stay .is
reasonable, this is it ....276

related

The Federal Circuit dismissed the "expeditious" and "duplication" policy
arguments based on the fact that the "PTO and the courts employ different
standards of proof when considering validity, and the courts, unlike the PTO
during reexamination of patent claims, are not lLmJted to review of prior art
patents or printed publications. "277 The fact that a patent is presumed valid and
the reexamination proceeding is limited to certain prior art is all the more
reason to stay the reexamination. If the Connecticut court were to hold the '591
patent invalid, almost certainly the same result would be reached by the PTO in
a reexamination proceeding inasmuch as the court's ability to review prior art
is not limited.
Furthermore, the court, and apparently Ethicon, Inc., failed to appreciate
the adversarial nature of a trial court setting. 278 In response to the
Commissioner's argument that the Connecticut trial will yield a more complete
record on the validity issue, the court extolled the neutrality of a reexamination
proceeding: "'Reexamination is ... neutral, the patentee and the public having
an equal interest in the issuance and maintenance of valid patents.'"279 Yet,
neutrality in this instance is not as virtuous as the Federal Circuit suggests.
Recall, Ethicon, Inc. is attempting to invalidate the '591 patent. The defendants
in the Connecticut trial, faced with potential infringement, are just as likely as
Ethioon, Inc~ to vigorously challenge the validity of the '591 patent; and USSC

275

Ethicon, 849 F.2d at 1429.

276 5 U.S.P.Q.2d

at 1141 (emphasis added).

277 Ethicon, 849 F.2d at 1427.
278 The Federal Circuit stated that "[t]he inequity of a stay is illustrated by the fact that

here Ethicon is not involved in the litigation in Connecticut . . . . " Ethicon, 849 F.2d at

1427.
279 ld. at 1428 (quoting In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 856 (Fed.Cir. 1985)).
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will certainly be able to defend against these claims of invalidity. 280 Besides, a
holding by the Connecticut court that the '591 patent is not invalid does not
preclude Ethicon, Inc. from asserting that patent's invalidity in a reexamination
proceeding or subsequent litigation.
.
The Federal Circuit's failure to attribute significance to the potentially
dispositive nature of the Connecticut trial and its claims relating to the
neutrality of reexamination proceedmgs"tnanifesteit:~Jer an insensitivity and lack
of appreciation of the finer policy concerns at play or a reluctance to defer to
the PTO. The latter is more likely given the considerable sophistication of the
judges on the Federal Circuit.

2. Glaxo Operations UK Ltd. v. Quigg
In Glaxo Operations UK Ltd. v. Quigg,2 81 the Federal Circuit reviewed the
Commissioner's statutory interpretation of the term "product" in 35 U.S.C. §
156(t)(2). In 1984, Congress enacted the Drug Price Competition and Patent
Term Restoration Act (Act).282 Under the Act, a patent owner may have the
term of her patent extended if a number of conditions are satisfied. Specifically,
a patent term may be extended if "the product has been subject to a regulatory
review period before its commercial marketing or use";283 and "the permission
for the commercial marketing or use of the product after such regulatory
review period is the first permitted commercial marketing or use of the product
under the provision of law under which such regulatory review period
occurred. "284
In the definitional section of 35 U.S.C. § 156, "product" is defined as "the
active ingredient of a new drug, . . . including any salt or ester of the active
ingredient. "285
Pursuant to the Act, the assignee, Glaxo, sought to extend the term of its
patent ('320 patent) "because of the lost marketing time due to the lengthy
280 Entities accused of patent infringement are likely to scour the earth in search of
prior art. This evidence is obtained through months, sometimes years, of discovery. On the
other hand, persons requesting reexamination are very limited in their rights. The requester
may only (1) receive notice of the Patent Office's decision regarding reexamination, (2)
receive a copy of the patentee's response to the request, and (3) file a rejoinder to that
response. See 35 U.S.C. § 304; 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.530, 1.535. Also, as mentioned earlier, the
Commissioner relies solely upon printed publications and patents in a reexamination.
281 894 F.2d 392 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
282 98 Stat. 1598.
283 35 U.S.C. § 156(a)(4) (Supp. V 1987) (emphasis added).
284 Jd. § 156(a)(S) (Supp. V 1987) (emphasis added).
285 /d. § 156(f)(2) (Supp. V 1987) (emphasis added).
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FDA approval process. " 286 The active ingredient in the '320 patent was
cefurmdme axetil, an ester of cefuroxime, which is an organic acid. 287 Glaxo
marketed the '320 patent under the tradename CEFTIN. To be effective,
CEfTIN had to be administered orally. The FDA approved CEFTIN on
December 28, 1987. Glaxo also had another patent ('153 patent), which
claimed cefuroxime and its salts. 288 Glaxo marketed the '153 patent under the
tradenames ZINACEF and KEFUROX, which had to. be administ~red
intramuscularly or intravenously. The FDA approved ZINACEF in 1983 and
¥..EFUROX in 1987.289
It was undisputed that cefuroxime axetil was the active ingredient in
CEFTIN; and that ZINACEF and KEFUROX were neither esters, nor salts of
cefuroxime axetil. Nevertheless, the Commissioner denied the tenn extension
based on his assertion that "Glaxo has already had a prior approval of the
'product' before it sought a term extension for its '320 patent. "290 According
to the Commissioner, § 156(t)(2) defines "product" broader than the three
categories of compounds enmnerated i..1 the statute, 291 and encompasses "a.11y
'new chemical entity. "'292
The Commissioner asserted that its interpretation is entitled to Chevron
deference,293 but the Federal Circuit rejected this assertion, stating that "[t]he
rule of deference enunciated in [Chevron] is limited to when the statutory
hL.'1guage has 'left a gap' or is &.vnbiguous. " 294 The court, employh1g a textualist
approach, invoked the plain meaning rule and held that§ 156 is unambiguous:
236 Glaxo, 894 F.2d at 394.
287 ld. at 393.
238 Jd.
289 Jd. at 394.

290 Jd.
291 The three categories are: (1) an active ingredient; (2) a salt of an active ingredient;
or (3) an ester of an active ingredient.
292 Glaxo, 894 F.2d at 394. The Commissioner asserted that the term "product" in 35
U.S.C. § 156(1)(2) includes "new active moiety, which would encompass all acid, salt, or
ester forms of a single therapeutically active substance even if the drug before being
administered contained only other substances." Therefore, the Commissioner argued that:

becaUlle after being orally administered CEFfiN tablets combine with digestive
substances in the human body to produce the same therapeutically active. substance
contained in both ZINACEF and KEFUROX, then ... Glaxo has already had a prior
approval of the "product" before it sought a tenn extension for its '320 patent.
/d.
293 Jd. at 398.

294 Jd.
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We conclude that section 156(t)(2)'s terms, "active ingredient of a new
drug .•. including any salt or ester of the active ingredient," all have a plain
meaning. We reach this conclusion because we must interpret statutory words
as "taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.... In particular,
the terms "active ingredient," "salt," and "ester" bad well-defined, ordinary
meanings when Congress enacted the Act. 295

As in Eihiton, 'however, the Federal Circuit broadened''fits ';'statutory '""'analysis by exploring the legislative history "'to determine whether there is a
clearly expressed legislative intention contrary to the statutory language.' "296
The court did not find a contrary intention in the legislative history.
One could argue that the Federal Circuit's finding of no ambiguity in
Gla:xo is more easily justified than its decision in Ethicon in that § 156 had a
definitional provision setting forth what the term "product" means;297 and that
section did not say anything about "new chemical entity" or "new active
moiety." One could conclude that Congress has spoken directly to this issue,
and therefore, step one of Chevron was the appropriate place to decide this
case. Even if this approach would lead to "absurd results," the fault and
potential remedy lie with Congress, not the courts.
On the other hand, the Federal Circuit found that the Commissioner's
interpretation is consistent with the "general purposes" of § 156, which leads
one to believe that the statutory term at issue is ambiguous, and the
Commissioner's interpretation was a reasonable alternative.298 Given these
cOmpeting interpretations, a strong argument could be made that the Federal
Circuit should have deferred to the Commissioner. 299

1.'2""'

295 Jd.
296 ld.

at 395 (citations omitted).
(quoting Madison Galleries Ltd. v. United States, 870 F.2d 627, 629 (Fed. Cir.
1989)) (emphasis added).
297 Recall, the court in Ethicon acknowledged that the statute and legislative history
were silent with respect to the term "special dispatch."
298 Gloxo, 894 F.2d at 396 ("Although we agree that the Commissioner's
interpretation of the meaning of section 156 is consistent with [the] general purposes [of the
Act], the plain meaning of section 156 is also consistent .... ").
299 See Abbott Laboratories v. Young, 920 F.2d 984 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
502 U.S. 819 (1991). The court, like Gloxo, had before it the term "active ingredient" as
put forth in the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act. Although the
statutory section in Abbott was different, the statutory definition of "active ingredient" was
essentially the same. In fact, the applicant in Abbott cited Gloxo in support of its contention
that the phrase "active ingredient" is unambiguous under the plain meaning rule. The court
disagreed:
Pursuant to the Supreme Court's guidance in Chevron, we must first determine whether
Congress manifested an "unambiguously expressed intent" that resolves this dispute
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Deference may also have been warranted in light of the Commissioner's
assertion that "applying the plain meaning of section 156 . . . will create
absurd results contrary to [the general purposes of § 156]. " 300 The absurd
results that would occur, according to the Commissioner, may be due to
unforeseen circumstances at the time the Act was enacted. This is especially
true when the following statement by the cou11: is considered: "We simply
cannot say tpat the plain ill~g of section 156 would provide unwanted
results because Congress may very well have contemplated all the ramifications
of its chosen defi..11Jtion in light of the political realities as seen played out in the

over the statute's meaning. Of course, the language of the statute itself is always the
best indication of Congressional intent. Abbott [applicant] argues, with the support of
the Federal Circuit, that the "plain meaning" of the language supports its interpretation.
Both Abbott [applicant] and the Federal Circuit [citing Glaxo] . . . focus only on the
phrase "active ingredient," claiming it has a well understood meaning . . . . [f]he
government . . . reads the . . . phrase ("including any ester or salt of the active
ingredient") to pennit aJl interpretation of "active ii1gredier1t" ta'"'ARt i.."'lcludes even more
tlmn salt or ester derivatives. According to the government, that phrase can be
interprcted to mean that Congress was using the term active ingredient loosely, possibly
as a virtual synonym for active moiety.

/d. at 987. This is what the Commissioner of the PrO essentially argued in Giaxo. See
Glaxo, 894 F.2d at 394. The Abbott court held: "Putting aside for a moment the relative
merits of the various constructions offered, we first conciude the ianguage is ambiguous ...
. " Abbott, 920 F.2d at 987. Although the court did not accept the government's
construction, it stated that:
Once we reject the agency's interpretation of the statute as unreasonable it does not
follow that appellant's competing construction must be adopted. Even if we thought
appellant's interpretation were reasonable we could not acc...yt it if we perceived still
other possible reasonable constructions. h is, qfier all, for the agency to make the
choice between Sl4clz ahernatives.
/d. at 988 (emphasis added). The court, in remanding the case to the district court

instructing the latter to remand to the agency, stated: "We hold only that the statute is
ambiguous [and given that both constructions were unreaso11able] ... we may not proceed
since we have no authority to place a construction on the statute that the agency has not
offered." ld. at 989.
300 Glaxo, 894 F.2d at 396. Traditionally, the Plain Meaning Rule was usually
inapplicable if it would lead to absurd results. See United States v. Missouri Pacific R.R.
Co., 278 U.S. 269, 278 (1929) ("[WJhere language of an enactment is clear and
construction according to its terms does not lead to absurd and impracticable consequences,
the words employed are to be taken as the final expression of the meaning intended.")
(emphasis added).

L
l:c
I.
I
I
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legislative process, and we must assume it did. ,301
However, it is just as likely, if not more likely, that Congress did not
foresee "all of the ramifications of its chosen definition." This lack of
congressional foresight is one of the major benefits of deferring to an agency's
interpretation.302
Furthermore, Congress explicitly delegated to the Commissioner the
authority to ,determine if,!!_,P~!lt is eligi~Jor a termj~J(tension, and the court
in Glaxo conceded as much. 303 As such, an argument can be made that the
Commissioner should have the authority to define the statutory terms related to
a patent extension determination. However, the court, based on the "plain
meaning of 'product,'" stated that all Congress delegated to the Commissioner
was the authority to determine "whether any patented chemical compound
named in a patent term extension application fell within the statutory definition
of 'product,' but not what 'product' was to mean. "304
This conclusion not only igilores Ozevron, but the realities of a patent term
extension determination as well. Although the court said that the determination
in question was not based on policy, but "a narrow dissection of statutory
language," it seems that policy is a factor and in order to make an informed
patent term extension determination, the Commissioner should be given greater
deference in defining what a "product" is.3os A determination of whether a
301 Glaxo, 894 F.2d at 397.
302 See Sunstein, Law and Administration, supra note 5, at 2088:
Sometimes regulation is made more difticuh because of the pervasive problem of
changed circumstances. New developments involving technological capacity,
economics, the international situation, or even law may affect regulatory performance.
Congress is unable to amend every statute to account for these changes, a situation that
creates a genuine problem for those who must apply the statute. . . . In these
circumstances, a grant of interpretive authority to administrators, allowing them to take
changed circumstances into consideration, seems to be a valuable if partial corrective.

Id.; see also Scalia, supra note 5, at 517-18.
303 See 35 U.S.C. § 156(e)(1) (1988), stating that:
A determination that a patent is eligtble for extension may be made by the
Commissioner solely on the basis of the representations contained in the application for
the extension. If the Commissioner determines that a patent is eligtbie for extension ...
the Commissioner shall issue to the applicant for the extension of the term of the patent
a certificate of extension ....

Jd.

304 Glaxo, 894 F.2d at 399.
305 See Sunstein, Law and Administration, supra note 5, at 2084 n.64 ("Because the
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claimed invention named in a patent term extension application is a "product,"
and a determination of what "product" means are inextricably linked,
especially given the reasonable alternative interpretations of "product," the
requisite tecr.nica! expertise involved, and potential lack of congressional
foresight with respect to new technologies and other unforeseen circumstances.

3. Hoechst AJctiengesellsch~ft v. Quigg
The Federal Circuit's approach to statutory construction in Hoechst
Akfi.engesellschaft v. Quigg,3 06 like that Lr1 Ethicon and GlaJt.o, stops at step one
of Chevron. The issue in Hoechst centered around the meaning of the phrase
"regulatory review period."
In Hoechst, the patent owner filed an application with the PTO to have the
term of its patent ('433 patent) extended under 35 U.S.C. § 156. The
Commissioner denied the application because the patent owner's product was
not subject to a "'reguiatory review period" set forth in 35 U.S.C.
§ 156(a)(4).307 The phrase "regulatory review period" is def1n.ed i.Il 35 U.S.C.
§ 156(g): "For purposes of this section, the term 'regulatory review period' has
the following meanings: (l)(A) In the case of a product which is a new drug,
antibiotic drug, or human biological product, the term means the period
described in subparagraph (B) to which the limitations described in paragraph
(6) applies. "303
In rejecting the term extension application, t.h.e Corrunissioner argued t.h.at
"the language [in § 156(g)(l)(A)] 'to which the lLrnitation described in
paragraph (6) applies' . . . incorporates the paragraph (6) limitations into the
definition of a regulatory review period. " 309 Because none of the lLrnitations (or
categories) set forth in paragraph (6) applied to the '433 patent, 3 1° the patent,
delegation to the agency to implement the statute is . . . permissible, the delegation of
power to give meaning to statutory terms should be seen as a legitimate part of the authority
of implementation.").
306 917 F.2d 522 (Fed. Cir. 1990).

307 ld. at 523.
303 35 U.S.C. § 156(g) (1988) (emphasis added).
309 Hoechst, 917 F.2d at 525.
310 /d. at 525. Section 156(g)(6) sets forth three limitations. Subparagraph (A) pertains

to patents issued after the enactment of the Patent Term Extension Act. The '433 patent was
issued before the enactment of the Act. Subparagraph (B) pertains to patents that issued
prior to the Act but only if no FDA exemption had been applied for as of the date of
enactment of the Act. The owner of the '433 patent applied for an exemption at the time of
enactment of the Act. Lastly, subparagraph (C) applies to patents which issued prior to the
enactment of the Act if the regulatory review period had begun but commercial marketing
and use had not yet been approved. The '433 patent had already been approved before the
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according to the Commissioner, did not undergo a "regulatory review period."
Needless to say, the patent owner asserted that the limitations of paragraph (6)
are not part of the definition of regulatory review period "and are thus not part
of the statute's eligibility requirements. "311
The district court, stating that there was "sufficient ambiguity in that
[statutory] language to accommodate and bear the weight of both positions,"
,~,held, for the, ..Gammissioner .lH The district court based its holding on an
extensive review of the legislative history.313
On appeal, the Federal Circuit analyzed the statutory language within the
confines of the Chevron doctrine, and, after reciting the plain meaning rule,
agreed with the district court that the statutory language of 35 U.S.C.
§ 156(g)(l)(A) was ambiguous. 314 However, the court proceeded to examine
the legislative history in great detail and eventually reached a conclusion
opposite to that of the district court and Commissioner.3 15 The Federal Circuit
initially stated that "the legislative history is silent" as to whether Congress
intended the '433 patent "and those similarly situated patents for drugs
approved shortly before enactment of the Act, to be eligible for a term
extension. "316 However, the court proceeded to say that the "legislative history
is not silent" with respect to whether § 156(g)(6) is part of the definition of
"regulatory review period, "31 7 and cited the following language to support its
holding that "[i]t is clear from the ... House Report that Congress intended ..
. Section 156(g)(6) to be a limitation on the extension term" and not part of its
definition: 318
1he dqinition of the various regulatory review periods is in sedions 156(g)(l)(3) . . . . 1he additional limitation on the period of extension is found in
seaion ... [156(g)(6)]. That section provides different maximum periods of
extension depending on whether the approved product was developed before or
after the date of enactment.319

enactment of the Act. See 35 U.S.C. § 156(g) (1988).
311 Hoechst; 917 F.2d at 525.
3 12 Hoechst Aktiengesellschaft v. Quigg, 724 F. Supp. 398, 401-03 (E.D. Va. 1989),
rev'd, 917 F.2d 522 (Fed. Cir. 1990). The district court judge in Hoechst, Thomas Selby
Ellis, ill, also wrote the Glaxo opinion.
313 Hoechst, 724 F. Supp. at 401-03.
314 Hoechst, 917 F.2d at 526.
315 /d. at 527.
316 /d.
317 /d.
318 /d.
319 /d. The court also stated: "Whether a drug has undergone a regulatory review

1494

OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 56:1415

After reaching its conclusion, based on a reading of the legislative history,
that § 156(g)(6) is only a limitation and not part of the definition of "regulatory
review period," the court began to speak in terms of the plain meaning rule as
if the statute were unambiguous on its face.320
However, the statute is not clear and unambiguous. The Commissioner's as
well as the district court's interpretation of § 156(g) is as reasonable as the
Federal Circuit's interpret@on. The legislative history suggested that Congress
wished to provide different periods of extension depending on: (1) when the
patent was issued; (2) whether the patent owner applied for an exemption
before enactment of the Act; and (3) whether the FDA approved the patent for
commercial marketing and use before enactment of the Act. If, after
considering these three limitations, a patent falls outside the limitations, one
could rea$onably conclude, as did the Commissioner and district court, that
Congress did not contemplate a term extension for these types of patents.
The point that I want to make with respect to the Hoechst case is not so
much t:Jiat the Federal Circuit's conclusion was wrong; rather, both the
Conu!llssioner's and the Federal Circuit's Lnterpretations were r6ll~~nable, a..nd
given these alternative reasonable interpretations and ambiguous statutory
language, the court should have deferred to the PT0.32 1 After citing the
Chevron doctrine and stating that the statutory language was ambiguous, the
period and the related patent is eligible for a term extension and how that extension should
be limited are two completely different issues." ld.
320 For example, the court, towards the end of the opinion, stated: "[W]e conclude
that the district court's assignment of a zero term extension to the '433 patent is erroneous
because it is speculative and disregards express provisions of the statute which render the
'433 patent eligible for a term extension." ld. at 528 (emphasis added). According to the
Federal Circuit: "[W]e are convinced that the plain language of the statute and the relevant
legislative history mandate that a term extension be given the '433 patent .... " ld. at 529
(emphasis added). This language appears to contradict the court's assertion, earlier in the
opinion, that "'there is sufficient ambiguity in [the statutory language] . . . . '" ld. at 526
(quoting HoediSt, 724 F. Supp. at 401).
321 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc,, 467 U.S.
837, 843 (1984). "[I]fthe statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the
question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction
of the statute." ld. at 843. "The court need not conclude that the agency construction was
the only one it permissibly could have adopted to uphold the construction, or even the
reading the court would have reached if the question initially had arisen in a judicial
proceeding." ld. at 843 n.ll; see also Abbott Laboratories v. Young, 920 F.2d 984, 988
(D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 819 (1991) ("Even if we thought appellant's
interpretation were reasonable we could not accept it if we perceived still other possible
reasonable constructions. It is, after all, for the agency to make the choice between such
alternatives.").
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court could have easily deferred to the Commissioner's interpretation. Instead,
the Federal Circuit mined the legislative history to find statutory meaning and
reached a conclusion which, although reasonable, is no more convincing than
the conclusion reached by the Commissioner and district court. Again, the
court's "traditional tools of statutory construction" avoided step two of

Chevron.
B. Missed Opportunities
In two statutory construction cases where the Federal Circuit did not apply
the Chevron doctrine, a strong argument can be made that the same result
would have been reached if the doctrine had been applied. The first case could
have been decided at step one of Chevron, whereas the second decision
strongly lent itself to a step two resolution.

1. In re Donaldson
Some background discussion of In re Donaldson3 22 would be helpful
before the case itself is discussed. The PTO has traditionally interpreted claims
of a patent as broadly as reasonably possible, while affording the patent
applicant the opportunity to file amendments to avoid prior art references.- As
part of this practice, the PTO has asserted that it is entitled to read a meanspliis-furicti"ori clahn323 independent of any structure put forth in the
specification. This practice was at odds with 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 6,
which reads:
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step
for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or
acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the

con-esponding strudure, material, of ads described in the specification and

equivalents thereoj. 324

The PTO's apparent disregard for § 112, paragraph 6 was criticized by the

322 16 F.3d 1189 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
323 A means-plus-function claim allows the patent applicant to recite, in her claim, a
"means" for performing some specified function as put forth in the specification of the
patent application. For example, instead of claiming "a wooden leg nailed to a chair," the
applicant, using means-plus-function language, could claim "a means for attaching a
wooden leg to a chair." The means (e.g., nails, screws, glue, etc.) would be specified in the
specification.
324 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988) (emphasis added).
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Federal Circuit,325 but the PTO rebuffed the court's criticism as non-binding
dicta. Thereafter, the Federal Circuit restated its contention that the PTO is
bound by 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 6. 326 Again, the PTO ignored the
court's ruling and issued a directive to its examiners stating that the PTO is not
bound by the statute. 327
This dispute culminated in In re Donaldson. In Donaldson, the Federal
Circuit invoked the plain meaning rule:
The plain and unambiguous meaning of [Section 112] paragrnph six is that one
construing means-plus-function language in a claim must look to the
specification and interpret that language in light of the corresponding structure,
material or acts described therein, and equivalents thereof, to the extent that the
specification provides such disclosure . . . . [The statute] does not state nor
even suggest that the PTO is exempt from this xrumdate, and there is no
legislative history to indicate that Congress meant that the PTO should be.
The Commissioner argues that his interpretation is entitled to deference in
view of what the Commissioner alleges is the PTO's sweeping and iongstanding practice of not applying p&~gruph six dur~~g examination. We
disagree. The fuct that the F'TO may have failed to adhere to a statutory
m.~mdate over an extended period of time does not justify its continuing to do
so.32H

This case was decided correctly. What is missing from the court's analysis,
however, is the application of the Chevron doctrine. Clearly, this case would
not have proceeded beyond step one of Chevron in that Congress had "directly
spoken to the precise question at issue" (i.e., A means-plus-function claim
"shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure . . . described in the
specification and equivalents thereof."). 329 Why the court did not apply the
Chevron framework is somewhat puzzling, given the fact that it was applied or
at least addressed in Ethicon, Glaxo, and Hoechst. In these cases, Chevron
deference to the PrO was circumvented by the court's textualist approach to
statutory construction or aggressive analysis of the legislative history. In
Dom:ddson, more than in any of three previously discussed cases, the statutory
language was dear and lent itself to only one interpretation.

325 See In re Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
326 See In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
327 See PTO L~,sues Directive to Examiners on Means-Plus-Function Equivalency,
supra note 19, at411-12.
328 Donaldson, 16 F.3d at 1193-94.
329 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. g37,
842(1984).
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2. In re Alappat
In re Alappafo3° provided the Federal Circuit with another opportunity to
apply the Chevron doctrine. Alappat involved the statutory interpretation of 35
U.S.C. § 7(b).33I Although I recited the pertinent facts in Part ll.A.l. above, it
would be helpful if I restate them here.
'~ Alappat,~1i·t:lifet7-member BPAI reversed an examiner's non"'statutory
subject-matter rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The examiner requested
reconsideration of this decision, arguing that the BPAI's ruling was contrary to
PTO policy. Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 7(b), the Commissioner designated an
eight panel board, including the three original panel members, which not only
granted the examiner's request for reconsideration, but reversed the original
panel's decision. Section 7(b) states, in relevant part: "Each appeal and
interference shall be beard by at least three members of the [BPAI], who shall
be designated by the Commissioner. Only the [BPAI] has the authority to grant
rehearings. "332
Alappat argued that only the BPAI has authority to grant rehearings, not
the Commissioner. The Federal Circuit disagreed. After citing the plain
meaning rule, the court held:
We ... interpret the Commissioner's express statutory authority to designate
the members of a panel hearing an appeal as extending to designation of a
panel to consider a request for a rehearing pursuant to section 7(b). There is no
indication to the contrary in the statute, and we have found no legislative
history indicating a clear Congressional intent that the Commissioner's
authority to designate the members of a Board panel be limited to exercising its
rehearing authority only through the panel which rendered an original
decision. 333

330 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
331 The case also involved the interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 101, but that is not
directly relevant to the present discussion.
332 35 U.S.C. § 7(b) (1988Y(em:phasis added).
333 Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1533. To make this determination, the court had to rule that
the BPAI is, for the most part, subservient to the Commissioner. For example, the court
stated:
Even though [BPAI] members seiVe an essential function, they are but examineremployees of the PfO, and the ultimate authority regarding the granting of patents lies
with the Commissioner. For example, if the Board rejects an application, the
Commissioner can control the PfO's position in any appeal through the Solicitor of the
PfO; the Board cannot demand that the Solicitor attempt to sustain the Board's position.
Conversely, if the Board approves an application, the Commissioner has the option of

1498

OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 56:1415

Therefore, according to the Federal Circuit, "we find the Commissioner's
interpretation of section 7 to be a reasonable one entitled to deference, given
that neither the statute itself nor the legislative history thereof indicates
congressional intent to the contrary. "334
The statutory language was ambiguous, although the Federal Circuit did
not expressly admit such. On one hand, the Com..missioner is given the
_ authority tQ designate BPA_l panels of"at least three members. On the other
hand, the statute states that only the BPAI can grant rehearings. The statute
neither explicitly states, nor denies, that the ColD!uissioner has the authority to
designate a._n expanded panel to consider a request for a rehearing. This
ambiguity is manifested by the fact that the Federal Circuit interpreted the
Commissioner's authority, as did the Commissioner, to designate BPAI
members "as extending to designation of a panel to consider a request for
rehearing ... , "335 and held the Commissioner's interpretation is "reasonable"
and "entitled to deference. " 336 In light of this ambiguity, the Federal Circuit
recognized this case as one involving a policy deterrr.Ji1ation,337 could have
decided t~is issue at step tv:,ro of tl}e Ch.evron doctrL'le.

refusing to sign the patent .... The Commissioner has an obligation to refuse to grant a
patent if he believe!! that doing so would be contrary to law. The foregoing evidences
that the Board iB merely the highest level of the Examining Corps, and like all other
members of the Examining Corps, the Board operates subject to the Commissioner's
overall ultimate authority and responsibility ....
. . . Congress clearly did not intend the [BPAI] to be independent of any and
all oversight by the Commissioner.

ld. at 1535-36.
334 ld. at 1532-33.
335 ld. at 1533 (emphasis added).
336 ld. at 1532-33.
337 In this vein, the Federal Circuit stated:
[WJe acknowledge the considerable debate and concern among the patent bar and
certain Board members regarding the Commissioner's limited ability to control
deciBions through his authority to designate Board panels. Our responsibility, however,
iB merely to adjudge whether the Commissioner's designation practices as they were
applied in this particular case resulted in a valid decision over which this court may
exerciBe subject matter jurudiction, not to assess whether they were sound from a
public policy standpoint. We leave to the JegiBiature to determine whether any
restrictions should be placed on the Commissioner's authority in this regard. Absent
any Congressional intent to impose such restrictions, we decline to do so sua sponte.

ld. at 1536.
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IV. POUCY AND THE PTO
A primary concern in administrative law focuses on whether the agency or
the court should have the authority to interpret a particular statutory provision.
In Part ll, I explored this question in the context of the PrO's congressional
delegation to examine and issue patents. In this section, I step outside the
confines of delegated authority and focus; on the comparative advantages of the
PTO in determining patentability.
A commentator, five years before Graham was decided, put forth a policy
argument which purportedly supports the Graham decision. This argument
emphasized the comparative advantages of an appellate court over a trial court
in making a patentability detennination:
The real question thus is whether a trial court is better able than an appellate
court to determine the presence or absence of invention. . . . A trial judge is
likely to be neither more able nor more expert than an appellate judge in this
respect. He is, therefore, in no better position to decide whether a given set of
facts falls within the legislative standard.
An ambiguous standard like the 'ordinary artisan' cannot be clarified by
general principles since the factual situation upon which those principles would
depend is not likely to recur. If appellate courts are to perform their function of
clarifying legislative terms at all, they must do so in such cases through
application of the standard. The cardinal point therefore is that invention is
largely a question of policy, and if it is to be decided by the court at all, as it
must under the general standard of the Patent Act, the opinion of the trial judge
should not be fina1.3 3 8

Based on its current judicial review standards, the Federal Circuit could
adopt this same policy argument with respect to the PTO in that the court
applies the same standards of review to the PTO as it does to a trial court.
Implicit in the Federal Circuit's de novo and clearly erroneous standards of
review is that the court is "better able," or at least in as good a position, to
make patentability determinations than the PTO. This implication, however,
ignores the trenchant policy arguments in support of deference, including the
inherent institutional attributes that the PTO contributes to its patentability
detenninations and statutory interpretations. There are four predominate policy
rationales which ulaf'..ifest 1Ji.is comparative adva."ltage and suggest t.'IJ.at the
balance of interpretive power should lie with the PTO.

338 Comment,

Appellate Review of DetermiiUJJions of Patentable Inventions, 29 U.

Cm. L. REv. 185, 195-97 (1961).

::·.;·
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A. The Economics of PaJentability Detennination.s
Technology is transient and iS persistently changing in unforeseeable ways.
Yesterday there was the light bulb; today there are the human genome and
DNA sequences. Patentability determinations must take into consideration the
ephemeral nature of technology and its effect on society. Furthermore, a
. T<patentability""'determination should go beyond the" technology"han<L become
familiar with industry practices which beget technological innovation, that is,
the research and development decision making processes as they relate to
patentability. The economic literature on patents suggests that the research and
development decisions of certain industries are influenced by the prospect of
patentability and patentability standards. 339 As Professor Merges has stated:
"Indeed, because the [patentability] standard will influence [R & D] decisions,
courts charged with interpreting the nonobviousness standard ought to be
cognizant of its impact on the behavior of firms, and ought to modify it where
necessary to carry out the underlying goals of the patent system. "340
Although the courts should have an understanding of the impact of
patentability standards, instead of speaking in terms of the "courts charged with
interpreting" these standards, it makes more sense, from an administrative law
perspective, to refer to the PTO as "charged with interpreting" patentability
requirements. The fact that the Federal Circuit, not unlike all Article m courts,
is institutionally removed from the day to day operations of the private
Lndustrial sector a.nd deal with legal problems episodically, highlights one of
the major advantages of the PTO as an agency.
For example, the PTO has the institutional capability to conduct public
339

See supra note 13.
340 See Merges, supra note 14, at 12. Professor Merges further stated:
The standard of patentability is assumed to have behavioral effects and thus merits
careful review. Firms will say, "Look, Finn A got a patent for doing that risky
research; let's do some risky research ourselves." There are several reasons to believe
the patent standard has such effects. Detailed case studies show that almost every finn
at least tries to evaluate the cost effectiveness of proposed research and development
projects. R&D managers also consider "patentability" or "patent strength" prior to
investing in R&D projects. Thus the prospect of getting a patent may enter into the
initial project investment or selection choice. If so, the standard of patentability enters at
this stage. Even for firms whose research proceeds further before making a detailed
cost/benefit analysis, patentability might enter in the very rough (and sometimes
implicit) economic feasibility decisions made by the R&D department at the outset of
the research project.

Jd. at 10-12.
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bearings specifically targeted to particular industries.3 41 This mechanism allows
the PTO to familiarize itself with the nature of the technology as well as how
the iildustry perceives the patentability requirements and the effect of those
standards on the industry's R&D decision making process and overall
competitiveness in the international market. 342 This point cannot be
. ~4l':Forexample; the:PTO held public hearings on October 17, 1994 and Jan\lal';};,~,.
27, 1994 with the biotechnology and computer software industries, respectively. See Patent
and Trademark Office: Biotech Industry Blasts PTO at San Diego Hearing, 48 Pat.
Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 677 (Oct. 20, 1994); Patent and Trademark Office: PTO
Hears from Silicon Valley on Patent Protection for Software, 47 Pat. Trademark &
Copyright J. (BNA) 3(17 (Feb. 3, 1994). On July 20, 1994, the PTO held hearings on the
nonobviousness standard as applied by PTO examiners. See Patent and Trademark Office:
Biotech Industry Blasts PTO at San Diego Hearing, supra, at 677. At the public hearings
relating to the biotechnology industry, the PTO sought to get feedback from the industry
concerning a number of unsettled issues. Specifically, (1) the legal standards relating to
§ 101 utility; (2) the enablement and operability requirements under § 112; and (3) the
level of ordinary skill in the art under § 103. Over fifty witnesses testified and most offered
constructive criticism of the PTO's application of the patentability requirements and offered
several suggestions for improving the examination of biotech patent applications. See Patent
and Trademark Office: Biotech Industry Blasts PTO at San Diego Hearing, supra, at 677.
The computer software hearings were held to elicit public comment on several issues,
"including the possible need for new standards of patentability and/or a new form of
protection for software-related inventions, and th~ adequacy of the current examination
process for software applications." In short, the hearings were designed to ascertain "just
how much patent protection is enough, and whether the current system stifles rather than
encourages development for the nation's software producers." See Patent and Trademark
Office: PTO Hears from Silicon Valley on Patent Protection for Software, supra, at 307.
With respect to the nonobviousness hearings, the PTO invited public comment on whether
the United States patent policy is being effectively served by the current standard of
nonobviousness. A vast array of suggestions were made both supporting and criticizing the
current nonobviousness standard and the application of such. Indeed, these hearings are
extremely informative and enable the PTO to better understand how each patentability
requirement affects the behavior of various industries.
342 See Interview with Lehman, supra note 20. According to the Commissioner:
Under my regime, we have instituted this policy of public hearings and, on a policy
basis, we can reach out to the world in a way that is entirely impossible for the Federal
Circuit. All the Federal Circuit can do is all that it is ethically permitted to do. That is to
read the briefs and listen to the oral arguments of the parties. This is not remotely clo~e
to the fact, infonnation, and policy gathering apparatus that we have here, where not
only can we rely on our internal staff of literally thousands of technical people,
examiners and lawyers, but also our capacity to reach out and have public hearings; to
meet and talk with people in the bar, all of these various groups that deal with this
office. So by failing to give deference to us, the Federal Circuit is just shutting
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overemphasized. The pharmaceutical, biotechnology, computer software, and
chemical industries, to name but a few, annually spend billions of dollars on
R&D. Each of these industries is unique, and each has a different perception of
how the patentability requirements affect their R&D decisions. As such, the
PTO is uniquely positioned to engage these industries and has the institutional
flexibility to "modify [the patentability requirements] where necessary to carry
out the underlying goal~ ofthepatent:system. " 3 ~~ _,.....

1. The Problem of "Capture"
Capture has been defined as when an agency "favors the concerns of the
industry it regulates, which is well-represented by its trade groups and lawyers,
over the interests of the general public, which is often unrepresented. "344
There is a potential problem with agency capture with respect to patentability
determinations. During these public hearings held by the PTO, the testimonials
are usually, if not always, from large corporations from various industries,
including the pharmaceutical, biotechnology, and computer software industries.
It is a rare occasion when societal concerns are heard. The public is simply left
out of the decision making process and becomes detached, thus perhaps
endangering the credibility of the patent examination process. Yet just how this
one sided approach has affected PTO rulemaking or adjudication is unclear.
themselves off from the benefit of this internal mechanism. I think they are being very
reckless, frankly, with one of the most critical areas of United States law.

ld.
343 See Merges, supra note 14, at 12; see also Scalia, supra note 5, at 517 ("[O]ne of
the major advantages [of Olevron] •.• is to permit needed flexibility, and appropriate
political participation in the pOlitical process. One of the major disadvantages of having the
courts resolve ambiguities is that they resolve them forever and ever; only statutory
amendment can produce a change."); Sunstein, Law and Administration, supra note 5, at
2088 asserts:
Sometimes regulation is made more difficult because of the pervasive problem of
changed circumstances. New developments involving technological capacity,
economics, the international situation, or even law may affect regulatory perfo!!!'J!nc.e.
Congress is unable to amend every statute to account for these changes, a situation that
creates a genuine problem for those who must apply the statute. Here as well,
administrators are in a far better position than courts to interpret ambiguous statutes in a
way that takes account of new conditions.
344

RicHARD J.

ed. 1992).

PIERCE, JR. ET. AL., ADMINISTRATNE LAw AND PROCESS§ 1.7.2 (2d
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Furthermore, some have argued that the Federal Circuit, and not just the PTO,
may be susCeptible to capture. 345 With both the court and the PTO potentially
subject to capture, one can argue that the overall policy considerations tip the
scale in favor of deference to the PTO with respect to patentability
determinations.

B. Security in Property Rights '"'·' .
We as a society, protective of our public domain, are concerned that
patents not issue to applicants who fail to satisfy the requisite patentability
requirements. Patents that never should have issued because of unknown prior
art at the time of examination should be invalidated and removed from the
protectorate of our patent laws. On the other hand, with an eye towards
encouraging innovation, 346 we should be sensitive to the notion of security in
property rights. A patentee should have a certain degree of security in the
validity of her patent and a reasonable expectation that she will be able to
recoup her research and development expenditures without living in fear of
constant invalidity challenges.347 As Judge Plager has stated:
345 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Qrczdt: A Case Study in Spedalized
Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 68 (1989) ("Of course, specialization poses the risk of bias,
and without public confidence in the court's neutrality, its ability to expolit the benefits of
specilization will be compromiSed."); Thomas K. Landry, Certainty and Discretion in
Patent Law: The On Sale Bar, The Doctrine of Equivalents, and Judidal Power in the
Federal Orcuit, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1151, 1206 (1994) ("[S]pecializ.ation widens the gap
between the public and the decisionmaker. Authoritatively as well as geographically, the
public loses sight as bureaucratization removes to expert control. The interested public is
redefined to include only those who are part of the same specialized subculture as the
decisionmaker. "); cf. Owen M. Fiss, The Bureaucratization of the 1udidary, 92 YALE L.J.
1442, 1466 (1983)("Establishing specialized courts also raises questions about the value of a
general, non-specialized perspective on legal issues.... [The judgments of a non-specialist
have] less chance of capture by a special interest group. I would [therefore] ... confine this
strategy [of creating specialized courts] to areas where there is less value to the generalist's
insight and less danger of capture.")
346 See supra note 13 for economic justifications for a patent system; see also Patlex
Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 599 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("The encouragement of
investment-based risk is the fundamental purpose of the patent grant .... ").
347 The Federal Circuit has recognized this expectation aspect of a patentee's property
interest. See Patlex, 758 F.2d at 599.
[W]e would not belabor the point that patent property rights, necessarily including
the right 'to license and exploit patents,' fall squarely within both classical and judicial
definitions of protecbble property. Suffice to cite the scholarship of Jeremy Bentham,
who defined property as "the collection of rules which are presently accepted as
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I can't imagine an administrative law arrangement where you get a license, a
permit, a grant, which people can challenge time and time again . . . . It not
only surprises me, it amazes me. Why would you possibly imve a system that
gives you a government grant which is little more than a right to litigate?
That's what it really is-a federal right to litigate. Well, when I make a great
invention I don't want a fedeml right to litigate-! want a protected property
interest in that invention. 341!
-',,

-

By second guessing the PrO's patentability determinations in the form of
de novo and the clearly erroneous review, the Federal Circuit infuses a degree
of insecurity in a patentee's property interest which may adversely affect
innovation and frustrate the patentee's proprietary expectations. As discussed
above, this does not mean that the Federal Circuit should give Chevron
deference to the PrO if unexamined prior art is discovered. But if the PTO did
consider the prior art reference which is reasserted by an alleged infringer, the
court should apply the Chevron doctrine when reviewing the validity of the
challenged patent. Furthermore, the court's standards of review encourage
unnecessary litigation in that potential patent infringers, lrnowing they will be
able to subject a patent to de novo review, are more likely to challenge a
patent's validity than if the review were more deferential to the PrO.
Lastly, although the PTO's affirmance rate is approximately 89%,349 a.n
argument can be made that this affirmance rate does not foster the requisite
degree of security in property rights that is necessary for sustained and
innovative research and development Wnat if one out of every ten real
property deeds resulted in a conveyance of false title? Indeed, the Federal
Circuit has held that patents are property just as much as land:
It is beyond reasonable debate that patents are property. In Consolidated
Fruit Jar Co. v. Wright, . .. the Supreme Court stated: "A patent for an
invention is as much property as a patent for land. The right rests on the same
foundation and is surrounded and protected by the same sanctions. . . .
[P]atents are property and therefore subject to the principles of eminent
domain. "350
governing the exploitation and enjoyment of resources. So regarded, property becomes
a basis of expectations founded on existing rules . . . . It is supposed that men will not
labor diligently or invest fuxly li!lJe..ss they know they ea.!'! dep-~d on rules which assure
them that they will indeed be permitted to enjoy a substantilll share of the product as the
price of their labor or their risk of savings."

/d. (emphasis added).
348 See Interview with Judge Plager,
349 See supra note 106.
350 See Pat/ex,

758 F.2d at 599.

supra note 1, at 6.
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C. PTO Expertise and Scientific Complexity
Agency expertise has long been a justification for according deference. 351
It is axiomatic that patentability detenninations are highly technical and
complex and r~ire a great deal of technical expertise. The subject matter of a
claimed'- inventren~·''ean ~'tange·~lfe>m' bioteclmology and pharmaceuticals to
computer software and semiconductor chips. A firm grasp of the technology
and how it relates to the patentability requirements are essential in making a
351 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resouces Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
865 (1984). ("In these cases, the Administrator's interpretation represents a reasonable
accommodation of manifestly competing interests and is entitled to deference: the regulatory
scheme is technical and complex."); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S.
633, 651-52 (1990) ("[A]gency expertise is one of the principal justifications behind
O!evron deference."); see also Aluminum Co. of America v. Central Lincoln Peoples' Util.
Dist., 467 U.S. 380, 389-90 (1984), stating that:

We have often noted that the inte1pretation of an agency charged with the
administration of a statute is entitled to substantial deference. . . . To uphold [the
agency's intelpretation] we need not find that its construction is the only reasonable
one, or even that it is the result we would have reached had the question arisen in the
first instance in judicial proceedings . . . . We need only conclude that it is a reasonable
intelpretation of the relevant provision . . . . These principles of deference have
particular force in the context ofthis case. The subject under regulation is technical and

complex.
/d. (emphasis added); Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966). In
Federal Power Comm'n v. Florida Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453, 463 (1972), the
Court stated:
A court must be reluctant to reverse results supported by such a weight of considered

and carefully articulated expert opinion. Particularly when we consider a purely factual
question within the area ·of competence of an administrative agency created by
Congress, and when resolution of that question depends on 'engineering and scientific'
considerations, we recognize the relevant agency's technical expertise and experience
and tkjer to its analysis unless it is without substantial basis in fact.

/d. (emphasis added). The Federal Circuit has also recognized that expertise is a factor in
the area of international trade. See Consumer Products Div., SCM Co1p. v. Silver Reed
American, Inc., 753 F.2d 1033, 1039 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("In determining whether a
regulation is reasonable, we must give considerable deference to the expertise of the agency
[ITA], i.e., the 'master of the subject.'"); Avesta AB v. United States, 914 F.2d 233, 237
(Fed. Cir. 1990), cerl. denied, 499 U.S. 920 (1991) (referring to expertise ofiTC).
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patentability determination.
The Federal Circuit's current standards of judicial review discount, if not
completely ignore, the considerable scientific expertise of the PTO and its
u..nJque w.stitutio!l:~l capability to engage in patentability determinations.352
Every patent examiner possesses a technical undergraduate degree and many
have doctorates in their respective disciplines. The examiners must also
graduate from the Patent Academy; 35l and"the judges~sitting on the BPAI are,
as required by statute, not only technically proficient, but have law degrees as
weii.354
In one sense, the Federal Circuit's high affirmance rate of issued patents
and BPAI non-section 103 determinations reflects the expertise of the PTQ. 355
Of course, the high affirmance rate is a double-edged sword. That is, if the
Federal Circuit affirms the PTO in a vast majority of cases, what difference
would it make if greater deference were accorded to the PTO? There are three
answers to this question. First, the affirmance rate of § 103 appeals arising
from the BPA1 is relatively low. Second, an 89% a.%·111ance rate of issued
patents mea...n.s that roughly one out of every 10 patents is invalidated. As I
352 See Interview with Lehman, supra note 20.
I think that a nonobvious determination is so cieariy a technicai determination ...
. I mean we have 2000 patent examiners and in the area of biotechnology, we have
over 150 Ph.Ds. How a judge for the CAFC, even if they are a patent lawyer, can
presume to know more about whether something meets that nonobviousness test than a
highly trained, skilled patent examiner, often times with a Ph.D, is beyond me.
!d.
Furthermore, one of the strongest motivating factors behind the enactment of the
reexamination statute is that it permitted an issued patent to be "tested in the Patent Office
where the most expert opinions exist . . . . " See H.R. 1307(1), 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 4
(1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6460, 6463; see also Reiner v. I. Leon Co., 285
F.2d 501, 504 (2d Cir. 1960)(Hand, J.) ("To judge on our own that this or that new
assemblage of old factors was or was not 'obvious' is to substitute our ignorance for the
acquaintance with the subject of those who were familiar with it.").
353 The Patent Academy is a school within the PTO designed to train examiners in the
laws and regulations associated with the patent examination process. The examiner/student
must satisry 114 hours of course work on 36 topics, including 12 hours on the doctrine of
nonobviouness; 5 hours on categories of invention and claim construction; 5.5 hours on
novelty/anticipation; and 4.5 hours on appeals to the BPAI.
354 See 35 U.S.C. § 7(a) (1988) ("The examiners-in-chief shall be persons of
competent legal knowledge and scientific ability . . . • The Commissioner, the Deputy
Commissioner, the Assistant Commissioners, and the examiners-in-chief shall constitute the
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences."
355 See supra note 106.
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discussed above, the invalidation of one out of every 10 patents does not
necessaruy lend itself to an optimal level of security in one's property interest.
Lastly, and most importantly, even if the current affirmance rate has a positive
effect on research and development and fosters a sense of security in property
rights, such does not necessarily mean that the Federal Circuit, with its de novo
and clearly erroneous standards of review, is promoting an efficient judicial
-review mechanism.
'''''"''" ~--· ...,,""..:

1. The Problem of "Reverse Capture"
My appraisal of PTO expertise is not to say that I don't share many of the
concerns of the private bar with respect to the technological competency of the
PTO. Indeed, this is a serious concern, one that can be viewed as a kind of
"reverse capture." That is, the problem is not so much the danger of the PTO
being beholden to private industry, as it is the PTO's inability to competently
understand and apply the ever transient technologies which examiners
encounter daily. Nevertheless, the question remains: Is the Federal Circuit the
most optimal forum to decide patentability? I think the answer is clearly no.
First, there are other cogent policy considerations which outweigh any
technological deficiencies within the PTO. Second, the internal operatioriS of
agencies are executive and congressional concerns. It is not incumbent upon the
judiciary to remedy what it perceives to be agency incompetence. Lastly, every
patent, of course, is not litigated and it is difficult to ascertain the percentage of
patents which should have never been issued. My feeling is that the percentage
is not very high. Then again, many firms decide not to challenge the validity of
a patent, not so much because they believe that the patent is valid, but because
of the costly nature of patent litigation. This leads me once again tO a proposal
I made earlier. That is, one of the best ways to remedy any shortcomings the
PTO may have with respect to technological competency is to introduce a
European-style opposition proceeding into the examination process. But again,
that is a topic for a later time.

D. Judicial Efficiency
A patent application on appeal before the Federal Circuit, before reaching

the court, has been reviewed by not only a patent examiner adept in the
relevant technology, but the BPAI, whose members are technically and legally
proficient.356 Given the technical and legal expertise of the PTO, the Federal
Circuit's de novo and clearly erroneous standards of review foster judicial
356 See 35 U.S.C. § 7(a) (1988).
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inefficiency and call into question the very existence of the PTO.
In In re Vaeck,357 a case in which the panel majority reversed the BPAI's
§ 103 nonobviousness rejection, Judge Mayer, in his dissent, commented on
this inefficiency:
An appeal is oot a second oppnrtunity to try a case or prosecute a parent
application, and we should not allow parties to "undertake to retry_ the entire
case on appeal." But that is precisely what the court has permitted here. The
PrO conducted a thorough examination of the prior art surrounding this patent
application and concluded the claims would have been obvious. The board's

decision based on the examiner's answer which co...._..,.eheusively explains the
rejection is persuasive and shows how the evidence supports the legal
conclusion that the claims would have been obvious. Yet the rourt ignores all
of this and ro1ulucts its own examination, if you will, as though the examiner
and board did 110t exist. Even if I thought this opinion were more persuasive
than the board's, I could 110t join it because it misperceives the role of the
court. Tnere m!!Y be more than one way to look at the prior a.rt, but on this
record we are bound by the PTO's interpretation of the evidence because it is
not clearly erroneous and its conclusion is unassailable. I would affirm on that
basis.35!l

Judge Mayer's dissent, despite its "clearly erroneous" language, nicely
highlights the inefficient nature of de novo review and implicitly calls attention
to the above mentioned policy considerations.
·

V.

CONCLUSION

Throughout this Article, I have asserted that the Federal Circuit's standards
of review and its "traditional tools of statutory construction" result in a less
than optimal balance of interpretive power between itself and the PTO. The
Chevron decision dictates that the Federal Circuit dispense with its de :novo
review and apply the Chevron two-step to questions of patent validity,
especially those iiwolving a nonobviousness determination. Furthermore,
Overton Park, State Fann, and § 706(2)(A) of the APA strongly suggest that
the court stop treating the PrO as if it were an Article m court, and apply the
"arbitrary and capricious" test when reviewing the fact findings of the PrO.
As for the Federal Circuit's review of the Commissioner's statutory
interpretations, the court seems to engage in a searching analysis at step one of
Chevron in an attempt to uncover any semblance of statutory clarity. This
approach to statutory interpretation is troublesome and leads to unconvincing
357

947 F.2d 488 (Fed, Cir. 1991).

35!1 Vaeck, 947 F.2d at 496-97 (M:ayer,

J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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and, at times, irrational holdings. Lastly, I have argued that there are four
policy considerations which suggest that the Federal Circuit should be more
deferential to the PTO. These policy concerns highlight the PrO's institutional
comparative advantages and lend convincing support to my doctrinal assertion
that greater deference is warranted.

